Riyadh Declaration on the Counterterrorism International Conference

August 22, 2010 Leave a comment

Riyadh 25-28/12/1425 (5-8/12/2005)

The participating states at the Counter terrorism international Conference held in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 25-28 Dhul Hijjah 1425H corresponding 5-8 February 2005 which are: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Argentina,, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Spain, Australia, Islamic State of Afghanistan, Federal republic of Germany, State of the United Arab Emirates, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Ukraine, Islamic republic of Iran, republic of Italy, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Kingdom of Bahrain, Republic of Brazil, Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Tunisia, People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Republic of South Africa, Kingdom of Denmark, Russian Federation, Republic of Sri Lanka, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Singapore, Republic of The Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Peoples’ Republic of China, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Iraq, Sultanate of Oman, Republic of France, Republic of Philippines, State of Qatar, Republic of Kazakhstan, Canada, State of Kuwait, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Lebanon, Kingdom of Malaysia, Arab republic of Egypt, Kingdom of Morocco, United kingdom, Republic of India, The Netherlands, United States of America, Empire of Japan, Republic of Yemen, Greece, as well as international, regional and specialized organizations which attended the Conference: The United Nations, Organization of the Islamic Conference, League of Arab States, African Union, European Union, The INTERPOL, Gulf Cooperation Council, Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, Muslim World League.

Express their profound appreciation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for convening and hosting this Conference held under the high patronage of His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Crown Prince and Deputy Premier and Commander of the National Guard.

Commend the spirit of cooperation that prevailed in the Conference and the unanimity of views and positions on the extent of the danger of terrorism and the need to challenge it through united, organized, and long- term international efforts that respect the principles of international law that consolidate the comprehensive and multidimensional role of the United Nations.

Call for fostering the values of understanding, tolerance, dialogue, co-existence, and the rapprochement between cultures to reject the logic of the clash of civilizations. Also, call for fighting any form of thinking that promotes hatred, incites violence, and condones terrorist crimes which can by no means be accepted by any religion or law.

Stress the fact that terrorism has no specific religion, ethnic origin, nationality, or geographic location. In this respect, it is of paramount importance to stress that any attempt to associate terrorism with any given faith will in actual fact only help the terrorists. It should be rejected wholeheartedly. Hence the need to take measures so as not to tolerate any accusations leveled against any religion and to lay the groundwork for understanding and cooperation founded on commonly shared values between countries with varying faiths.

Reiterate their commitment to resolutions issued by the United Nations in the fight against terrorism, which call upon the international community to condemn and combat terrorism by all means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in the view of the fact that terrorists’ acts threaten world peace and security. They also stress that the United Nations is the major forum to promote international cooperation against terrorism and that the relevant Security Council Resolutions constitute a solid and comprehensive foundation for fighting terrorism worldwide. All countries are therefore called upon to comply fully with the provisions of those resolutions.

Stress the fact that any international efforts will not be sufficient to effectively combat this terrorism phenomenon, if it were not to be conducted within the framework of joint actions and an over-all strategic vision. In this respect, they support and adopt the proposal made by HRH the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contained in His Highness’ opening session address, which called for the establishment of an International Counterterrorism Centre staffed by experts in this field in order to share real-time information to adequately prevent attacks before they occur with the ultimate goal of eradicating terrorism.

Encourage individual efforts to expand political participation, achieve sustainable development, and promote the role of the civil institutions to help address the conditions that spawn violence and extremist thinking.

Stress the importance of the role to be played by the media, civil institutions, and educational systems in establishing strategies against terrorists’ propaganda, while setting guidelines for press reports to prevent terrorists from exploiting media outlets for their communication and recruitment.

Request the United Nations to develop international unified criteria to regulate the work of non-profit charitable and humanitarian relief organizations to ensure that they are not exploited for illegal activities.

Call for the promotion of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, on national and bilateral levels, to combat terrorism, money-laundering, weapons and explosives trafficking, and drug smuggling. Also, call for the exchange of experiences and best practices, including training, in order to ensure effectiveness in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

Stress the need to strengthen international measures to monitor the movement of nuclear material and relevant technology, and to support the role of the United Nations in securing nuclear facilities and enacting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 58/48 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Call for the support and assistance to developing countries in combating terrorism, namely, by providing early-warning equipment, crisis management training, and capacity-building measures among first responders.

Develop national legislation and procedures to prevent terrorists from abusing migration and asylum laws to establish safe havens or to use the territory of states as bases for recruiting, training, planning, inciting, or launching of terrorist operations against other states.

Stress the importance of utilizing the media to promote shared values, tolerance, and co-existence and to refrain from publishing material that calls for extremism and violence.

Express solidarity and support for all victims of terrorism


II. Recommendations of the Four Working Groups Adopted by the Plenary Sessions

Recommendations of the First Working Group: The Roots, Culture, and Ideology of Terrorism

1. Terrorism and extremism constitute a continuous threat to the peace, security and stability of all countries and peoples. They should be condemned and comprehensively confronted by a unified and effective global strategy; and an organized international effort underlining the leading role of the United Nations is needed.

2. No matter what pretext terrorists may use for their deeds, terrorism has no justification. Terrorism, under all circumstances, regardless of the alleged motives should be condemned unreservedly.

3. Lack of agreement on a comprehensive definition of terrorism which is acceptable to all hampers international efforts to combat terrorism. Therefore, the problem of definition should be overcome. The proposals contained in the UN High Level Panel Report on New Threats and Challenges could provide a useful basis for a speedy compromise in this field.

4. The violent nature of terrorism forces the international community to concentrate on measures to eliminate terrorist organizations and prevent terrorist acts. On the other hand, it is important to address the factors that provide a fertile ground where terrorism can flourish with a view to contribute to the elimination of terrorism.

5. Serious attempts should be made to solve regional and international conflicts peacefully, so that terrorist organisations are denied the opportunity of exploiting the suffering of peoples under unjust conditions, spreading their misguided ideology and founding a fertile ground for recruitment and for their illegal activities.

6. Terrorism violates the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. Terrorism has no particular religion, race, nationality or a specific geographic region. In this context, it should be underlined that any attempt to couple terrorism with any religion would in fact play into the hands of terrorists and should be strongly rejected. Therefore, measures should be taken to prevent intolerance against any religion and to create an atmosphere of common understanding and cooperation based on shared values among nations belonging to different faiths.

7. Guidelines and codes of conduct should be developed by the appropriate UN bodies to assist states and their law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism while observing their obligations under international law including human rights, humanitarian and refugee laws.

8. National reform efforts of countries aiming at widening political participation and pluralism, achieving sustainable development, reaching social equilibrium and promoting the role of civil society institutions should be supported so as to confront the conditions promoting violence and extremism.

9. Programs should be developed and implemented which are aimed at promoting multicultural and inter-religious dialogue. To this effect, policies and mechanisms should be set to develop educational systems and other sources of socialization in order to strengthen the values of tolerance, pluralism and human co-existence at grassroots level as well as to provide basic knowledge of civilizations and religions and to raise public and mass media awareness of the dangers of terrorism and extremism.
10. Ideas of tolerance and co-existence should be encouraged and mutual understanding on different religions be deepened through public debate and exchange of thoughts. Standards and codes of ethics should be identified to regulate publication or spreading of materials that promote hatred or inciting violence.
11. Special attention should be given to the situation of migrants. In many cases, these people represent “the Other” and are subjected to racism, xenophobia and intolerance. Addressing the fundamental rights of these persons will help bridge the cultural divide. At the same time, migrants should demonstrate willingness to integrate into their host societies.

12. The UN is the main forum for consolidating international cooperation against terrorism. Member states are called to join, ratify without reservation and implement the 12 major international conventions on combating terrorism. The states could benefit whenever appropriate from technical assistance of the UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UNODC. All states should also support the work of the 1267 Committee of the UN Security Council and its Monitoring Team.

13. The UN Security Council resolutions 1267, 1373, 1526, 1540 and 1566 constitute a solid and comprehensive basis for combating terrorism on a universal scale. These resolutions provide a clear road map for the steps that need to be taken. All countries should take necessary measures in order to fully comply with the provisions of the above mentioned Security Council resolutions.

14. The task of creating a universal legal instrument is yet to be fulfilled. The discussions in the UN on a comprehensive convention on terrorism have not moved ahead due to differences on the definition of terrorism. All states should exert further efforts in order to conclude the convention.

15. Special attention should be given to measures aimed at preventing terrorists’ access to weapon of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The earliest possible adoption within the UN of the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism would be a crucial step in this direction.

16. The idea launched by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to establish an international center to combat terrorism should be positively examined and supported.

Recommendations form the Second Working Group: The Relation Between Terrorism and Money Laundering, and Arms and Drug Trafficking Adopted by the Plenary Session

1 Strengthening international, regional and bilateral cooperation among states to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the financial underpinning of terrorism, as well as the activities of organized crime groups, illegal weapons, and explosives trafficking and illicit narcotics trade. Countries should endeavor to create legal frameworks that allow for flexible exchange of information in a flexible way between competent authorities, both domestically, regionally, and internationally.

2. Encouraging countries to fully implement the existing Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) international standards – in particular, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 + 9 Recommendations and the relevant United Nations Conventions and the Security Council Resolutions, as well best practices to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism through:

– strengthening the efforts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in AML/CFT.

– encouraging the countries not subject to mutual evaluation by Financial Action Task Force (FATF), or FATF style regional bodies (FSRBs), to volunteer for assessment by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

– encouraging all countries to develop Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that meet the criterion of Egmont Group Definition and standards, and to have these FIUs join the Egmont Group to share their experience, expertise, and operational information.

3. Asking the United Nations to work together with the FATF and FSRBs to further elaborate international standards to ensure the fulfillment of the Charitable and humanitarian role of charitable and humanitarian role of charities and non-profit organizations by regulating their operations and by preventing their use in illegal activities. The articulation of these standards should be conducted in the context of FATF and FSRBs.

4. Ensuring effective information flow among relevant law enforcement, national security and intelligence agencies with AML/CFT responsibilities. Additionally, countries should to the greatest extent possible ,ensure cooperation among agencies on bilateral, regional, and international basis.

5. Increasing national, bilateral, and regional cooperation and coordination among agencies combating terrorism, as well as money laundering, arms and explosives trafficking and drugs smuggling and supporting the sharing of expertise and experiences, for instance by training, to ensure effectiveness in the fight against terrorists and organized crime.

6. Enhancing laws on combating arms and explosives trafficking and drugs smuggling, money laundering and improving the capacities of law enforcement agencies (including judicial authorities) to implement those laws.

7. Reinvigorating international community efforts to develop and refine mechanisms that enable countries to comply fully with their obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 to freeze without delay the assets of terrorists and those who materially support them. In particular, countries should provide accurate, reliable and complete data at their disposal of any individual name, organization, or entity as well as information on the involvement in terrorism prior to the submission of the designation to the 1267 Committee. Delisting procedures should be established.

8. Encouraging the creation of special domestic bodies that would manage seized and confiscated assets and funds derived from money laundering, terrorism financing, arms and drugs smuggling and organized crime. These funds could be used for strengthening the means allocated to the fight against these forms of crime, as well as to compensate and assist victims of terrorism.

9. Identifying individuals and entities that are suspected of financing terrorism at the national level. At the FIU level, this information could be shared freely and rapidly and in line with the Egmont principles. In the case of the discovery of relevant information, countries should respond through appropriate channels.

10. Encouraging countries to undertake a study to determine the feasibility of implementing a system for collection and analysis, by the FIUs of international wire transfers to facilitate the detection of transactions or patterns that may be indicative of money laundering or financing terrorism.

Recommendation of the Third Working Group: Experiences and Lessons Learned From Counterterrorism Adopted by the Plenary Session

1. The essential basis for success is an effective national cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, which sets out clear and measurable objectives for all relevant departments and agencies, including law enforcement, intelligence, military, interior and foreign affairs.

2. There is a requirement for effective national mechanisms for coordinating the national strategy, in particular the work of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, also in respect to regional and international cooperation.

3. Each nation is affected by the success or failure of others. It is therefore essential to have effective bilateral and multilateral mechanisms underpinned by political will for integrated law enforcement, judicial and intelligence dimensions of co-operation. These could address a range of issues, such as the legal framework for dealing with terrorist groups and their associates, extradition procedures, border controls, protecting ports and maritime transportation. Effective co-operative working is required at all stages of international counter-terrorist operations, including ad hoc multinational teams where appropriate.

4. At international level, success requires the sharing of information, techniques expertise, and equipment. There is value in the establishment of counter terrorism capacity building centres and forums with the objective of improving counter terrorism legislation, offering training and sharing equipment techniques experties for tackling evolving terrorist organizations and methods, such as the use of the internet as a tool for terrorists.

5. It is important, on voluntary basis that funds and other resources, such as high technology equipment, are made available to states needing such assistance, commensurate with the threat they face and the level of their anti-terrorist operations.

6. Counter terrorist measures must be carried out in accordance with domestic and international law, with respect for human rights, also in order not to alienate communities and cause marginalization.

7. A key part of any strategy must be to identify and address factors which can be exploited by terrorists in recruiting new members and supporters.

8. Terrorists thrive on publicity by any means. Mass media, civil society and the educational system can play a crucial role in any strategy to counter terrorist propaganda and claims to legitimacy. Developing methods for reporting on terrorism that would prevent terrorists from exploiting these reports in their communication

9. Any counter terrorism strategy must ensure utmost respect, sensitivity and material assistance for victims of terrorism.

Recommendations of the Fourth Working Group: Terrorist Organizations and Thieir Formation Adopted by the Plenary Session

1. Supporting the call of His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the creation of an international centre for combating terrorism which will undertake, among other things, to develop a mechanism for exchanging information and expertise between states in the field of combating terrorism, and for linking the national centers for combating terrorism with a database which enables the fastest updating of information possible considering that the fight against terrorism is a collective effort requiring maximum cooperation and coordination among states and full readiness to exchange security information and intelligence instantly between specialized organs through secure equipment.

2. Encouraging states to set up national centers specialized in combating terrorism, and calling on them to create similar centers on the regional level to facilitate intelligence sharing, exchange of real time operational information, developing mechanisms and technologies for data collection and analysis to thwart the preparation of terrorist operations and undermine the networks of recruitment, training, support and financing of terrorists, and coordination between relevant international bodies and other regional centers.

3. Inviting Interpol to consider how it could most effectively reinforce its extensive existing work against terrorism, and calling on all members of Interpol to contribute promptly and actively to the maintenance of an up-to-date list of wanted terrorists.

4. Encouraging states to adopt national legislation and procedures capable of preventing terrorists from utilizing asylum and immigration laws to reach safe havens or to use states’ territories as bases for recruitment, training, planning, instigation, and for the launching of terrorist operations against other states.

5. Establishing, whenever appropriate, task forces to fight terrorism in every country that would be composed of elements from law enforcement and task forces and train them to deal with terrorist networks.

6. Developing domestic laws on fighting terrorism by criminalizing all terrorist acts including financing of terrorist activities.

7. Supporting and assisting developing countries in establishing early-warning mechanisms, management of crises and improve capabilities of those dealing with crises and situations of terror.

8. Increasing interaction with the media to enhance people’s awareness as to the dangers of terrorism and so that the media would not be used or manipulated by the terrorists.

9. Strengthening relations with non-government organizations to ensure an effective contribution to information-sharing relating to the fight against terrorism.

10. Establishing an international data base for coordination in respect of stolen passports, and other travel documents, whereby it will be possible to identify the place and numbers of those passports in order to reduce the movements of the terrorists, and encourage adopting high technology-related international criteria through international cooperation and technical assistance as may be necessary to prevent forging passports and using them by terrorist groups to travel from one country to another.

Categories: Uncategorized


August 22, 2010 Leave a comment



Faculty: Prof. Francisco Roman Jr., Prof. Jun Borromeo

Course Description

The IMEST is a 2-unit course consisting of 10 classroom sessions (1 unit) at AIM and a 5-day study tour in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (1 unit). Classroom sessions in KL will be conducted by faculty of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia, or UKM, Malaysia’s No. 1 university, and experts from the Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (Institute for Islamic Understanding Malaysia, or IKIM), a government organization which promotes guidelines for the practice of Islam.

IMEST will introduce students to Islamic business and management practices, with emphasis on Malaysia. In the AIM part of the course, they will be required to read seminal articles and books on the subject and report to the class (different students report each session). There will also be a number of cases on the issues faced by managers in an Islamic business environment. Classes will be scheduled for late afternoons or early evenings in November to minimize conflicts with core-program schedules of non-MBA students. Students will be asked to submit a major paper after the study tour in lieu of a final exam.

In Kuala Lumpur (9 – 14 December), they will attend two days of classes at UKM. They will also have one-and-a-half days visiting places of interest, important to Malaysian/Islamic society and culture. Most meals, except for breakfast, will be hosted by local groups, and lunches may include a talk by a key personality from the private or public sector. There will be at least one company or factory visit, and a “mini job fair” with headhunters and recruiters to discuss the job opportunities and challenges for non-Islamic expatriates.


Sessions 1 & 2: What is Islam?
Friday, 3 November
5:00 – 8:00 pm (refreshments will be served)

Video screening: Gardner, R. (Producer/Director). (2001). Empires. Islam: Empire of Faith. United States: Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).

Session 3: What is Islam? (continued)
Wednesday, 8 November
5:00 – 6:20 pm

Discussion: Gardner, R. (Producer/Director). (2001). Empires. Islam: Empire of Faith. United States: Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).
Read: Horrie, C., Chippindale, P. (2003). What is Islam? A Comprehensive Introduction (Revised & Updated). London: Virgin Books Ltd.

Session 4: Islam and Business
Thursday, 9 November
5:00 – 6:20 pm

Dyad presentation/class discussion: Noor, I. (Ed.). (2002). Islam & Business. Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn Bhd.

Presentors: Gaurav Mahajan and Alok Kumar Singh

Session 5: Islamic Management in Practice
Wednesday, 15 November
6:30 – 7:50 pm

Dyad presentation/class discussion: Amin, A.R. (2004). The Celestial Management (English Ed.). Jakarta: Bening Publishing.

Presentors: Praveen Kuruvalli and Pranay Bhargava

Session 6: Islamic Management in Practice (continued)
Wednesday, 29 November
6:30 – 7:50 pm

Guest speaker: Mr. Albert Ladores

Session 7: Islamic Management in Practice (continued)
Thursday, 30 November
6:30 – 7:50 pm

Dyad presentation/class discussion: Musa, M., & Salleh, S. (Ed.). (2005). Quality Standard From The Islamic Perspective. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM).

Read: [any article or book by Prof. Rene Domingo on TQM]

Presentors: Fahim Saleem and Md. Abbas

Session 8: Islamic Banking and Finance
Wednesday, 6 December
6:30 – 7:50 pm
Benpres Room
Dyad presentation/class discussion: Venardos, A. M. (2005). Islamic Banking & Finance in South-East Asia. Its Development & Future. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. [Part 1presentation]

Presentors: Sonal Sinha and Abishek Mohan

Session 9: Islamic Banking and Finance (continued)
Thursday, 7 December
5:00 – 6:20 pm
Malaysian Rm.
Dyad presentation/class discussion: Venardos, A. M. (2005). Islamic Banking & Finance in South-East Asia. Its Development & Future. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. [Part 2 presentation]

Presentors: Sonal Sinha and Abishek Mohan

Session 10: Wrap-up and final briefing for study tour
Thursday, 7 December
6:20 – 7:40 pm

Presentation and discussion of individual research questions and hypotheses for final paper.


August 22, 2010 Leave a comment


The study evaluates interbank performance of Islamic Banks in Indonesia on profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency; and community involvement for the period 2000 – 2004. Financial ratios are applied in measuring these performances. F-test are used in determining their significance. The study found that Islamic Banks are relatively more commitment to community development, but less liquid compared to the Government Banks, Foreign Banks, and Commercial Banks. Islamic Banks do not show (statistically) any difference in performance and managerial performance with the Government Banks and Commercial Banks, but Islamic Banks are less performance and managerial performance with the Foreign Banks. Islamic Banks are relatively more cost efficient compared to the Government Banks and Commercial Banks; more profit (NIM) compared to the Commercial Banks; and relatively less risky compared to the Foreign Banks.

Keyword : Kinerja, Bank Islam, Bank Umum

1. Pendahuluan

Bank dan Keuangan Islam pada sepuluh tahun terakhir tumbuh 15 % setiap tahun yang melebih pertumbuhan Bank maupun institusi keuangan yang ada di pasar modal global, berada di lebih dari 75 negara dengan asset sekitar 200 milyar dolar Amerika (Yawer, 2002). Beberapa institusi keuangan Islam bahkan beroperasi di tiga belas lokasi lain, diantaranya Australia, Bahama, Kanada, Cayman Islands, Denmark, Guernsey, Jersey, Irlandia, Luxemburgh, Switzerland, Inggris, Amerika Serikat dan Virgin Islands. Ekspansi bank Islam ke seluruh dunia, baik dalam jumlah maupun dana yang diluasai, disertai operasi-operasi yang dikaji di mesir, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Jordania, Australia, Sudan, Iran dan Pakistan menunjukkan bahwa perbankan Islam sangat layak dan bank Islam benar-benar dapat beroperasi di negara manapun, memenuhi banyak sekali fungsi dan menggunakan instrumen-instrumen yang berbeda. Meskipun banyak bank telah mendapat dukungan modal yang banyak sekali dan mendapat perlindungan dari pemerintahan-pemerintahan dan keluarga-keluarga muslim terkemuka, tetapi bank Islam telah mempercayakan diri jauh lebih banyak pada lingkungan pasar kompetitif pada sistem perbankan campuran-konvensional (Algaoud dan Lewis, 2001). Selanjutnya Algoud dan Lewis menambahkan bahwa perbankan Islam merupakan sebuah pasar yang berkembang dan ada perbedaan dalam penerapan prinsip-prinsip dasarnya di lokasi-lokasi yang berbeda. Misalnya pada sisi deposito, rekening lancar (current account) dijalankan terutama berdasarkan prinsip al-wadiah. Deposito tabungan juga diterima berdasarkan prinsip al-wadiah, tetapi “hadiah” kepada para deposan diberikan menurut kebijakan Bank Islam atas saldo minimum, sehingga para deposan juga sama-sama mendapat bagian laba. Di Malaysia, keuntungan dari rekening tabungan islami secara langsung bersaing dengan rekening tabungan Bank konvensional. Deposito investasi didasarkan pada prinsip mudharabah, tetapi terdapat banyak variasi. Dengan demikian, Islamic Bank of Bangladesh, mislanya menawarkan rekening deposito profit-loss sharing (PLS), rekening pemberitahuan khusus PLS dan rekening deposito berjangka PLS, sedangkan Bank Islam Malaysia mengoperasikan dua jenis deposito investasi, satu untuk masyarakat umum dan satu lagi untuk nasabah kelembagaan. Juga terdapat variasi-variasi yang menarik dalam pola penggunaan sumberdaya oleh Bank Islam. Misalnya, musyarakah telah menjadi cara investasi yang penting di Mesir dan sudan, sedangkan di Malaysia cara ini nyaris tidak menonjol. Musyarakah yang berkurang (diminishing musyarakah) telah dipakai untuk permodalan kemitraan pembangunan perumahan di Australia. Jordan Islamic Bank telah melakukan investasi langsung dalam perumahan dan skema-skema investasi lainnya. Pada saat-saat sekarang, Bank Islam dalam berbagai bentuk bermunculan di banyak negara muslim mapupun non-muslim. Deposito, dana-dana yang disalurkan, serta modal para pemegang saham di Bank tersebut meningkat tajam (Saeed, 1996). Maka Bank Islam menarik untuk diteliti.
Bank Islam merupakan gabungan antara bank komersial dan bank investasi, dan akan menawarkan serangkaian produk pelayanan bagi para pelanggan yang mempunyai hubungan jangka panjang. Sebagian dari dana pembiayaannya akan digunakan untuk proyek-proyek tertentu atau ventura, sedangkan mayoritspembiayaan yang bersifat jangka pendek akan tersedia dalam kerangka persetujuan ini. Investasi yang berorientasi kepada penyertaan modalnya, tidak mengijinkannya untuk meminjam jangka pendek dan memberikan pinjaman jangka panjang. Hal ini menyebakan kecenderungan tidak mudah terkena krisis dibandingkan dengan bank konvensional (Chapra, 2000).
Bank Islam yang mengedepankan model equity finance menjadi lebih menarik setelah model debt financing oleh bank konvesional di Amerika Serikat mengalami krisis baik 1930-an atau 1980-an. Jepang menggunakan kombinasi struktur debt financing dan equity finance sehingga pertumbuhan ekonominya setelah perang tinggi (Akacem dan Gillian, 2002). Sebaliknya bank konvensional mudah terkena krisis. Krisis perbankan terbesar terjadi di Amerika Serikat pada 1930-an, yaitu 9.106 ditutup / dibantu (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,2004).
Keunggulan konsep perbankan Islam atas perbankan konvensional terletak dalam kenyataan bahwa Islam telah melenyapkan kezaliman bunga. Islam melarang bunga, karena tidak berpengaruh pada volume tabungan, dan bunga dapat menyebabkan depresi kronis juga memperlambat proses pemulihan, karena ia memperburuk masalah pengangguran dan akhirnya mendorong pembagian kekayaan yang tidak merata (Mannan, 1970). Bank Islam dengan menggunakan sistem non bunga akan meringankan beban negara dari hutang. Setiap tahun Amerika Serikat membayar jutaan dolar bunga atas hutang nasionalnya. Demikian juga, negara-negara yang dianggap kaya harus membayar bunga besar sekali atas hutang nasionalnya. Keberadaan hutang ini seharusnya tidak terjadi. Karena itu pembayaran bunga atasnya tidaklah seharusnya dilakukan (Diwany, 2003). Dengan demikian Bank tanpa bunga (Bank Islam) menjadi lebih menarik lagi untuk diteliti.
Meskipun demikian, masih ada masalah yang harus diselesaikan untuk kemajuan bank Islam. Masalah-masalah tersebut berkait dengan masalah hukum, daya tarik deposito yang terus bertahan dan pola operasi pendanaan yang dilaksanakan. Undang-undang perbankan di sebagian besar negara tidak mengijinkan bank untuk terlibat langsung dalam bisnis yang menggunakan dana para deposan, atau paling tidak secara tegas membatasi investasi-investasi semacam itu hanya pada dana yang dipasok oleh para pemegang saham. Di negara-negara nonmuslim, mendirikan bank Islam harus sesuai dengan undang-undang yang ada di negara yang bersangkutan yang pada umumnya tidak kondusif untuk jenis pendanaan PLS dalam sektor pebankan. Pasar sudah tidak lagi dalam masa pertumbuhannya, dan bank Islam tidak dapat menerima nasabah apa adanya. Terdapat banyak institusi, termasuk Bank Barat, yang bersaing dengan Bank Islam murni melalui jendela-jendela islami, dan pelajaran umum yang dapat dipetik dari pasar-pasar modal, sebagaimana dalam pasar-pasar lainnya adalah bahwa penyebaran laba dan margin laba mengalami penurunan begitu institusi-institusi keuangan baru masuk pasar. Tidak adanya instrumen jangka pendek juga menyulitkan bank Islam (Algoud dan Lewis, 2001). Dengan demikian studi tentang bank Islam lebih mendalam perlu dilakukan.
Perkembangan Bank Umum Syariah (Islam), Unit Usha Syariah dan Bank perkreditan Rakyat Syariah dari 2000 sampai dengan 2004 dapat dilihat pada tabel 1.1.

Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank Umum Syariah 29 26 41 43 54 59 94 113 132 131
PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia 16 26 18 37 20 46 41 80 49 78
PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri 13 0 23 6 34 13 53 33 81 53
PT. Bank Syariah Mega Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Unit Usaha Syariah 7 0 12 0 25 0 48 0 48 0
PT. Bank IFI 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
PT. Bank Negara Indonesia 5 0 10 0 12 0 17 0 22 0
PT. Bank Jabar 1 0 1 0 3 0 4 0 4 0
PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 0 18 0
PT. Bank Danamon 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 0 10 0
PT. Bank Bukopin 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 3 0
PT. Bank Internasional Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0
HSBC, Ltd. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
PT Bank DKI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
BPD Riau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
BPD Kalsel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
PT Bank Niaga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
BPD Sumut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
BPD Aceh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bank Permata 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 115 26 134 43 162 59 142 113 206 131

KPO = Kantor Pusat Operasional
KC = Kantor Cabang
KCP = Kantor Cabang Pembantu
KK = Kantor Kas

Sumber : Statistik Perbankan Syariah, Bank Indonesia, Maret 2004

Dari Tabel 1.2., Bank Umum Syariah dari 2000 sampai dengan 2004 mengalami peningkatan, dari 2 bank menjadi 3 bank, dan Kantor Pusat Operasional/Kantor Cabang/Kantor Cabang Pembantu mengalami peningkatan dari 29 buah pada 2000 menjadi 41 buah pada 2001, menjadi 54 buah pada 2002, menjadi 94 buah pada 2003 dan menjadi 132 buah pada 2004. Kantor Kasnya juga ningkat dari 26 buah pada 2000, menjadi 43 buah pada 2001, menjadi 59 buah pada 2002, menjadi 113 buah pada 2003 dan menjadi 131 pada 2004.
Unit Usaha Syariah dari 2000 sampai dengan 2004 mengalami peningkatan, dari 3 buah menjadi 15 buah, dan Kantor Pusat Operasional/Kantor Cabang/Kantor Cabang Pembantu juga mengalami peningkatan dari 7 buah pada 2000, menjadi 12 buah pada 2001, menjadi 25 buah pada 2002, menjadi 48 buah pada 2003 dan menjadi 66 buah pada 2004, tetapi Kantor Kasnya tidak mengalami peningkatan, tidak mempunyai Kantor Kas pada 2000 sampai dengan 2004.

2. Metodologi dan data

Kinerja merupakan sebuah konsep yang sulit, baik dalam bentuk definisi maupun dalam pengukuran. Kinerja didefinisikan sebagai hasil akhir dari aktivitas, dan ukuran tepat yang terpilih untuk menilai kinerja perusahaan yang dipertimbangkan bergantung pada jenis organisasi yang dievaluasi dan sasaran yang dicapai melalui evaluasi itu (Hunger dan Wheelen, 1997). Dengan demikian kinerja bank Islam dapat didefinisikan sebagai hasil akhir dari aktivitas bank Islam.
Untuk mengukur kinerja bank Islam, Haron (1996) menggunakan tiga indikator kinerja bank Islam, yaitu Total income yang diterima oleh bank (TITA), the bank’s portion of income after payment to depositors (BITA), dan net profit before tax (BTTA).
Sarker (1999), menggunakan Banking Efficiency Model untuk mengevaluasi kinerja bank Islam di Bangladesh. Banking Efficiency model menggunakan lima kriteria tes untuk mengukur efisiensi sistem perbankan Islam. Kelima kriteria tes tersebut antara lain Investment Opportunity Utilisation Test, Profit Maximisation Test, Project Efficacy Test, Loan Recovery test dan Test of Elasticity in Loan Financing.
Samad dan Hassan (1999) melakukan pengukuran kinerja perbankan Islam Malaysia antara 1984 – 1997. Indikator yang dipakai untuk melakukan pengukuran kinerja bank Islam adalah profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency dan commitment to community.
Studi ini membuat perbandingan kinerja Bank Islam (Bank Syariah) dengan Bank Konvensional (Bank Umum atau Bank Komersial) di Indonesia. Pertama, Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero (Bank Pemerintah). Kedua, kinerja Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing. Ketiga, kinerja dibandingkan dengan Bank Konvensional yang terdiri dari 145 bank (Industri Bank). Analisis mengenai kinerja antar-bank ini, pertamakali dilakukan Sabi (1996). Dalam pasar keuangan yang sangat kompetitif, kinerja suatu bank dapat lebih baik difahami dengan menggunakan analisis antar bank (Samad dan Hassan, 2000).
Studi ini menggunakan 9 rasio keuangan untuk kinerja bank. Rasio-rasio ini dikelompokkan dalam empat kategori, yaitu: a. profitability ; b. liquidity; c. risk and solvency; d. commitment to community.

a. Profitability Ratios :

Profitability dapat diukur menggunakan empat kriteria :
1. Return on asset (ROA) = Laba sebelum pajak dalam 12 bulan terakhir / Rata-rata Aktiva dalam periode yang sama (sesuai Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia No. 30/2/UPPB tanggal 30 April 1997)
2. Return of equity (ROE) = Laba sebelum pajak dalam 12 bulan terakhir / Rata-rata Modal dalam periode yang sama (sesuai Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia No. 30/2/UPPB tanggal 30 April 1997).
ROA dan ROE merupakan indicator pengukuran efisiensi of manajerial (Ross (1994), Sabi (1996), Hassan (1999) and Samad (1998). ROA merupakan pendapatan bersih per unit suatu aset, yang menunjukkan bagaimana sebuah bank dapat melakukan konversi aset menjadi pendapatan bersih. Semakin tinggi rasio ROA semakin baik kinerja bank tersebut. Demikian halnya, ROE merupakan net earnings per unit equity capital. Semakin tinggi rasion ROE semakin baik kinerja manajerial bank tersebut.
3. Income expense ratio (IER) = Pendapatan Operasional dalam 12 bulan terakhir / Biaya operasional dalam periode yang sama (sesuai Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia No. 30/2/UPPB tanggal 30 April 1997).
IER merupakan indikator efisiensi biaya dalam menghasilkan pendapatan. Semakin tinggi IER semakin tinggi efisiensi biaya untuk mendapat pendapatan, yang berarti pula semakin tinggi kinerja bank tersebut (Samad dan Hassan, 2000).
4. Net Interest Margin (NIM) = Pendapatan Bunga Bersih / Rata-rata Aktiva
Produktif (untuk Bank Konvensional, sesuai Surat
Edaran Bank Indonesia No. 30/2/UPPB tanggal 30
April 1997)
Non Net Interest Margin (NIM) = Pendapatan Non Bunga Bersih / Rata-rata
Aktiva Produktif (untuk Bank Islam)
Semakin tinggi NIM suatu Bank, semakin tinggi margin pendapatan bank

b. Liquidity Ratios.

Bank dan lembaga keuangan berbagi resiko likuiditas, karena transaksi deposito dan tabungan dapat dilakukan setiap saat. Dengan demikian, pendeknya waktu dapat menyebabkan masalah pada likuiditas (Samad dan Hassan, 2000).
Likuiditas dapat diukur menggunakan criteria sebagai berikut :
1. Loan deposit ratio (LDR) = Kredit / Dana yang diterima. (Untuk bank konvensional, (sesuai Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia No. 30/2/UPPB tanggal 19 Maret 1997).
Financing deposit ratio (FDR) = Financing / Dana yang diterima (Untuk bank
Semakin tinggi LDR/FDR mengindikasikan bahwa sebuah bank membuat lebih
menekankan keuangannya pada pembuatan hutang/pembiayaan yang telalu
banyak. Semakin kecil LDR/FDR semakin baik likuiditas bank tersebut.
CAR yang tinggi mengindikasikan bahwa bank mempunyai asset yang likuid jangka panjang. Bank Indonesia memberikan ketentuan minimal CAR 8 %.

c. Risk and Solvency Ratios

Sebuah bank dikatakan mampu membayar hutangnya (solvent) jika total nilai asetnya lebih besar dari liabilitasnya. Bank menjadi beresiko jika tidak solvent. Berikut ini yang umum digunakan untuk risk and insolvency.

1. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) = (Modal Inti + Modal Pelengkap) / Aktiva tertimbang Menurut Resiko (ATMR).
Modal Inti terdiri dari Modal disetor dan Cadangan tambahan modal, sedangkan modal pelengkap terdiri dari revaluasi aktiva tetap, cadangan umum PPAP maksimal 1,25 % dari ATMR, modal pinjaman, pinjaman sub ordinasi maksimal 50 % dari modal inti dan peningkatan nilai penyertaan pada portofolio yang tersedia untuk dijual setinggi-tingginya sebesar 45 %.

2. Debt to total asset ratio (DTAR) = Hutang (Dana Pihak Ketiga) / total asset. DTAR mengindikasikan kemampuan keuangan sebuah bank untuk membayar kepada pemberi hutang. Semakin tinggi DTAR semakin tinggi suatu bank melibatkan diri dalam resiko bisnis.
3. Non Performing Financing (Loan) (NPF) = Collectibility / Total Credit (financing). Collectibility meliputi kualitas kredit (pembiayaan) kurang lancar, diragukan dan macet. Semakin tinggi nilai NPF mengindikasikan sebuah bank mepunyai resiko lebih tinggi.

d. Commitment to Community

1. Credit (Financing) to Total Asset Ratio (CTA) = (FTA) =
Kredit (pembiayaan) yang diberikan / Total Asset.
Semakin besar prosentase FTA semakin besar pula komitmen bank terhadap
pengembangan masyarakat. (commitment to community development). Hal ini
sesuai dengan yang dikemukakan Samad dan Hassan (2000).

Kinerja Bank Islam (Syariah) di Indonesia diukur dalam dua tahap. Tahap pertama membandingkan kinerja Bank Islam dengan Bank Persero dan membandingkan kinerja Bank Islam dengan Bank Asing yang beroperasi di Indonesia. Tahap kedua, membandingkan kinerja Bank Islam dengan seluruh Bank Umum atau Bank Konvensional yang ada di Indonesia (145 bank).
SPSS 11.5 for Windows digunakan dalam analisis. Dalam membadingkan antar kelompok Bank tersebut, digunakan Analisis Varian Satu jalan (One Way ANOVA) untuk menguji hipotesis nul (H0), yaitu kinerja bank Islam dengan Bank yang lain itu sama (tidak ada perbedaan yang berarti).
MSB / MSW digunakan untuk mengestimasi nilai F. Jika nilai F ini (F hitung) lebih besar dari nilai F kritis (F tabel), maka dikatakan Ho ditolak atau Ha yang diterima, artinya kinerja antara dua kelompok bank tersebut secara statististik tidak sama atau berbeda. Sebaliknya jika nilai F ini (F hitung) lebih kecil dari nilai F kritis (F tabel), maka dikatakan Ho diterima Ha ditolak, artinya kinerja antara dua kelompok bank tersebut secara statististik sama atau tidak berbeda.

3. Analisis data dan Hasil Empiris

Pada kategori profitabilitas, ANOVA menyarankan untuk menerima Ho untuk ROA dan ROE antara Bank Islam dengan Bank Persero, artinya ROA dan ROE Bank Islam tidak ada beda secara statistik dengan Bank Persero (Tabel 1). Dengan demikian kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam dengan Bank Persero tidak berbeda secara signifikan. Sedangkan perbandingan Bank Islam dengan Bank Asing, yaitu rata-rata ROA and ROE untuk Bank Islam masing-masing 1,884 % and 16,428 % sedangkan ROA and ROE untuk Bank Asing pada periode yang sama masing-masing 3,882 % dan 124,230 % (Tabel 2). ANOVA menyarankan untuk menolak Ho, atau menerima Ha dengan signifikansi secara statistik masing-masing pada tingkat 5 % dan 1 %, artinya kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam berbeda secara statistik dengan Bank Asing. Maka kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam kurang baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing. Perbandingan antara Bank Islam dengan Bank Umum untuk ROA dan ROE, ANOVA menyarankan untuk menerima Ho untuk ROA dan ROE antara Bank Islam dengan Bank Umum, artinya ROA dan ROE Bank Islam tidak ada beda secara statistik dengan Bank Umum (Tabel 3).. Dengan demikian kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam dengan Bank Umum tidak berbeda secara signifikan. Hasil ini sesuai dengan studi yang dilakukan Samad dan Hassan (2000) yang membandingkan kinerja antara Bank Islam dan Bank Konvensional di Malaysia.
Perbandingan Income Expense Ratio (IER) antara Bank Islam dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum, ANOVA menyarankan untuk menolak Ho, atau menerima Ha, artinya IER Bank Islam berbeda secara statistik dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum. Rata-rata IER untuk Bank Islam 1,220 sedangkan IER untuk Bank Persero dan Bank Umum pada periode yang sama masing-masing 1,002 dan 1,098. Perbedaan ini signifikan secara statistik masing-masing pada tingkat 1 % dan 5 % (Tabel 1 dan Tabel 3).. Maka Bank Islam lebih efisien biaya untuk memperoleh pendapatan dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum. Meskipun demikian IER Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing, hasil dari ANOVA, menerima Ho, artinya tidak berbeda secara signifikan (Tabel 3) atau Bank Islam tidak lebih efisien biaya untuk memperoleh pendapatan dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing.
Perbandingan Net Non Interest Margin (NIM) Bank Islam dengan Net Interest Margin (NIM) Bank Persero dan Bank Asing, ANOVA menyarankan untuk menerima Ho, maka Net Non Interest Margin (NIM) Bank Islam dengan Net Interest Margin (NIM) Bank Persero dan Bank Asing tidak berbeda secara signifikan (Tabel 1 dan Tabel 2).. Bank Islam lebih baik daripada Net Interest Margin (NIM) Bank Umum. Maka margin pendapatan Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Asing tidak berbeda secara signifikan. Namun demikian, NIM Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan NIM Bank Umum, ANOVA menyarankan untuk menolak Ho, menerima Ha yang berarti NIM Bank Islam dan NIM Bank Umum berbeda secara signifikan. Rata-rata NIM untuk Bank Islam 5,774 % sedangkan NIM untuk Bank Umum pada periode yang sama masing-masing 3,772%. Perbedaan ini signifikan secara statistik pada tingkat 5 % (Tabel 3). Maka margin pendapatan Bank Islam lebih baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Umum.
Pada kategori likuiditas, Loan / Financing Deposit Ratio (LDR/FDR) Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum berbeda secara signifikan (menolak Ho). Rata-rata FDR untuk Bank Islam 98.126 % sedangkan LDR untuk Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum pada periode yang sama masing-masing 34.738 %, 53.248 % dan 41.288 %. Perbedaan ini signifikan secara statistik masing-masing pada tingkat 1 % ((Tabel 1, Tabel 2 dan Tabel 3). Dengan demikian Bank Islam kurang likuid dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum. Hal ini justru berbeda dengan studi yang dilakukan Samad dan Hassan (2000) yang membandingkan kinerja likuiditas antara Bank Islam dan Bank Konvensional di Malaysia, bahwa likuditas Bank Islam lebih baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Konvensional, karena Bank Islam memelihara likuditas lebih baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Konvensional. Sebaliknya di Indonesia, Bank Islam memelihara likuiditas kurang baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Konvensional (Bank Umum) atau berarti pula Bank Islam mempunyai kemampuan menyalurkan dana lebih baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Konvensional.
Sedangkan Capital Adequacy ratio (CAR) Bank Islam Islam berbeda dari Bank Asing (menolak Ho). Rata-rata CAR untuk Bank Islam 26.314 % sedangkan CAR untuk Bank Bank Asing 17.490 %, berbeda secara signifikat pada tingkat 10 %, artinya Bank Islam Islam mempunyai kecukupan modal lebih baik daripada Bank Asing (Tabel 2), tetapi CAR Bank Islam tidak berbeda secara signifikan dengan CAR Bank Persero dan Bank Umum (Tabel 2 dan Tabel 3). atau Bank Islam mempunyai kecukupan modal yang tidak berbeda atau mempunyai likuiditas jangka panjang tidak berbeda dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum.
Pada kategori Risk and Solvency, Debt to total asset ratio (DTAR) Bank Islam tidak berbeda dengan DTAR Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum (menerima Ho), dapat dilihat pada Tabel (Tabel 1, Tabel 2 dan Tabel 3). Dengan demikian kemampuan keuangan Bank Islam untuk membayar kepada pemberi hutang atau melibatkan diri dalam resiko bisnis dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum tidak berbeda.
NPL Bank Islam juga tidak berbeda secara signifikan dibandingkan dengan NPL Bank Persero dan Bank Umum (menerima Ho) atau berarti pula resiko Bank Islam tidak berbeda secara signifikan dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum (Tabel 1 dan Tabel 3)., tetapi berbeda (menolak Ho) dengan Bank Asing pada tingkat sinifikansi 1%. Rata-rata NPL untuk Bank Islam 5.110 % sedangkan NPL untuk Bank Asing 11.193 % (Tabel 2). Maka Bank Asing mempunyai resiko lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan Bank Islam.
Pada kategori commitment to community, Financing Total Asset Ratio (FTA) Bank Islam lebih baik dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum. Rata-rata FTA untuk Bank Islam 75.762 % sedangkan FTA untuk Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum pada periode yang sama masing-masing 29.460 %, 45.508 % dan 37.964 %, berbeda secara signifikan masing-masing pada tingkat 1 % (Tabel 1, Tabel 2, dan Tabel 3).. Hal ini berbeda dengan yang ditemukan Samad dan Hassan (2000) pada studi perbandingan kinerja Bank Islam dengan Bank Umum di Malaysia, yang menyatakan bahwa komitmen antara Bank Islam dan Bank Konvensional adalah sama. Hal ini berarti Bank Islam di Indonesia lebih berkomitment terhadap pengembangan masyarakat dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum.

4. Kesimpulan dan Saran

Berdasarkan hasil analisis dapat disimpulkan bahwa kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum tidak berbeda secara signifikan. Sedangkan perbandingan kinerja dan kinerja manajerial Bank Islam kurang baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing.
Bank Islam lebih efisien biaya untuk memperoleh pendapatan dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum. Meskipun demikian Bank Islam tidak lebih efisien biaya untuk memperoleh pendapatan dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing.
Margin pendapatan Bank Islam dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Asing tidak berbeda secara signifikan. Namun demikian, margin pendapatan Bank Islam lebih baik dibandingkan dengan Bank Umum.
Pada kategori likuiditas, Bank Islam kurang likuid dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum Bank Islam Islam mempunyai kecukupan modal lebih baik daripada Bank Asing, tetapi CAR Bank Islam tidak berbeda secara signifikan dengan CAR Bank Persero dan Bank Umum atau Bank Islam mempunyai kecukupan modal yang tidak berbeda dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum.
Pada kategori Risk and Solvency, kemampuan keuangan Bank Islam untuk membayar kepada pemberi hutang atau melibatkan diri dalam resiko bisnis dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum tidak berbeda. Bank Islam tidak berbeda secara signifikan dalam resiko kemacetan hutang dibandingkan dengan Bank Persero dan Bank Umum., tetapi Bank Islam mempunyai resiko kemacetan lebih kecil dibandingkan dengan Bank Asing.
Pada kategori commitment to community, Bank Islam lebih berkomitment terhadap pengembangan masyarakat dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum.
Dengan terbuktinya Bank Islam lebih berkomitment terhadap pengembangan masyarakat dibandingkan Bank Persero, Bank Asing dan Bank Umum, maka Pemerintah untuk terus mendukung perkembangan Bank Islam di Indonesia dengan membuat kebijakan yang memberikan peluang lebih besar untuk Bank Islam.
Studi lebih lanjut dari ini pelu dilakukan, misalkan studi tentang pengaruh kinerja Bank Islam terhadap kesejahteraan masyarakat. Studi teantang pengaruh Kebijakan Pemerintah terhadap kinerja Bank Islam.

Table 1

Performance Measure Bank Islam Bank Persero F-value
I. Profitability
1. ROA 1,824 % 1,872 % 0,008
2. ROE 16,428 % 21,336 % 0,572
3. IER 1,220 1,002 22,567***
4. NIM 5,774 % 4,042 % 0,162
II. Liquidity
6. LDR 98,126 % 34,738 % 52,964***
III.Risk and Solvency
7. CAR 26,314 % 17,372 % 2,846
8. DTAR 66,304 % 67,690 % 0,077
9. NPL 5,110 % 8,990 % 2,501
IV. Commitment to
10.FTA 75,762 % 29,460 % 95,681***

* Difference in means : Significant at 10 %
** Difference in means : Significant at 5 %
***Difference in means : Significant at 1 %

Table 2

Performance Measure Bank Islam Bank Asing F-value
I. Profitability
1. ROA 1,824 % 3,882 % 9,738**
2. ROE 16,428 % 124,230 % 21,153***
3. IER 1,220 1,174 0,656
4. NIM 5,774 % 4,144 % 0,127
II. Liquidity
5. LDR 98,126 % 53,248 % 27,816***
III.Risk and Solvency
6. CAR 26,314 % 17,490 % 4,311*
7. DTAR 66,304 % 73,830 % 2,631
8. NPL 5,110 % 11,193 % 11,193***
IV. Commitment to Community
9. FTA 75,762 % 45,508 % 47,866***

* Difference in means : Significant at 10 %
** Difference in means : Significant at 5 %
***Difference in means : Significant at 1 %

Table 3

Performance Measure Bank Islam Bank Umum F-value
I. Profitability
1. ROA 1,824 % 1,834 % 0,000
2. ROE 16,428 % 27,966 % 2,505
3. IER 1,220 1,098 6,460**
4. NIM 5,774 % 3,722 % 3,837*
II. Liquidity
5. LDR 98,126 % 41,288 % 38,597***
III.Risk and Solvency
6. CAR 26,314 % 19,328 % 2,321
7. DTAR 66,304 % 73,822 % 2,514
8. NPL 5,110 % 10,880 % 5,396**
IV. Commitment to Community
9. FTA 75,762 % 37,964 % 85,797***

* Difference in means : Significant at 10 %
** Difference in means : Significant at 5 %
***Difference in means : Significant at 1 %


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Hubungan Industial di Indonesia

August 22, 2010 Leave a comment

Perspektif Ekonomi Islam
Oleh: abdul Jalil

A. Interrelasi Islam Dan Ekonomi
Pada awalnya, banyak pihak meragukan hubungan antara agama dan ekonomi. Namun, sejak terbitnya buku Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5), orang yakin adanya hubungan itu.
Dalam Islam, hubungan agama dan ekonomi diyakini sudah ada sejak awal, bahkan menjadi salah satu penyebab kehadirannya. Kelahiran Islam merefleksikan sebuah reformasi terhadap keangkuhan sistem peradaban masyarakat ja>hiliyyah kala itu. Keangkuhan ini dapat dilihat dari perlakuan yang tidak fair terhadap perempuan, penindasan terhadap suku dan klan yang kecil, peminggiran kaum miskin, pemusatan kekuasaan pada kaum aristokrat, ketimpangan ekonomi, dan lain-lain.
Ikrar ‘la> ila>ha’ dalam shaha>dat dengan tegas mengkumandangkan penegasian terhadap kekuatan hegemonik dan kuasa semu yang membelenggu manusia, baik dalam berfikir, bersikap ataupun berbuat, untuk selanjutnya hanya mengakui satu kekuatan sejati, “illa Alla>h”, yang berhak diikuti, ditaati, dan disembah.
Dalam rangka mengembalikan idealisme awal, bukan romantisme masa lalu, seorang muslim mesti mampu melakukan pembongkaran dan pembebasan dari sistem kuasa semu beserta jaringannya, untuk kemudian memberikan realitas alternatif dengan seperangkat jaringan kuasa ilahi yang mengikatnya dalam semua sistem hidupnya. Dengan cara demikian, realitas alternatif diharapkan mampu memberikan arah, motivasi dan akhirnya tumbuh kesadaran (self consciousness) secara penuh untuk patuh, tunduk dan menjalankan kuasa ilahi.
Selama ini masih terdapat stereotip bahwa persoalan industri sangat ditentukan oleh dua ekstrimitas sistem ekonomi, yaitu kapitalisme dan sosialisme. Sistem kapitalisme diasumsikan cenderung mengeksploitasi kaum buruh, karena di dalam sistem ini buruh diperas tenaganya untuk menghasilkan apa yang disebut sebagai nilai lebih (surplus value).
Sementara itu, sosialisme cenderung bersikap sebaliknya, yaitu membela buruh. Pembelaan itu dilakukan dengan menempatkan buruh sebagai pelopor utama perubahan dan kepemimpinan negara.
Di Indonesia, sebuah negara yang mayoritas penduduknya muslim, kebijakan perindustriannya, lebih khusus lagi tentang system perburuhanya, di set up sebagai bagian dari sistem produksi dengan metafora mesin. Upah yang diberikan kepada buruh dianggap sebagai cost (beaya) yang kongruen dengan produktivitas yang dihasilkan. Unsur-unsur kemanusiaan, termasuk agama sebagai sistem kesadaran buruh, tidak menjadi factor penting yang mempengaruhi kebjakan perburuhan.
Banyak penyebab mengapa hal ini bisa terjadi. Diantaranya adalah minimnya studi tentang hubungan industrial yang mampu mengekplorsi dan mengobkektivikasi konsepsinya sehingga Negara mempertimbangkan untuk mengadopsinya. Tulisan berikut ini adalah studi awal tentang hal tersebut.

B. Industrialisasi dan Hubungan Industrial di Indonesia
Di Indonesia, sejarah hubungan industrial, dalam arti hubungan antara orang yang melakukan pekerjaan pada orang atau badan hukum, dimulai dengan perbudakan yang dilakukan oleh budak dan hamba. Mereka ini merupakan “buruh” pada jaman itu. ‘Upah’ yang mereka terima adalah makanan, pakaian dan perumahan. Upah berupa uang biasanya tidak diberikan kepada mereka. Orang lain atau badan itu merupakan “majikan” yang berkuasa penuh dan mutlak, bahkan menguasai pula hidup-mati para budak itu.
Setelah Indonesia diserahkan kembali kepada Nederland, pemerintah Hindia-Belanda mulai membuat regulasi perbudakan, namun tidak sampai menghapuskannya. Yang terjadi justru pada tahun 1930-an terjadi peralihan status dari budak menjadi buruh. Hubungan industrial yang kapitalistik mulai terbentuk dengan adanya produksi komoditas internasional secara massal (generalized commodity production). Ststistik Hindia-Belanda tahun 1930 menyebutkan bahwa penduduk Indonesia yang hidup di sector buruh ada sekitar 6 juta orang. Dari jumlah ini, sekitar setengah jutanya merupakan buruh yang sudah bersentuhan teknologi seperti tambang, transportasi dan bengkel. Sedangkan sisanya terdiri dari buruh inustri kecil (2.208.900), buruh lepas (2.003.200), dan buruh musiman yang umumnya terdiri dari buruh tani dan tani miskin.
Produksi yang paling menonjol saat itu adalah tebu. Upah per kepala rata-rata 14,22 gulden, dengan catatan mereka masih membayar pajak yang disebut natura. Karena hal ini dirasa memberatkan, 600 planter (penanam tebu) dari 51 Desa di kab. Batang boikot membayar pajak, dan menuntut kenaikan upaha menjadi 25 gulden.
Gelombang kapitalisasi tidak hanya berhenti disitu. Intitusi keuangan juga didirikan sebagai pendukung konsep Negara yang diimpikan Willem Daendels yang sangat mengagumi revolusi Perancis. Ada dua lembaga keuangan yang didirikan, yakni Nederlansche Handels Maatschapij (NHM) dan Javasche Bank. Kehadiran kedua lembaga juga dimaksudkan untuk menghambat arus perdagangan Inggris di Pulau Jawa, karena saat Inggris sudah memiliki 100 kapal yang berlabuh di batavia, sementara belanda hanya memiliki 43 buah.
Untuk melancarkan proyeknya, Williem Daendels juga memberlakukan kerja paksa (rodi) dan poenale sanctie, yakni pidana terutama atas penolakan untuk melakukan pekerjaan dan melarikan diri serta mengangkut buruh kembali ke perusahaan dengan bantuan polisi.
Lembaga punale sanksi ini semata-mata diadakan dengan maksud mengikat buruh, sebab dari ketentuan-ketentuan dalam kuli ordonansi tersebut jelas bahwa majikan sama sekali tidak terikat pada perjanjian kerja. Dengan aturan tersebut, buruh, selama masa kontrak, kehilangan kemerdekaannya karena tidak dapat mempersingkat, apalagi membatalkan kontrak.
Keharusan memenuhi kewajiban memang berlaku bagi semua orang. Akan tetapi, dalam punale sanksi ini, buruh diwajibkan dengan ancaman pidana, atau ancaman dibawa kembali oleh polisi ke pekerjaannya. Dengan demikian, pihak majikan memiliki hak atas pribadi buruh untuk kepentingannnya. Punale sanksi telah memberikan kekuasaan kepada pengusaha untuk berbuat kepada buruh-buruh yang dapat menimbulkan perlakuan tidak adil.
Sementara itu, Pada masa awal kemerdekaan, hubungan industrial nampak diwarnai oleh pergolakan politik. Pada masa awal kemerdekaan hubungan industrial relatif berjalan baik. Serikat-serikat pekerja mempunyai peranan penting dalam bidang ekonomi, pemerintahan dan kegiatan-kegiatan politik praktis. Para anggotanya memandang bahwa organisasinya dapat dipakai sebagai alat (vehicle) untuk memperjuangkan kepentingan mereka.
Pada 1956, pemerintah Indonesia meratifikasi Konvensi ILO No. 98/1949 tentang Hasar-Hasar Hak dari pada untuk Berorganisasi dan Perundingan Bersama (ILO Convention on the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively). Implikasinya, pada periode 1960-an, jumlah dan keanggotaan serikat buruh menjamur dan sangat sulit dihitung. Namun demikian, tingkat kesejahteraan para buruh ternyata tidak memiliki hubungan signifikan untuk menumbuhkan peningkatan standar kehidupan para buruh dan keluarganya.
Pada masa awal pemerintahan Orde Baru, pemerintahan berhasil membentuk MPBI (Majelis Permusyawaratan Buruh Indonesia) yang diarahkan untuk membicarakan berbagai hal untuk mengkonsolidasi kehidupan serikat buruh. Pada tahun 1972, dua puluh satu serikat buruh disatukan sehingga melahirkan Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (FBSI).
Dalam perjalanannya, federasi ini dinilai tidak demokratis. Tuduhan tidak demokratis pertama-tama dilontarkan oleh gerakan serikat buruh Internasioanal, diantaranya WCL (World Convenderation of Labour) dan ICFTU (International Convenderation of Free Trade Unites ). Tuntutan mereka adalah agar pemerintah Indonesia membuka kesempatan yang seluas-luasnya bagi kaum buruh untuk berorganisasi dan menentukan tempat kerja yang nyaman, terhindar dari unsur eksploitasi, tersusunnya syarat-syarat kerja yang sesuai dengan keinginan buruh dan manajemen serta lingkungan kerja yang bebas dari polusi industri.
Tahun 1974, pemerintah bersama komponen masyarakat lainnya merumuskan apa yang disebut dengan HIP (Hubungan Industrial Pancasila). Melalui konsep ini, diharapkan agar sistem hubungan industrial di Indonesia berjalan sesuai budaya bangsa yang tercermin dalam UUD 45 dan Pancasila.
Dalam perkembangannya, konsep ini memang telah melahirkan praktek-praktek hubungan industrial yang mantap dan serasi. Akan tetapi, dari sisi pekerja, hubungan ini belum menghasilkan manfaat optimal yang bisa dirasakan oleh mereka. Partnership sebagaimana yang diharapkan antara pengusaha dengan pekerja ternyata belum berjalan dengan baik. Belum pernah ada UU yang mengatur tentang hubungan industrial secara khusus di Indonesia, tidak seperti Inggris dan bekas jajahannya yang relatif memiliki UU seperti itu.
Peraturan yang ada juga lebih mengacu pada stabilitas, sehingga nasib buruh tetap berada pada posisi inverior. Peraturan-peraturan Menteri Tenaga Kerja yang dirasa tidak sesuai dengan Perundang-undangan Perburuhan adalah:
a. Permen (Peraturan Menteri) No. 342/1986 tentang intervensi militer sebagai perantara dalam perselisihan perburuhan.
b. Permen No. 1108/1986 tentang keharusan kalau terjadi perselisihan perburuhan supaya diselesaikan terlebih dulu dengan atasan langsung, sebelum lewat perantara atau P4.
c. Permen No. 1109/1986 tentang pembentukan UK (Unit Kerja) di perusahaan harus melibatkan pengusaha.
d. Permen No. 04/1986 tentang pemberian ijin kepada majikan untuk merumahkan buruh sewaktu-waktu tanpa menunggu P4.
Permen-permen itulah yang memicu gejolak masyarakat yang peduli terhadap masalah-masalah perburuhan, karena dirasakan sangat merugikan dan membatasi gerak buruh. Walaupun beberapa permen tersebut dicabut tahun 1993, tetapi dampaknya masih nampak dari tindakan-tindakan pengusaha, sehingga posisi, nasib dan kesejahteraan pekerja masih sangat memperihatinkan.
Memang, upah minimum regional (UMR), yang kemudian berubah menjadi UMP (Upah Minimum Propinsi) dan UMK (Upah Minimum Kabupaten), terus mengalami kenaikan sesuai dengan perkembangan daya beli masyarakat. Namun, persentase kenaikan UMR tersebut tidak memiliki korelasi kuat dengan peningkatan kebutuhan buruh dan masyarakat. Itu berarti tingkat kesejahteraan buruh masih dibawah standar. Hal ini yang membuat eskalasi tuntutan dan demontrasi semakin meningkat khususnya yang dilancarkan oleh pekerja.
Di era reformasi, yang didahului dengan perpindahan kekuasaan dalam pemerintahan, serikat buruh tumbuh dengan subur sesuai dengan aspirasi dan tuntutan terhadap pembebasan. Hal tersebut merupakan konsekuensi diratifikasinya Konvensi ILO tahun 1948 tentang Kebebasan Berserikat dan Perlindungan Berorganisasi. Konvensi tersebut memberi peluang yang seluas-luasnya untuk membentuk serikat buruh baru, sesuai dengan kehendak para pekerja/buruh dan dilarang adanya campur tangan dari pihak manapun.
Berkaitan dengan ratifikasi itu, pada 18 Juni 1998, ILO mendeklarasikan prinsip-prinsip dan hak-hak mendasar di tempat kerja. Deklarasi ini merupakan tonggak sejarah baru bagi ILO untuk mengubah persepsi yang berkembang, seolah-olah ILO hanya mendukung kepentingan negara maju, sekaligus merupakan jawaban terhadap tantangan globalisasi pasar kerja dan perdagangan yang telah menjadi fokus perdebatan internasional. Deklarasi ILO tersebut bertujuan merekonsiliasi keinginan semua pihak dalam hubungan industrial, menggairahkan usaha-usaha nasional seiring dengan kemajuan sosial-ekonomi, mengakomodir perbedaan kondisi lokal masing-masing negara, dan untuk menegakkan Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM).
Namun di pihak perusahaan, para pengusaha tidak dapat segera memenuhi standart perburuhan yang baru, disamping karena pertumbuhan ekonomi yang rendah, juga karena mereka menghadapi sejumlah pilihan sulit, terutama berkaitan dengan pengeluaran sejumlah biaya ‘siluman’, yang tidak berhubungan dengan proses produksi. Selain itu persediaan tenaga kerja yang berlimpah juga menjadi salah satu pertimbangan pengusaha untuk tidak segera merespon tuntutan pekerja yang ada.
Untuk keluar dari situasi ini, banyak negara, termasuk Indonesia, kemudian mengadopsi konsep Negara sejahtera (welfare state), yang sesungguhnya lahir sebagai respon atas depresi ekonomi 1935 dan Perang Dunia II. Landasan filosofisnya berbeda dengan Darwinisme Sosial tentang kapitalisme laissez-faire. Negara sejahtera berkeyakinan bahwa kesejahteraan individu merupakan sesuatu yang sangat penting dan tidak mungkin hanya tergantung dengan operasi pasar. Paradigma Filsosofis ini mengindikasikan pengakuan formal terhadap ekonomi mainstream yang menyatakan bahwa kemiskinan dan ketidakmampuan seseorang dalam memenuhi kebutuhannya bukanlah dalil atas kegagalannya. Para pekerja yang terpaksa melakoni pekerjaan dengan gaji dibawah Upah Minimum Regional (UMR) dan Upah minimum Kabupaten (UMK), para pengangguran dan mereka yang jatuh miskin tidak semata-mata disebabkan oleh kesalahannya sendiri. Oleh karena itu, perlu dicarikan cara agar mereka mendapatkan pelayanan umum seperti kesehatan, pendidikan, transportasi, perumahan, dan lain-lain, disamping juga melindunginya dari resiko sosial, ekses industrialisasi, ketidakmampuan dan pengangguran.
Negara Sejahtera tidak perlu mengajukan perubahan fundamental untuk merealisasikan tujuannya. Peran Negara yang lebih besar sudah dianggap cukup untuk menjalankan fungsi pasar secara sempurna dan memperbaiki ketidakadilan yang diciptakan kapitalisme laissez-fire.
Secara teori, target ini bisa dilaksanakan melalui enam langkah: regulasi, nasionalisasi, gerakan buruh, kebijakan fiskal, pertumbuhan yang tinggi, dan full employment. Enam langkah tersebut di atas pada dasarnya mengakui adanya full employment, distribusi kekeyaan dan pendapatan secara adil sebagai bagian dari tujuan pokok kebijakan negara. Filosofi ini menuntut peranan negara dalam bidang ekonomi menjadi lebih aktif dibanding dengan paham kapitalisme laissez-fire, atau bahkan teori Keynes.
Hanya saja, karena konsep Negara Sejahtera berbicara tentang sesuatu yang abstrak, yakni kesejahteraan, maka sampai hari ini para pakar belum mampu menyepakati definisi Negara Sejahtera. Bahkan Titmuss sampai berkesimpulan bahwa Negara Sejahtera adalah abstraksi yang tidak bisa didefinisikan. Dengan demikian, banyak dijumpai contoh praktis yang berbeda antara satu negara dengan lainnya, mulai dari yang kurang sempurna seperti Amerika Serikat, sampai yang sempurna seperti Swedia.
Sekalipun Negara Sejahtera telah berusaha semaksimal mungkin mengusung kesejahteraan umum, namun tetap saja tidak bisa lepas dari unsur kapitalisme. Ia tidak bisa keluar dari unsur filsafat enlightenment atau dari keyakinan akan kesucian sistem pasar. Sikap antagonistik enlightenment terhadap pertimbangan nilai juga tetap tak berkurang. Karena itu, pendekatan yang dipakai adalah pasar bebas. Negara tidak perlu mencampuri urusan import tenaga kerja asing, misalnya, asal dilakukan sesuai mekanisme pasar, fair, tidak ada rekayasa dan permainan kotor.
Dalam kondisi ini, negara diibaratkan sebagai wasit dalam permainan sepak bola. Ia tidak punya hak menendang atau memegang bola. Yang perlu dilakukan adalah agar permainan dalam sepak bola tersebut berjalan lancar dan tidak ada kecurangan.
Teori pasar di atas, ternyata menimbulkan banyak ekses. Mereka yang mempunyai kapital tinggi akan dengan sendirinya menguasai pasar, sehingga potensial melakukan penyimpangan dan ketidakadilan, sehingga apa yang disebut sebagai kesejahteraan (walfare) masih jauh panggang dari api.
Kebenaran pernyataan ini tidak membutuhkan riset yang njlimet karena sejak dulu kita memang belum bisa menyelesaikan kondisi ketenagakerjaan. Dari dulu masalah perburuhan menjadi sorotan banyak pihak, tapi dari dari dulu pula masalah ini tidak selesai. Hal ini karena ketidakseimbangan supplay dan demand tenaga kerja. Teorinya memang benar bahwa slope upah bergerak positif sesuai dengan perkembangan permintaan, tapi ternyata pergerakannya tidak secepat yang diharapkan sehingga terjadi kesenjangan (baca: pengangguran).
Karena ketidakseimbangan supplay dan demand itulah, maka harga (upah) tenaga kerja di Indonesia sangat murah. Upah buruh ditetapkan dengan Upah Minimum Propinsi (UMP) dan Upah Minimum Kabupaten/Kota (UMK) hanya untuk memenuhi Kebutuhan Hidup Minimal (KHM), bukan pada Kebutuhan Hidup Layak (KHL), sehingga seluruh potensinya habis untuk Opportunity cost, tanpa pernah bisa menikmati economic rent. Kenyataan ini menunjukkan bahwa di Indonesia faktor yang paling mempengaruhi pasar tenaga kerja masih upah, belum bergeser ke faktor selera, nilai pengalaman, atau faktor non materiil lainnya.
Oleh karena itu sangat dimengerti jika buruh selalu menuntut perbaikan nasib. Tahun 2004 ada 103 kasus pemogokan yang melibatkan 44.280 tenaga kerja, sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya jam kerja sebanyak 462.624 jam.
Data diatas merupakan fakta tak terbantahkan bahwa posisi buruh memang sangat sulit. Kaum buruh terus hidup dengan kesadaran tradisional, sementara mereka di hadapkan secara langsung dengan praktek-praktek diskursif dan hegemonisasi modal. Kapitalisme telah menjadi ideologi dominan. Ia membentuk, memproduksi dan melakukan kontrol kesadaran. Dominasi kapitalisme ini telah sampai pada praktek kekerasan, penindasan dan penghisapan terhadap kaum pekerja (buruh, tani, dan kaum miskin kota). Ironisnya, karena fenomena ini menjadi tontonan keseharian, maka tidak lagi dilihat sebagi kejahatan, tetapi telah diterima sebagai kewajaran.
Integrasi sistem ekonomi nasional ke dalam sistem ekonomi dunia yang didasari oleh liberalisme perdagangan dan investasi diakui atau tidak telah menimbulkan banyak ekses. Disamping secara ekonomi menimbulkan ketimpangan, secara sosiologis juga memunculkan kelas sosial buruh perkotaan sebagai akibat arus urbanisasi yang masif dari desa ke kota. Kondisi ini masih ditambah lagi dengan media kapitalisme yang membombardir buruh dengan tontonan visual yang penuh daya persuasif (bujuk rayu).
Model-model represivitas ini dengan sendirinya membuat kaum buruh tetap dalam kondisi terpuruk. Kaum buruh secara sistemik tidak akan sampai pada kesadaran sebagai kelas sosial yang tertindas, sebagai sapi perahan di dalam siklus jam kerja dan cost produksi.
Mereka dibelenggu untuk hanya hidup di dalam lingkungan pabrik, lahan sawah, areal perkebunan, dan ruang perkantoran swasta. Di luar itu, akibat hegemonisasi, ilusi juga tak henti-hentinya disusupkan di ruang-ruang kesadaran rakyat pekerja oleh media-media kapitalisme, sehingga rakyat pekerja hidup dalam tradisi budaya yang semrawut, konsumtif, dan individualistik. Budaya liberal telah membuka kemungkinan sebesar-besarnya bagi penguasaan dan pengebirian potensi kesadaran kritis, daya korektif dan semangat resistensi rakyat. Melalui tontonan dan sajian berita yang bebas nilai, potensi kolektivitas yang didasari oleh kesadaran kelas rakyat digiring untuk tunduk pada kapitalisme.

C. Basis Normativ Hubungan Industrial Dalam Islam
Melihat paradigma perburuhan di Indonesia yang lebih menguntungkan modal dan menempatkan buruh pada posisi lemah, tidak salah jika Islam datang menawarkan sistem lain yang diharapkan menjadi alternatif. Ada beberapa alasan mengapa Islam harus mengampil peran. Antara lain, Islam sebagai agama komprehensif dipandang mempunyai konsep dasar tentang sistem ekonomi yang bisa menjadi alternatif terhadap dua ideologi besar yang sama-sama ekstrim, kapitalisme dan sosialisme. Hukum Islam sebagai konsep normatif yang bersifat operasional dalam Islam diharapkan mampu mengaktualisasikan dirinya untuk menjawab realitas perburuhan kontemporer di bawah sistem kapitalisme.
Alasan lain adalah untuk melakukan pressure terhadap negara dengan landasasan teologis, agar penanganan masalah buruh tetap mengacu kepada fitrah kemanusiaan yang menjadi misi setiap agama. Oleh karenanya, Hukum Islam di abad modern ini diharapkan mampu berbicara banyak mengenai konsep perburuhan melalui penelusuran norma-norma Islam, dalam bentuk prinsip dasar maupun operasional, baik yang terdapat dalam teks-teks nash mapun pengalaman historis masyarakat Islam.
Untuk meneropong isu hubungan industrial dengan kompleksitas persoalannya, mau tidak mau kita mesti melangkah ke persoalan yang lebih mendasar, yaitu paradigma perekonomian dalam Islam.
Basis paradigmatic ekonomi Islam adalah keterkecukupan makhluk akan kebutuhannya, sebagaimana tampak dalam firman:
وَمَا مِنْ دَابَّةٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَّا عَلَى اللَّهِ رِزْقُهَا وَيَعْلَمُ مُسْتَقَرَّهَا وَمُسْتَوْدَعَهَا كُلٌّ فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ (هود: 6)
Data menunjukkan bahwa kekayaan alam yang disediakan Tuhan di bumi ini sebenarnya sangat mencukupi untuk sekedar memenuhi kebutuhan (bedakan dengan: keinginan) makhluk hidup yang melata di atasnya, tidak terkecuali umat manusia. Lebih-lebih dengan senjata ilmu dan teknologinya, umat manusia kini mampu mengeksplorasi kekayaan alam yang tersimpan di perut bumi yang paling dalam sekalipun. Oleh sebab itu, apabila dalam kenyataannya, banyak orang yang tidak mampu memenuhi kebutuhan dlarûri-nya, apalagi yang takmîli atau tahsîni, itulah bukan karena persoalan supply yang terbatas melainkan lebih karena distribusi yang terampas. Berdasar cara pandang ini, Ilmu Ekonomi Islam didefinisikan sebagai ilmu yang mempelajari tata kehidupan kemasyarakatan dalam memenuhi kebutuhannya untuk mencapai ridla Allah. Ta’rif ini setidaknya telah mengakomodir tiga domein utama; [1] domein tata kehidupan [2] domein pemenuhan kebutuhan, dan [3] domein ridla Allah. Definisi ini juga sekaligus melengkapi pemikiran Monzer Kahf, Choudhuri, Mannan dan Marshall.
Konsisten dengan tiga domein ini, maka pola hubungan industrial belum sepenuhnya sejalan dengan idealisme Islam yang menghendaki adanya keadilan yang merata. Sebab, dalam fungsinya yang sebatas regulator, pemerintah sulit menjamin kesejahteraan warganya karena ia tidak mempunyai keberpihakan yang jelas terhadap kaum miskin, atau secara umum terhadap pemerataan keuntungan. Pemerintah memang telah berusaha mengatur upah minimum bagi buruh. Tapi sama sekali tidak menyentuh ‘upah maksimum’ yang dihasilkan oleh modal pengusaha. Sebagai misal, dari modal 1.000.000,- seorang pengusaha mendapatkan laba 1.500.000,. Berapa persenkah ia berhak mengambil keuntungan dari saham modalnya? Kalau buruh hanya diberi UMR, itu artinya selebihnya milik pengusaha, berapapun jumlahnya. Buruh hanya mendapatkan taraf kehidupan minimal, sementara pengusaha mendapatkan keuntungan maksimal. Dalam kondisi ini, maka penumpukan modal tidak akan terhindari.
Hal ini, disadari atau tidak, pada gilirannya dianggap turut bertanggung jawab atas kesenjangan pembagian kekayaan dan pendapatan secara mencolok, karena dalam perkembangannya, ia meningkatkan kekuasaan perusahaan, memonopoli harga, sistem produksi, kebebasan pasar, dan pengejaran keuntungan. Konsep ini, disadari atau tidak, telah membuat si kaya menjadi lebih kaya dan si miskin menjadi lebih miskin.
Islam juga tidak sepakat dengan tawaran kepemilikan kolektif dari kaum sosialis, sebagai cara untuk meratakan kemakmuran warganya. Sebab hal itu akan berakibat pada dihapuskannya milik pribadi. Sekalipun skenario totaliter yang dituntun oleh konsep hak kolektif ini dapat membantu mengurangi pengangguran, distribusi yang tidak adil, dan banyak kekurangan kekurangan kapitalis lainnya, namun tidak berarti bebas dari keterbatasan keterbatasan, terutama soal insentif dan kebebasan pribadi. Di bawah komunisme, manusia sesungguhnya diasumsikan sebagai mesin yang tidak berperasaan.
Islam berposisi diantara kapitalis-sosialis yang hanya melihat manusia secara parsial. Islam tidak hanya mengakui hak milik pribadi, tetapi dengan menjamin pembagian kekayaan yang seluas luasnya dan bermanfaat melalui lembaga lembaga yang didirikan dengan bimbingan moral universal.
Islam berkeyakinan bahwa kesejahteraan sosial merupakan sesuatu yang sangat penting. Kemiskinan dan ketidakmampuan seseorang dalam memenuhi kebutuhannya, bukanlah dalil atas kegagalannya. Para pekerja yang terpaksa melakoni pekerjaan dengan gaji dibawah Upah Minimum Propinsi (UMP), para pengangguran dan mereka yang jatuh miskin, tidak semata-mata disebabkan oleh kesalahannya sendiri.
Oleh karena itu, perlu dicarikan formula agar mereka mendapatkan pelayanan umum; seperti kesehatan, pendidikan, transportasi, perumahan, dan lain-lain, disamping juga melindunginya dari ekses industrialisasi seperti pencemaran lingkungan, terganggunya sistem sosial, pengangguran, dan sebagainya. Semua itu tidak mungkin terjadi jika pemerintah hanya berperan sebagai regulator.
Secara umum, prinsip hubungan industrial dalam Islam harus mengakomodir kepentingan buruh yang meliputi:
1. Hak mendapatkan pendidikan dan keterampilan sesuai dengan kompetensinya.
Pada dasarnya, setiap tenaga kerja berhak untuk memperoleh, meningkatkan dan mengembangkan kompetensi kerja, sesuai dengan bakat, minat, dan kemampuannya melalui pelatihan kerja untuk meningkatkan produktivitas mereka..
Sebagai sebuah terminologi, istilah produktivitas memang baru muncul pertama kali pada tahun 1776 dalam suatu makalah yang disusun oleh seorang ekonom Perancis, Francois Quesney, dalam tulisannya yang berjudul Historis Viewpoint of Economic Theories. Sedangkan produktivitas sebagai konsep dengan input dan Output sebagai eleman utamanya pertama kali dicetuskan oleh David Ricardo bersama Adam Smith sekitar tahun 18. Ini senada dengan pernyataan Stevenson yang mengatakan bahwa yang disebut produktivitas tak lain adalah indeks untuk mengukur seberapa jauh keluaran relatif dapat di capai dengan mendayagunakan masukan yang dapat dikombinasikan. Penjelasan lebih lanjut tentang produktivitas dikemukakan oleh Adam and Ebert yang menyatakan bahwa productivity can be expressed on a total faktor basis or on partial faktor basis.
Akan tetapi, sebagai sebuah substansi, produktivitas bukanlah konsep baru, jauh-jauh hari Islam telah mengenal konsep tersebut. Dalam surat al-Mulk ayat 2 Allah berfirman:
الَّذِي خَلَقَ الْمَوْتَ وَالْحَيَاةَ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ أَيُّكُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلًا وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْغَفُورُ(الملك:2)
“Yang menjadikan mati dan hidup, supaya Dia menguji kamu, siapa di antara kamu yang lebih baik amalnya. Dan Dia Maha Perkasa lagi Maha Pengampun”
Ayat ini menyatakan bahwa Allah menciptakan kematian dan kehidupan adalah untuk menemukan siapa di antara mereka yang lebih baik perbuatannya. Dalam konteks ekonomi, yang lebih baik perbuatannya adalah yang lebih produktif. Nabi juga pernah menyatakan bahwa barang siapa yang hari ini lebih jelek dari hari kemarin berarti rugi karena tidak ada nilai tambah. Karena itu, satu-satunya pilihan bagi seorang muslim adalah bahwa hari ini harus lebih baik (lebih produktif) dari hari kemarin.
2. Hak Mendapatkan pekerjaan dan penghasilan sesuai dengan pilihannya.
Keterampilan sesorang merupakan aset pribadi buruh, bukan milik majikan. Sehingga, ia tidak terbebani untuk melakukan sesuatu yang berada diluar miliknya. Konsekwensinya adalah, jikalau dengan skill tersebut buruh merasa tidak pas bekerja dengan majikan tersebut, ia punya hak untuk pindahSebagaimana tertera dalam pasal 31, setiap tenaga kerja mempunyai hak dan kesempatan yang sama untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan, memilih jenisnya, pindah dari pekerjaan lama dan memperoleh penghasilan, baik di dalam atau di luar negeri. Garis yang dibikin Islam sangat jelas. Allah berfirman :
قُلْ كُلٌّ يَعْمَلُ عَلَى شَاكِلَتِهِ فَرَبُّكُمْ أَعْلَمُ بِمَنْ هُوَ أَهْدَى سَبِيلًا(الاسراء :84)
“Katakanlah: “Tiap-tiap orang berbuat menurut keadaannya masing-masing”. Maka Tuhanmu lebih mengetahui siapa yang lebih benar jalannya”
3. Hak Mendapatkan keselamatan, Kesehatan dan perlindungan kerja, terutama bagi pekerja yang cacat, anak dan perempuan.
Disamping konsep h}ifz} al-nafs dalam al-d}aru>riyya>t al-khamsah, dalam sebuah Hadith, Nabi bersabda:
…هُمْ إِخْوَانُكُمْ جَعَلَهُمُ اللَّهُ تَحْتَ أَيْدِيكُمْ فَمَنْ جَعَلَ اللَّهُ أَخَاهُ تَحْتَ يَدِهِ فَلْيُطْعِمْهُ مِمَّا يَأْكُلُ وَلْيُلْبِسْهُ مِمَّا يَلْبَسُ وَلَا يُكَلِّفُهُ مِنَ الْعَمَلِ مَا يَغْلِبُهُ فَإِنْ كَلَّفَهُ مَا يَغْلِبُهُ فَلْيُعِنْهُ عَلَيْهِ (رواه البخارى)
” Para perkerja adalah saudaramu yang dikuasakan Allah kepadamu. Maka barang siapa mempunyai pekerja hendaklah diberi makanan sebagaimana yang ia makan, diberi pakaian sebagaimana yang ia pakai, dan jangan dipaksa melakukan sesuatu yang ia tidak mampu. Jika terpaksa, ia harus dibantu” (HR. Ahmad).
Hadith ini sangat jelas menyatakan bahwa keamanan buruh berada dalam tanggungan para majikan. Kewajiban memberi makanan dan pakaian sebagaimana yang dipakai majikan, jika dipahami dengan pemahaman Isha>rah al-Nas}, adalah perintah untuk menyediakan basic need, sebagaimana dibayangkan Maslow. Juga, larangan memaksa melakukan pekerjaan yang mereka tidak mampu dan kewajiban membantu melaksanakan pekerjaan tersebut bisa dipahami sebagai kewajiban memberikan fasilitas dan perlindungan kerja.
Pemaknaan secara isha>ri> ini akan menemukan kerangka yang lebih kongkrit ketika kita memahaminya dengan menggunakan beberapa prinsip yang ada dalam Islam. Prinsip tersebut antara lain adalah:
a. Prinsip al-Maslah}ah} al-Mursalah, yaitu suatu prinsip kemashlahatan umum yang telah menjadi acuan sahabat dan tabi’in, terutama masalah yang berkaitan dengan kepentingan umum yang tidak ada ketentuannya dalam berbagai hukum syarak atau semisalnya.
b. Prinsip al-Istih}san, yaitu persetujuan terhadap sesuatu karena sesuatu itu mengandung kebaikan yang berguna untuk manusia. Ia merupakan satu prinsip yang digunakan oleh fuqaha dalam usaha untuk menda-patkan beberapa kepentingan yang sangat diperlukan oleh manusia.
c. Prinsip al-Istish}ab, yaitu mengqiyaskan satu masalah yang sudah ijmak hukumnya terhadap masalah yang baru yang belum ada hukumnya.
d. Prinsip sadd al-dhara>’i’, yaitu prinsip menghindari bahaya yang diramalkan akan berlaku.
Prinsip-prinsip di atas dapat dijabarkan menjadi bagian-bagian yang lebih khusus dengan berdasarkan pada kebutuhan pihak-pihak yang bertransaksi. Upaya penerjemahan ini telah dimulai oleh para fuqaha. Secara fiqh, hubungan kerja antara buruh-majikan dikonsepsi menjadi ‘akad ijarah yang merupakan akad pertukaran manfaat dan upah. Sebagai konsekwensi akad, pihak majikan bertanggung jawab atas berbagai hal yang menyangkut keselamatan pekerja. Oleh karena itu, pihak pekerja mempunyai hak untuk mendapatkan pelayanan kesehatan dan perawatan secara teratur agar bisa menjalankan pekerjaan sebagaimana yang tercantum dalam perjanjian kerja.
Para fuqaha mengharuskan majikan untuk memberikan anggaran biaya perawatan kesehatan bagi setiap orang dalam waktu satu sesi kerja. Biaya tersebut perlu dipersiapkan lebih awal, karena tidak diketahui dengan pasti kapan para pekerja itu akan jatuh sakit. Adalah sebuah kesalahan (dan juga termasuk perbuatan menganiaya) jika majikan membiarkan pekerjanya sakit, di mana yang sakit itu masih menjadi tanggungannya selama dalam jangka waktu yang tercantum dalam perjanjian kerja.
Mengenai buruh anak, istilah itu sendiri senantiasa memunculkan berbagai interpretasi yang lebih menjurus kepada soal-soal negatif, seperti isu kemiskinan, keterpaksaan dan kekerasan. Nabi sangat menyadari posisi dilematis ini. Karena itulah beliau menyatakan:
…وَلَا تُكَلِّفُوا الصَّغِيرَ الْكَسْبَ فَإِنَّهُ إِذَا لَمْ يَجِدْ سَرَقَ وَعِفُّوا إِذْ أَعَفَّكُمُ اللَّهُ وَعَلَيْكُمْ مِنَ الْمَطَاعِمِ بِمَا طَابَ مِنْهَا (رواه مالك)
Dari kata idha> lam yajid saraqa dapat dipahami bahwa fenomena pekerja anak bukanlah fenomena normal. Semua itu lahir dari kemiskinan, yang jika tidak terpenuhi mereka akan terjebak pada pencurian.
Termasuk dalam kategori melindungi keselamataan dan kesehatan kerja adalah dengan memberinya hak istirahat dan cuti. Aturan cuti ini juga selaras dengan misi Islam untuk menghilangkan eksploitasi terhadap makhluk, termasuk buruh. Tidak memberi kesempatan istirahat secara cukup terhadap buruh termasuk bagian dari eksploitasi, yang merupakan kesalahan besar dan bertentangan dengan fitrah kemanusiaan. Dalam al-Qur’an Allah berfirman:
…لَا يُكَلِّفُ اللَّهُ نَفْسًا إِلَّا مَا ءَاتَاهَا سَيَجْعَلُ اللَّهُ بَعْدَ عُسْرٍ يُسْرًا(الطلاق : 7)
“…Allah tidak memikulkan beban kepada seseorang melainkan (sekedar) apa yang Allah berikan kepadanya. Allah kelak akan memberikan kelapangan sesudah kesempitan”
Setiap pekerja mempunyai hak untuk beristirahat dan juga mendapatkan ketenangan jasmani dan rohani. Tuntutan akan hal-hal tersebut menjadi tanggung jawab majikan selama ia masih terikat dengan perjanjian kerja dengannya.
Keseimbangan antara tuntutan jasmani dan ruhani merupakan anjuran syari’at, seperti sabda Rasulullah SAW;
حَدَّثَنِي عَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ عَمْرِو بْنِ الْعَاصِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا قَالَ لِي رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَا عَبْدَ اللَّهِ أَلَمْ أُخْبَرْ أَنَّكَ تَصُومُ النَّهَارَ وَتَقُومُ اللَّيْلَ فَقُلْتُ بَلَى يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ قَالَ فَلَا تَفْعَلْ صُمْ وَأَفْطِرْ وَقُمْ وَنَمْ فَإِنَّ لِجَسَدِكَ عَلَيْكَ حَقًّا وَإِنَّ لِعَيْنِكَ عَلَيْكَ حَقًّا وَإِنَّ لِزَوْجِكَ عَلَيْكَ حَقًّا وَإِنَّ لِزَوْرِكَ عَلَيْكَ حَقًّا… (رواه البخارى)
”Wahai Abdullah, saya mendengar kabar bahwa engkau puasa disiang hari dan shalat semalam suntuk. ‘Abdullah menjawab: Benar, wahai Rasul. Rasul bersabda: jangan lakukan itu. Fisikmu, matamu, istrimu, dan tamumu mempunyai hak atas dirimu…”
Kata jasd dalam kontek hadis ini, sebagaimana yang diyakini Ibn Hajar, adalah memberikan hak dasarnya, termasuk didalamnya istirahat, baik jasmani maupun ruhani.
Secara fiqh, hak untuk beristirahat bagi adalah bagian integral dari kontrak, sehingga ketentuan tersebut harus diperjelas dan terpisah dari waktu kerja.
Soal aturan khsus bagi perempuan, termasuk didalamnya waktu istirahat, memang sangat diperlukan. Hal ini karena ada waktu-waktu tertentu dimana ia mempunyai tuntutan reproduksi yang tidak bisa dibatalkan oleh siapapun. Kita tidak boleh memaksa mereka untuk tidak punya anak, tidak menyusui, tidak haid dan semisalnya, karena semua itu fitrah mereka. Kita juga tidak boleh menolak buruh perempuan karena alasan-alasan tidak produktif, karena produktivitas perempuan tidak semata-mata diukur dari sisi jam kerja. Allah berfirman:
وَلَا تَتَمَنَّوْا مَا فَضَّلَ اللَّهُ بِهِ بَعْضَكُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ لِلرِّجَالِ نَصِيبٌ مِمَّا اكْتَسَبُوا وَلِلنِّسَاءِ نَصِيبٌ مِمَّا اكْتَسَبْنَ وَاسْأَلُوا اللَّهَ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمًا ( النساْ: 32(
” Dan janganlah kamu iri hati terhadap apa yang dikaruniakan Allah kepada sebahagian kamu lebih banyak dari sebahagian yang lain. (Karena) bagi orang laki-laki ada bahagian daripada apa yang mereka usahakan, dan bagi para wanita (pun) ada bahagian dari apa yang mereka usahakan, dan mohonlah kepada Allah sebagian dari karunia-Nya. Sesungguhnya Allah Maha Mengetahui segala sesuatu”
Untuk itu, menjadi benar jika undang-undang mengkhususkan waktu-waktu cuti bagi perempuan, sebagaimana uraian di atas. Dalam sebuah Hadith, Nabi juga berpesan agar jangan memaksakan pekerjaan terhadap tenaga kerja perempaun. Imam Malik meriwayatkan bahwa:
حَدَّثَنِي مَالِك عَنْ عَمِّهِ أَبِي سُهَيْلِ بْنِ مَالِكٍ عَنْ أَبِيهِ أَنَّهُ سَمِعَ عُثْمَانَ بْنَ عَفَّانَ وَهُوَ يَخْطُبُ وَهُوَ يَقُولُ لَا تُكَلِّفُوا الْأَمَةَ غَيْرَ ذَاتِ الصَّنْعَةِ الْكَسْبَ فَإِنَّكُمْ مَتَى كَلَّفْتُمُوهَا ذَلِكَ كَسَبَتْ بِفَرْجِهَا … (مالك)
“Usman berkata dalam sebuah pidatonya: Janganlah kalian memaksa buruh perempuan yang tidak layak kerja untuk bekerja. Sebab, jika hal itu terjadi, mereka akan berkerja dengan alat vitalnya”
Karena cuti dengan mekanisme di atas telah sesuai dengan hak reproduksi perempuan, maka pihak majikan tidak boleh membatalkan hak tersebut, apalagi sampai memutuskan hubungan kerja.
4. Hak melaksanakan ibadah yang diwajibkan oleh agamanya dengan tetap mendapatkan upah.
Dalam sebuah negara demokrasi, melakukan internalisasi terhadap standar, harapan, prinsip, norma, ide dan keyakian yang dipegangnya adalah hak azasi. Ia berhak mengetahui, memahami, dan mengambil tindakan sesuai dengan nilai-nilai yang diyakininya. Dalam konteks seorang buruh muslim, nilai tersebut adalah keimanannya. Keimanan dalam perspektif ini adalah keyakinan pada keesaan Allah yang terbangun jauh sebelum ia dilahirkan, sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam firman-Nya:
وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِنْ بَنِي ءَادَمَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ وَأَشْهَدَهُمْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمْ أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ قَالُوا بَلَى شَهِدْنَا أَنْ تَقُولُوا يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ إِنَّا كُنَّا عَنْ هَذَا غَافِلِينَ (الاعراف: 172)
Dan (ingatlah), ketika Tuhanmu mengeluarkan keturunan anak-anak Adam dari sulbi mereka dan Allah mengambil kesaksian terhadap jiwa mereka (seraya berfirman): “Bukankah Aku ini Tuhanmu?” Mereka menjawab: “Betul (Engkau Tuhan kami), kami menjadi saksi”. (Kami lakukan yang demikian itu) agar di hari kiamat kamu tidak mengatakan: “Sesungguhnya kami (bani Adam) adalah orang-orang yang lengah terhadap ini (keesaan Tuhan)”,
Agar iman berjalan lurus, stabil, konsisten, dan mempunyai daya responsifitas tinggi, Islam tidak memisahkan keimanan (faith) dari pengetahuan (knowledge). Jelas pandangan ini berseberangan dengan pandangan yang menyatakan bahwa agama dan pengetahuan secara tegas terpisah dan saling eksklusif. Islamlah yang paling peduli menumbuhkan konvergensi dan kesatuan dalam keragaman.
Ketidakterpisahan antara keimanan dan pengetahuan menandakan bahwa, pertama, pengetahuan dalam pengertiannya yang paling luas diinspirasikan oleh keimanan yang mengantarkan pada jalan yang lurus; dan kedua, pengetahuan tidak hanya mengarahkan bagaimana seseorang harus berindak, tetapi juga menginspirasikan dan mengkarakterisasikan bentuk-bentuk tindakan (action).
Keterkaitan antara keimanan (faith), pengetahuan (knowledge), dan tindakan (action) menunjukkan kesatuan elemen-elemen itu, yaitu, sebuah pemahaman yang mengantarkan diri pada kesadaran diri (self consciousness) untuk selalu menghambakan dirinya hanya pada Allah.
Dengan paradigma ini, pelaksanaan ibadah bagi seorang buruh bukan sebagai tindakan yang merugikan pihak majikan karena mengurangi waktu, akan tetapi justru sebagai mekanisme untuk membangun kesadaran diri yang memunculkan spirit, motivasi, dan kekuatan baru untuk bekerja lebih baik sehingga produktivitas kerjanya akan naik. Dengan ibadah, ia akan semakin menyadari makna Hadith Nabi:
عَنْ أَبِي بَكْرٍ الصِّدِّيقِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ بَخِيلٌ وَلَا خَبٌّ وَلَا خَائِنٌ وَلَا سَيِّئُ الْمَلَكَةِ وَأَوَّلُ مَنْ يَقْرَعُ بَابَ الْجَنَّةِ الْمَمْلُوكُونَ إِذَا أَحْسَنُوا فِيمَا بَيْنَهُمْ وَبَيْنَ اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ وَفِيمَا بَيْنَهُمْ وَبَيْنَ مَوَالِيهِمْ (رواه احمد)
“Tidak masuk Surga orang pelit, penipu, pengkhianat, dan orang yang jelek pelayananannya terhadap majikan. Sedangkan orang yang pertama kali mengetuk pintu Surga adalah para buruh yang baik terhadap sesamanya, taat kepada Allah, dan kepada majikannya. (HR Ahmad)
Hadith ini dengan lugas menyatakan bahwa kewajiban kepada Allah dan majikannya bukan sesuatu yang antagonistik, tapi seseuatu yang saling mengisi. Oleh karena itu, Islam tidak memetaforakan tenaga kerja sebagai sebagai mesin, yang kemudian kehidupan, struktur, dan individualitasnya dirancang dan dikendalikan secara mekanistis. Sungguh, penggunaan metafora mesin, secara radikal telah merombak hakikat aktivitas produksi dan telah meninggalkan jejaknya dalam pikiran, pemikiran, dan perasaaan manusia selama beberapa waktu. Dan implikasi-implikasi lain dapat ditemukan, seperti presisi dan repetisi kerja mekanik, aktivitas-aktivitas yang dapat diramalkan hasilnya, dan kehidupan yang kering dari nilai kehidupan.
Metafora seperti ini tentu mempunyai efek yang menguntungkan dan merugikan. Efek menguntungkannya adalah produk yang dihasilkan dapat dengan pasti dihitung, sehingga tujuan majikan dapat tercapai. Akan tetapi, Effek terburuk yang terjadi adalah mengurangi dan merendahkan hakikat esensial manusia sebagai aktor sosial yang mampu mengkonstruk realitas sosialnya sendiri yang peniuh dengan makna. Bukan realitas yang kering norma, nilai atau etika yang pada akhirnya menambah rasa keterasingan aktor-aktor sosial dari hakikat kemanusiaan mereka.
Oleh karena itu, sebagaimana Hadi>th di atas, Islam memandang kerja sebagai amanah yang bermata ganda. Seorang buruh harus menjalankan amanah Allahnya, disamping amanah majikannya. Dengan cara ini, maka majikan tidak boleh melarang buruh menjalankan ibadah menurut keyakinan mereka. Majikan juga tidak perlu kuatir pekerjaan akan terbengkalai, karena jika hal itu terjadi, maka si buruh telah mengkhianati amanah majikannya dan bertentangan dengan misi peribadatan itu sendiri. Dalam sebuah Hadi>th, Nabi bersabda:
حَدَّثَنَا يَزِيدُ بْنُ هَارُونَ أَخْبَرَنَا صَدَقَةُ بْنُ مُوسَى عَنْ فَرْقَدٍ السَّبَخِيِّ عَنْ مُرَّةَ الطَّيِّبِ عَنْ أَبِي بَكْرٍ الصِّدِّيقِ رَضِي اللَّهم عَنْهم عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهم عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ لَا يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ خَبٌّ وَلَا بَخِيلٌ وَلَا مَنَّانٌ وَلَا سَيِّئُ الْمَلَكَةِ وَأَوَّلُ مَنْ يَدْخُلُ الْجَنَّةَ الْمَمْلُوكُ إِذَا أَطَاعَ اللَّهَ وَأَطَاعَ سَيِّدَه (رواه احمد)
Rumusan ini memang masih abstrak dan normatif. Oleh karena itu, metafora amanah perlu diterjemahkan ke dalam bentuk-bentuk nyata dan operatif yang merge dengan karakter, kebutuhan masyarakat, dan lingkungan, serta kekuatan sosial lain.
5. Hak memperoleh penghasilan yang memenuhi penghidupan yang layak bagi kemanusiaan.
Sebelum bicara lebih jauh berbicara tentang upah, terlebih dulu harus diperhatikan asumsi dasar pengupahan, yakni pertama, ada hubungan yang signifikan antara upah dengan perolehan laba; dan kedua, ada tindakan tidak maksimal dari pihak buruh jika upah tidak diperhatikan.
Ada banyak teori yang menjelaskan besaran dan jenis upah yang mesti diterima buruh. Antara lain adalah; 1] Teori Subsistensi yang digunakan untuk pekerja yang tidak mempunyai keterampilan khusus. Upah, menurut teori ini, didasarkan pada tingkat subsistensi sesuai tingkat kebutuhan mendasar; 2] Teori Dana Upah. Menurut terori ini, upah pekerja adalah bagian dari modal untuk berproduksi. Besaran upah pekerja akan selalu didasarkan pada penambahan modal atau pengurangan jumlah pekerja; 3] Teori Marginal Productivity. Menurut teori ini, upah tenaga kerja didasarkan pada permintaan dan penawaran tenaga kerja. Pengusaha akan menambah upah pekerja sampai batas pertambahan produktivitas marjinal minimal sama dengan upah yang diberikan pada mereka. 4]. Teori Bargaining. Teori ini mengandaikan ada batas minimal dan maksimal upah. Upah yang ada merupakan hasil persetujuan kedua belah pihak; 5] Teori Daya Beli. Teori ini mendasarkan permintaan pasar atas barang dengan upah. Agar barang terbeli, maka upah harus tinggi. Jika upah rendah, maka daya beli tidak ada, dan barang tidak laku. Jika hal ini dibiarkan, maka akan terjadi pengangguran besar-besaran; 6] Teori upah hukum alam. Teori ini menyatakan bahwa upah ditetapkan atas dasar biaya yang diperlukan untuk memelihara atau memulihkan tenaga buruh yang telah dipakai untuk berproduksi.
Konsepsi Islam tentang upah sesungguhnya hampir sama dengan Teori Marginal Productivity dan Teori Bargaining. Sebagaimana penjelasan di atas, teori marginal productivity menyatakan bahwa upah tenaga kerja didasarkan pada permintaan dan penawaran tenaga kerja. Pengusaha akan menambah upah pekerja sampai batas pertambahan produktivitas marjinal minimal sama dengan upah yang diberikan pada mereka. Dengan cara ini, maka upah dapat ditentukan secara transparan, seksama, adil, dan tidak menindas pihak manapun. Setiap pihak mendapat bagian yang sah dari hasil usahanya, tanpa menzalimi pihak yang lain, sebagaimana firman Allah SWT:
وَأَنْ لَيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَى وَأَنَّ سَعْيَهُ سَوْفَ يُرَى ثُمَّ يُجْزَاهُ الْجَزَاءَ الْأَوْفَى (النجم :39-41)
“Dan bahwasanya seorang manusia tiada memperoleh selain apa yang telah diusahakannya. Dan bahwasanya usahanya itu kelak akan diperlihatkan (kepadanya). Kemudian akan diberi balasan kepadanya dengan balasan yang paling sempurna”
Setelah besaran upah berdasarkan produktivitas marjinal ketemu angkanya, kedua belah pihak kemudian melakukan bargaining berdasarkan perubahan umum tingkat harga barang dan biaya kebutuhan hidup, sehingga upah riil merupakan hasil persetujuan kedua belah pihak. Islam selalu memotivasi untuk memberikan penjelasan (dan persetujuan) besaran upah dari kedua belah pihak. Nabi bersabda:
عَنْ أَبِي سَعِيدٍ الْخُدْرِيِّ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهم عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ نَهَى عَنِ اسْتِئْجَارِ الْأَجِيرِ حَتَّى يُبَيَّنَ لَهُ أَجْرُهُ وَعَنِ النَّجْشِ وَاللَّمْسِ وَإِلْقَاءِ الْحَجَرِ ( احمد)
“Sesungguhnya Nabi melarang mempekerjakan buruh sampai ia menjelaskan besaran upahnya, melarang Lams, najash dan ilqa>’ al-hajr”
Masuknya kompenen biaya hidup dalam upah, tidak semata-mata pertimbangan produktivitas kerja, memang masalah tersendiri jika majikan memetaforakan tenaga kerja sebagai mesin. Akan tetapi, dengan pertimbangan surplus value dan kemanusiaan, hal tersebut bisa diterima.
Dalam konteks inilah Islam bisa menerima kehadiran Upah Minimum. Allah berfirman:
إِنَّ لَكَ أَلَّا تَجُوعَ فِيهَا وَلَا تَعْرَى وَأَنَّكَ لَا تَظْمَأُ فِيهَا وَلَا تَضْحَى (طه : 119-120)
“Sesungguhnya kamu tidak akan kelaparan di dalamnya dan tidak akan telanjang. dan sesungguhnya kamu tidak akan merasa dahaga dan tidak (pula) akan ditimpa panas matahari di dalamnya”.
Nabi juga menyatakan bahwa:
سَمِعْتُ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهم عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَقُولُ مَنْ وَلِيَ لَنَا عَمَلًا وَلَيْسَ لَهُ مَنْزِلٌ فَلْيَتَّخِذْ مَنْزِلًا أَوْ لَيْسَتْ لَهُ زَوْجَةٌ فَلْيَتَزَوَّجْ أَوْ لَيْسَ لَهُ خَادِمٌ فَلْيَتَّخِذْ خَادِمًا أَوْ لَيْسَتْ لَهُ دَابَّةٌ فَلْيَتَّخِذْ دَابَّةً وَمَنْ أَصَابَ شَيْئًا سِوَى ذَلِكَ فَهُوَ غَالٌّ (احمد)
“Saya mendengar Nabi bersabda: Barang siapa mengangkat pekerja, jika ia tidak mempunyai rumah harus dibikinkan rumah; jika belum menikah harus dinikahkan; jika tidak mempunyai pembantu harus dicarikan pembantu; jika tidak mempunyai kendaraan harus diberikan kendaraan. Jika Majikan tidak memberikan hal tersebut, ia adalah pembunuh”
Dari ayat dan Hadi>th ini kita mengetahui bahwa besaran upah dikaitkan dengan hak dasar untuk hidup (hifz al-nafs) secara layak, bukan semata-mata oleh sejauhmana produktivitas mereka.
Dengan demikian, dalam Islam, upah yang layak bukanlah semata-mata konsesi buruh-majikan, tetapi merupakan hak asasi yang dapat dipaksakan oleh kekuasaan negara. Majikan harus memberikan upah minimum yang bisa menutupi keperluan dasar hidup yang meliputi makanan, pakaian, tempat tinggal, dan sebagainya.
Data sejarah menunjukkan bahwa upah minimum dimasa Rasul (tahun 5 H) adalah 200 Dirham, sedang upah maksimumnya adalah 2000 dirham, dengan perbandingan 1:10. Seiring dengan perkembangan perekonomian Madinah saat itu, upah minimumnya menjadi 300 dirham
dan upah maksimumnya 3000 dirham.
Namun perlu diingat pula, bahwa adanya jaminan kebutuhan ini bukan berarti Islam menyamakan seluruh upah sebagaimana dibayangkan mazhab sosialis. Islam tetap mengakui perbedaan upah karena faktor perbedaan skill dan pengalaman kerja.
6. Hak mendirikan dan menjadi anggota serikat buruh.
Penulis tidak menemukan padanan kata arab untuk kata guild (serikat pekerja). Istilah ‘T{a>ifah’ yang sering digunakan untuk menyebut serikat pekerja, sebenarnya menunjukkan pengertian yang lebih luas, yakni suatu komunitas atau kelompok, khususnya kelompok keagamaan atau nasional. Sedangkan kata hirfah dan Shinf, yang juga kadang-kadang dipakai, lebih berarti perdagangan, bukan organisasinya. Ketiadaan padanan kata yang pas bagi ‘serikat pekerja’ mungkin akibat terlambatnya kemunculan serikat pekerja di dunia arab.
Menurut Claude Cahen dan Samuel Stren dalam The Islamic City (1970), serikat pekerja secara resmi baru muncul di era Uthmaniyyah. Di Turki Anatolia, organisasi profesional pernah muncul pada abad XIV, yang kala itu disebut Akhi dan Fityan, sebagaimana di ulas oleh Ibn Battutah. Dokumen lain menyebut adanya kelompok-kelompok profesional (jama’ah) sebelum penaklukan Uthmaniyyah, yang dipimpin oleh Sheikh dan dikontrol oleh muhtasib. Serikat Pekerja ini aktif di Andalusia, dimana institusi Hisbah terorganisasi dengan baik.
Sejak abad keenam belas hingga kesembilan belas, serikat-serikat pekerja terorganisir diseputar wilayah perdagangan dan kegiatan pertukangan. Mereka hidup di pasar kota, termasuk pasar yang dikelola oleh grossir (pedagang besar) rempah-rempah dan tujjar (pedagang kain) yang merupakan bagian dari sistem itu. Tidak hanya pedagang besar, pedagang kecil-pun mempunyai serikat pekerja. Bahkan, pencuri tampaknya juga mempunyai serikat pekerja.
Serikat pekerja umumnya dikepalai oleh seorang Shaikh (Timur Dekat) atau Ami>n (Maghribi) yang dipilih oleh anggota serikat pekerja, dan disahkan oleh otoritas lokal atau penguasa pusat, sebagaimana dibuktikan oleh sarana nominasi di Istanbul. Tampaknya, mereka juga punya otoritas melakukan intervensi, khususnya ketika muncul masalah dengan nominasi seorang shaikh atau ami>n.
Dalam tradisi Syi’ah, keberadaan serikat pekerja dipertalikan dengan Nabi melalui wali pelindung mereka, pir. Imam Ali yang dilantik Nabi Muhammad dalam upacara pengikatan (shadd), pada gilirannya meresmikan tujuh belas pir, dan kemudian Salman Al-Farisi (sahabat Nabi dan pelindung tukang cukur) mengambil sumpah para pelindung serikat pekerja non ekonomi lainnya (mu’azin, pembawa panji/pemimpin) dan serikat pekerja non tradisional (kopi disebut, tetapi tembakau tidak).
Dengan menyimak data sejarah di atas, maka dapat dikatakan bahwa dalam Islam, peranan serikat pekerja di bidang ekonomi antara lain adalah mengatur produksi barang, menjaga kode etik profesi, menjaga stabilitas harga, khususnya pada masa krisis, membina hubungan baik antar anggota, dan memasok tenaga kerja.
Serikat pekerja juga membantu mengelola kota di area ekonominya sendiri, dan dengan demikian mereka membantu memelihara tatanan. Oleh karena itu, serikat pekerja telah memainkan sebuah mekanisme yang sangat dibutuhkan kota yang tak punya struktur administratif yang jelas. Dengan mengorganisasi penduduk pekerja sesuai dengan profesinya, serikat pekerja telah memberikan andil secara efesien bagi keseimbangan sosial.
7. Hak melakukan mogok kerja.
Harus diakui, bahwa pemogokan buruh memang persoalan yang krusial. Pemogokan dapat diartikan sebagai penarikan diri seorang buruh dari pekerjaannya yang selama ini dilakukan, dengan harapan memperoleh perlakuan atau penghasilan yang lebih baik. Pressure ini akan mengakibatkan produksi terhenti, sehingga harga akan naik, dan majikan akan mengalami kerugian.
Jawaban dari langkah ini, jika kesepakatan tetap tidak tercapai, adalah dengan lock out atau menutup perusahaan. Target dari langkah ini adalah untuk memaksakan keinginan majikan terhadap buruh, sebab buruh akan dihadapkan pada dua pilihan yang sama-sama sulit; tetap kerja atau PHK.
Secara umum, ada dua motivasi besar pemogokan, yaitu faktor ekonomis dan faktor psikologis. Secara ekonomis, laba merupakan penambahan tenaga buruh atas modal, atau pinjam istilahnya Marx, suplus value. Jika buruh hanya diberi sekedar untuk mencukupi taraf hidupnya yang minimal, sementara majikan memiliki kelebihannya, mau tak mau hal ini akan menimbulkan rasa tidak senang buruh. Maraknya model kerja lembur disaat banyak pengangguran seperti sekarang ini, tidak lain adalah upaya majikan untuk mengurangi hak kaum miskin yang merugikan buruh karena bersifat retrogresif, menghilangkan standar upah yang sebenarnya, memperbanyak pengangguran, dan juga membahayakan kesehatan pekerja.
Sedangkan faktor psikologis penyebab mogok adalah adanya keberpihakan pemerintah lebih kepada majikan dari pada buruh. Para majikan dengan cerdik membuat regulasi yang menekan buruh pada posisi inferior. Karena keterdesakan ini, kemudian muncul perlawanan (baca: pemogokan) kolektif. Umumnya, hal ini disebabkan adanya ketidakadilan regulasi mengenai konstruk hubungan kerja, syarat-syarat kerja dan/atau keadaan perburuhan. Namun demikian, ada pula pemogokan yang bersifat personal, jika ternyata si buruh tidak menjadi anggota serikat pekerja. Karena dipicu oleh hal-hal tersebut di atas, sampai saat pemogokan masih merupakan masalah besar yang pro-kontra.
Apapun alasannya, baik mogok ataupun pemecatan (termasuk lock out) sebenarnya bukan pilihan ideal, karena keduanya berdampak negatif dalam skala makro. Karena itulah, Islam mengidealkan musyawarah kolektif dibawah panji-panji norma Islam untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan industrial.
Akan tetapi, jika hal tersebut tidak tercapai, pertanyaannya kemudian adalah sejauh mana hak untuk mogok dan memecat diperkenankan? Ini masalah yang tidak bisa dijawab secara hitam-putih dan memuaskan semua pihak. Sebab disana ada banyak variabel, seperti tingkat pemusatan tenaga kerja, orientasi gerakan buruh, tingkat kesenjangan, kebijakan perusahaan dan perundang-undangan pemerintah.
Akan tetapi, jika kedua belah pihak mau menghayati nilai-nilai Islam, setidaknya persoalan tersebut dapat berkurang. Sebab, kedua belah pihak harus tunduk dalam panji-panji Islam. Majikan dilarang menghisap buruh, buruh-pun dilarang menuntut sesuatu yang tidak mungkin dilakukan oleh majikan.
Dalam Islam, ada beberapa norma yang bisa kita jadikan sebagai basic ideas untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan antara buruh dan majikan secara damai, jujur dan menjamin rasa keadilan bagi kedua belah pihak.
Pertama-tama harus dipahami, bahwa kedua belah pihak terikat dengan norma amanah. Seorang majikan mempunyai amanah untuk mengelola perusahaan dengan cara yang adil dan tidak menindas, sementara buruh juga mempunyai amanah untuk melaksanakan tugasnya dengan baik, tidak curang, apalagi mengkhianati majikan. Dalam konteks inilah Allah berfirman:
إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُكُمْ أَنْ تُؤَدُّوا الْأَمَانَاتِ إِلَى أَهْلِهَا وَإِذَا حَكَمْتُمْ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ أَنْ تَحْكُمُوا بِالْعَدْلِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ نِعِمَّا يَعِظُكُمْ بِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا(النساء:58)
“Sesungguhnya Allah menyuruh kamu menyampaikan amanat kepada yang berhak menerimanya, dan (menyuruh kamu) apabila menetapkan hukum di antara manusia supaya kamu menetapkan dengan adil. Sesungguhnya Allah memberi pengajaran yang sebaik-baiknya kepadamu. Sesungguhnya Allah adalah Maha Mendengar lagi Maha Melihat”
Dengan cara ini, hubungan industrial buruh-majikan akan berjalan dengan damai, aman, kondusif dan produktif. Mereka tidak angkuh, keras kepala, boikot, dan saling mencari kesalahan pihak lain. Yang diperlukan oleh kesalahan bukan kambing hitam, tapi ma’af dan penyelesaian. Nabi bersabda:
جَاءَ رَجُلٌ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهم عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ كَمْ يُعْفَى عَنِ الْمَمْلُوكِ قَالَ فَصَمَتَ عَنْهُ ثُمَّ أَعَادَ فَصَمَتَ عَنْهُ ثُمَّ أَعَادَ فَقَالَ يُعْفَى عَنْهُ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ سَبْعِينَ مَرَّةً (رواه احمد)
“Seorang laki-laki datang kepada Nabi. Ia bertanya: wahai Rasul, berapa kali seorang buruh layak dimaafkan (jika melakukan kesalahan). Nabi diam saja. Kemudian ia bertanya lagi, dan Nabipun hanya diam. Untuk pertanyaan yang ketga kalinya, Nabi menjawab: Buruh harus dima’afkan, walaupun ia melakukan kesalahan 70 kali sehari”
Jika mereka tidak mau melaksanakannya, sudah pasti iklim kerja berubah menjadi panas, destruktif dan jauh dari tujuan awal. Mereka terjebak pada sikap saling intai, mencari kesalahan pihak lain, dan berkutat pada alasan pembenar untuk menjastifikasi kesalahan masing-masing. Maka tak ayal lagi, situasi kerja menjadi tidak kondusif dan produktivitas meenjadi rendah. Dalam konteks inilah al-Qur’an berpesan agar kondusivitas dirawat sedemikian rupa.
فَبِمَا رَحْمَةٍ مِنَ اللَّهِ لِنْتَ لَهُمْ وَلَوْ كُنْتَ فَظًّا غَلِيظَ الْقَلْبِ لَانْفَضُّوا مِنْ حَوْلِكَ فَاعْفُ عَنْهُمْ وَاسْتَغْفِرْ لَهُمْ وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ فَإِذَا عَزَمْتَ فَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَوَكِّلِينَ (ال عمران : 159)
“Maka disebabkan rahmat dari Allah-lah kamu berlaku lemah-lembut terhadap mereka. Sekiranya kamu bersikap keras lagi berhati kasar, tentulah mereka menjauhkan diri dari sekelilingmu. Karena itu ma`afkanlah mereka, mohonkanlah ampun bagi mereka, dan bermusyawaratlah dengan mereka dalam urusan itu. Kemudian apabila kamu telah membulatkan tekad, maka bertawakkallah kepada Allah. Sesungguhnya Allah menyukai orang-orang yang bertawakkal kepada-Nya”
Sikap angkuh tidak akan menghasilkan apapun kecuali perselisihan, yang berakhir pada pemutusan hubungan kerja (PHK). Kedua belah pihak akan sama-sama rugi dengan tindakan tersebut.
Nabi bersabda:
عَنْ أَنَسِ بْنِ مَالِكٍ قَالَ كَانَ أَخَوَانِ عَلَى عَهْدِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَكَانَ أَحَدُهُمَا يَأْتِي النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَالْآخَرُ يَحْتَرِفُ فَشَكَا الْمُحْتَرِفُ أَخَاهُ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ لَعَلَّكَ تُرْزَقُ بِهِ (رواه الترمذى)
“Salah satu dua orang bersaudara datang kepada Nabi dan mengeluhkan saudaranya yang tidak mau bekerja. Nabi menjawab: Justru (anda terpacu kerja) sehingga mendapatkan hasil sebab dia”
Apabila terpaksa berselisih, dan perselisihan tersebut tidak mampu didamaikan secara intern, yaitu penyelesaian secara bersama antara majikan dan buruh, maka kasus tersebut bisa diselesaikan segera oleh badan arbitrase (al-tahkim) untuk mendamaikannya, sehingga masing-masing pihak merasa puas dengan keputusan itu. Penyelesaian kasus ini pertama-tama dilakukan oleh lembaga yang bertanggung jawab terhadap stabilitas sosial perdagangan yang dikenal dengan nama wilayat al-H{isbah, yang kemudian diteruskan kepada wilayat al-qad}a>’ atau wilayat al-maz}a>lim, sesuai dengan jenis pelanggarannya. Ketiga kekuasaan ini, masing-masing mempunyai tugas dan wewenang tersendiri yang berbeda antara satu dengan yang lain, tetapi ketiganya mempunyai tujuan yang sama yaitu menciptakan keamanan, ketertiban, dan keadilan di tengah-tengah masyarakat.

D. Obkektifikasi Konsep Islam di Indonesia
Dari penjelasan diatas dapat dikatakan bahwa konsep hubungan industrial dirumuskan Islam sebagai pola perilaku manajemen yang didasarkan pada penghormatan setiap individu sebagai potensi, kapabelitas, pengalaman, hak dan kewajiban masing-masing.
Masalahnya kemudian adalah karena buruh sudah menjadi kelas atau komunitas tersendiri, maka rumusan-rumusan hukum tekstual yang telah dihasilkan oleh ulama terdahulu kurang mampu mengakomodir isu perburuhan kontemporer. Persoalan buruh dewasa ini sudah menjadi masalah sosial yang sangat kompleks yang melibatkan institusi dan struktur-struktur negara. Maka mengkaji isu buruh harus pula melibatkan pendekatan sosial, ekonomi dan politik.
Objektifikasi konsep Islam dalam perindustrian di Indonesia mengharuskan perubahan paradigmatic, dimana hubungan industrial memiliki kualitas yang spesifik dan berbeda dengan negara lain. Sehingga pola hubungan industrial model liberal kapitalis, sosialis, dan semacamnya harus ditolak. Pola hubungan industrial yang diharapkan tumbuh berkembang di negara Indonesia adalah yang memegang teguh nilai dan cara pandang orang Indonesia yang harmonis dan seimbang. Hubungan antara pekerja dan perusahaan bukan didasarkan pada mola profit maximize, tapi pada pola yang saling menguntungkan.
Kehadiran UU nomor 13 tahun 2003 tentang ketenagakerjaan dan UU no 2 tahun 2004 adalah bagian dari skenario besar pemerintah Indonesia untuk menata dan menegosiasikan kepentingan bersama buruh, majikan dan negara. Jika pengusaha berkepentingan terhadap pengembangan modal, buruh berkepentingan menaikkan pendapatan, maka pemerintah berkepentingan mengamankan makro ekonominya. Tanpa kondisi yang kondusif, maka makro ekonomi sebuah negara akan terguncang. Dalam posisi ini, semua pihak akan terkena getahnya.
Buruh berkewajiban menjalankan pekerjaan sesuai dengan kewajibannya, menjaga ketertiban demi kelangsungan produksi, menyalurkan aspirasi secara demokratis, mengembangkan ketrampilan, dan keahliannya serta ikut memajukan perusahaan dan memperjuangkan kesejahteraan anggota beserta keluarganya. Sedangkan majikan berkewajiban menciptakan kemitraan, mengembangkan usaha, memperluas lapangan kerja, dan memberikan kesejahteraan pekerja/buruh secara terbuka, demokratis, dan berkeadilan. Sementara pemerintah, disamping memerankan tiga fungsi, pelindung (protector), pembimbing (guide), dan penengah (arbitrator), juga dituntut untuk lebih aktif membela kepentingan rakyatnya, bukan tunduk begitu saja pada pasar.
Disamping pergeseran paradigma yang berimplikasi pada penerjemahan prinsip-prinsip Islam di atas dalam perundang-undangan, satu hal yang perlu dicermati adalah bahwa perundang-undangan di Indoensia masih mendikotomi buruh dan majikan, sehingga buruh selamanya buruh dan majikan selamanya majikan. Ini merupakan kerawanan yang tersembunyi.
Untuk itu, Islam dapat menawarkan kombinasi konsep ijarah dengan Shirkah inan. Sebagaimana diketahui, bahwa Shirkah ‘Ina>n adalah kontrak kerja sama antara dua orang atau lebih untuk melaksanakan sebuah pekerjaan. Setiap pihak memberikan suatu porsi dari keseluruhan dana, dan juga berpartisipasi dalam kerja. Kedua belah pihak berbagi dalam untung maupun rugi (profit-loss Sharing) sesuai dengan kesepakatan yang mereka capai.
Dengan kombinasi Shirkah Ina>n-Ija>rah, seorang buruh mempunyai posisi yang relatif sama dengan majikan dalam hal keuntungan. Semakin tinggi laba yang diperoleh, maka dengan sendirinya upah mereka akan naik. Begitupun sebaliknya. Jika perusahaan mengalami kerugian, maka seorang buruh-pun ikut merasakan derita majikannya.
Aplikasi teori shirkah ini dapat menggunakan gainsharing approach sebagaimana telah dilakukan oleh Manajemen Sumber Daya Modern. Gainsharing adalah pendekatan kompensasi yang berhubungan dengan outcome tertentu. Sistem ini di set up sebagai bentuk berbagi keuntungan dengan pekerja atas performa dan produktvitas mereka dalam menghasilkan peningkatan laba dalam perusahaan. Biasanya gainsaharing diterapakan terhadap seluruh pekerja, bukan secara individual.
Gainsharing dibagi manjadi tiga kategori, yaitu; kepemilikan pekerja (Employee ownership), sharing produksi (Production Sharing), dan profit sharing.
1. Employee ownership
Employee ownership adalah pendekatan gainsharing bagi pekerja untuk memiliki perusahaan. Beberapa perusahaan memperbolehkan pekerja membeli sahamnya sebagai andil perusahaan. Hasilnya adalah partisipasi pekerja dalam memiliki bagian-bagian perusahaan.
Pendekatan revolusioner ini salah satunya diwujudkan dengan rencana kepemilikan saham pekerja, atau ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan). Sekalipun Employee ownership dilakukan dengan berbagai cara, namun semua berarti pekerja membeli saham perusahaan.
Ada beberapa model ESOP yang bisa dipilih perusahaan. Antara lain adalah:
a. Pekerja membeli saham dengan uang pinjaman berdasarkan perjanjian pekerja.
b. Pekerja membeli saham dengan dana dari kontribusi pajak (tax-deductible contribution).
c. Pekerja membeli saham melalui keuntungan yang akan diperoleh di perusahaan dengan perencanaan tertentu.
d. Pekerja membeli saham melalui perusahaan yang sudah go publik.
Dengan cara tesebut, ESOP sesungguhnya dapat digunakan untuk melindungi perusahaan dari serangan kerja-sama (corporate raider), perburuan membeli perusahaan, pemogokan buruh. ESOP juga bisa menjadi salah satu cara untuk malakukan divestasi perusahaan menuju prospek yang lebih cerah.
2. Production Sharing Plans
Prodution Sharing Plans adalah rencana pembagian produksi dengan pekerja dengan memberikan bonus ketika melebihi tingkat output yang direncanakan. Rencana ini cenderung menjadi jangka pendek dan berhubungan dengan tujuan produksi yang spesifik.
3. Profit-sharing plans
Profit-sharing plans adalah sistem membagi keuntungan perusahaan dengan para pekerja. Profit-sharing dipilih karena keuntungan tidak selalu berhubungan dengan performa pekerja. Sebuah resesi atau kompetisi baru bisa berpangaruh secara signifikan. Beberapa perusahaan kemudian mengantisipasinya dengan mengurangi insentif untuk kemudian mengalokasikannya pada pembagian profit pekerja. Ketika langkah reinforcement (penguatan) ini berjalan dengan baik, maka akan menimbulkan pengaruh yang dramatis pada organisasi, melahirkan kepercayaan baru dan memunculkan perasaan senasib-sepenanggungan di antara para pekerja dan menajemen.
Dengan gainsharing system di atas, maka tidak ada alasan bagi buruh untuk malas bekerja, karena hasil yang akan mereka terima (deviden) bergantung pada produktivitas yang mereka hasilkan. Disamping itu, mereka juga masih menerima upah harian yang besaran dan regulasinya menggunakan model Ijarah, yang secara teoritik hampir sama dengan Teori Marginal Productivity dan Teori Bargaining.
Riset Werther menyebutkan bahwa sistem gainsharing mampu menumbuhkan perasaan senasib sehingga bisa meningkatkan komitmen, performa, produktivitas, dan kualitas kerja. Dia menyatakan bahwa 80 % perusahaan di Amerika menggunakan sistem gainsharing sebagaimana yang telah dilakukan oleh Lincoln Electric. Dengan gainsharing, pengusaha telah membagi informasi finansial dan non finansial dengan pekerja lebih sering (65 persen) dibanding perusahaan tanpa gainsharing (37 persen). Selama tahun 1980 dan awal 1990, penggunaan gainsharing menjadi berlipat ganda.
Di Indonesia, Bank Mandiri dan bank BRI adalah contoh perusahaan yang menerapkan system tersebut. Hasilnya sangat fantastis. Dalam waktu dua tahun sejak pola tersebut diterapkan, return saham Bank Mandiri naik 119 %, sedangkan bank BRI naik 234%.
Sampai disini sesungguhnya masih ada masalah lain, yakni bagaimana menyiapkan basis kesadaran kultural dan struktural yang memungkinkan cita ideal tersebut menjadi sebuah kenyataan sosial-politik di negeri ini. Dalam konteks negara kebangsaan, norma tersebut harus dipahami sebagai bahan baku (raw material) seperti halnya hukum adat atau hukum hukum yang lain, yang bisa saja ditransformasikan menjadi hukum positif sejauh bisa disepakati/diterima oleh forum pengambil keputusan publik (parleman) melalui cara dan prosedur yang demokratis. Wallahu A’lam.


al-Azhari, Abdullah ibn Hija>zi ibn Ibra>hi>m al-Shafi’I, Hashiyah al-Syarqa>wi ‘ala> Tuhfah al-Tulla>b, vol.2 Beirut: Da>r al-Ma’rifah, tt.;
Briggs, Asa “The Walfare State in Historical Perspective” dalam Archives Europeenes de Sociologie, 1961.
Brinton, Crane, “Eglightenment”, dalam Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 2, New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967;
al-Buhuti, Mans}u>r ibn Yu>nus ibn Idris, Sharh Muntaha> al-Ira>dat al-Musamma, vol. 2, Madi>nah: maktabah al-Salafiyah , tt; 1980;
Budiono, Tori Eknomi Mikro, Yogyakarta: BPFE, 1998;
Capra, Umer, Islam dan Tantangan Ekonomi, Jakarta: IIT, 2000;
al-Fanjari, Shauqi, Huquq al-Ummal fi al-Islam, Riyad: Rabithah al-‘alam al-Islami, Gramsci, Antonio, “Ekonomi dan Korporasi Negara” dalam Catatan-catan Politik, terj. Gafna Raiza, Surabaya: Pustaka Promethea, 2001;
Hitti, Philip K. History of The Arabs, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1970;
Indaryani, Mamik, dkk. Hasil Penelitian Penentuan Upah Minimal di Kabupaten Kudus Jawa tengah, Kudus: Kantor Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi bekerja sama dengan Litbang UMK, 2002;
al-Isfiha>ni>, Abu al-Faraj Kita>b al-Agha>ni>, vol. 1, Beiru>t: Mat}ba’ah al-‘Arabiyyah, tt;
Mannan, M.A. Islamic Economy: Theory and Practice, England: Edward Arnold Limited, 1993;
McEachern, William A., Ekonomi Mikro Pendekatan Kontemporer, Jakarta: Thomson Learning, 2001;
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al-Sharbaini, Muhammad al-Kha>tib, Mughni al-Muhta>j, vol. 2, Qa>hirah: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1985;
Setiadji, Bambang, Upah Antar Buruh Industri di Indonesia, Surakarta: Muhammdiyyah University Press, 2002;
Tempo interaktif, 19 Januari 2005
‘Uthma>n, Fakhr al-di>n ibn ‘Ali al-H{anafi, Tabyi>n al-H{aqa>iq, vol. 5, Qa>hirah: Mat}ba’ah al-Kubra> al-A,Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-Isla>m wa Adillatuhu,vol. V, Damaskus: Da>r al-Fikr, 1977.

Manajemen Style

August 22, 2010 Leave a comment

Dari Dustur Rabbani
“ Hai anak Adam, pakailah pakaianmu yang indah di setiap (memasuki) mesjid, makan dan minumlah, dan janganlah berlebih-lebihan. Sesungguhnya Allah tidak menyukai orang-orang yang berlebihan “
(QS al-A’raaf 31)

Manajemen style adalah bagian dari sebuah inovasi (baca: tathawwur,-peny) yang teraplikasikan dalam seni berda’wah (baca: fiqh da’wah,-peny). Penyusun ingin mengutip sebuah pernyataan yang sangat bagus dari sebuah tulisan Akh Afwan Riyadi, ” Strategi dakwah ini dalam kaidah syar’i masih berupa sesuatu yang normatif, sehingga diperlukan pengayaan-pengayaan sebagai manifestasi aplikatif untuk merealisasikannya ”1.
Masyarakat Islam saat ini tengah menunggu kiprah para kader dakwah dalam membawa mereka (masyarakat) ke arah kebaikan dan perbaikan. Masyarakat tersebut terbagi ke dalam beberapa golongan. Ada golongan2 simpati, ragu-ragu, penentang, masyarakat kota, desa, kolot, moderat, pengusaha, birokrat, pedagang, pengamen, pengemis, bahkan-maaf- pelacur dan preman. Yang sudah tentu dalam setiap bagiannya, diperlukan strategi yang beda untuk ’menaklukkannya’ plus tangan-tangan terampil, kepala-kepala bijak dan hati-hati yang lembut untuk mendukungnya.
Oleh karenanya, kecerdasan seorang da’i yang bijak dalam menyampaikan kebenaran sangatlah dibutuhkan, seorang da’i yang menurut Ustadz Arifin Ilham adalah3 pribadi yang selalu berbaik sangka, tidak sinis, tidak pesimis dan suka memvonis. Semua itu agar seruan yang disampaikan mampu menghujam ke dalam relung hati dan tidak sekedar mampir di permukaannya.

Bingkai pemikiran
Sebelum penyusun membahas topik sebenarnya, penyusun ingin sekedar memaparkan sekelumit kaidah yang dijadikan sebagai pijakan dalam pembahasan ini. Sebagaimana kita ketahui bersama bahwa, umat kontemporer (baca: Ikhwah,-peny) haruslah memiliki pemahaman yang benar akan agamanya. Pemahaman yang tidak sekedar catatan di atas kertas atau hapalan di dalam kepala tapi justru lemah di tataran operasional. Pemahaman akan perlunya pengembangan yang berdasar pada keaslian yang ada pada dakwah ini. Sehingga mereka tidak salah kaprah dalam memperjuangkannya.
Maka dari itulah, Imam Asy-Syahid menjelaskan ada dua hal yang menjadi bagian dari manhaj dakwah ini, yakni Tsawabit (sesuatu yang tetap) dan Mutaghayyirat (sesuatu yang senantiasa berubah). Adapun Ustadz Musyaffa Ahmad Rahim Lc. mengatakan bahwa ” Orisinalitas (ashalah) sebenarnya membutuhkan pengembangan (tathawwur) agar mampu mengikuti perkembangan jaman, dan tathawwur tidak boleh ngawur, akan tetapi harus berangkat dari ashalah agar tetap berada pada ash-shiraatal mustaqiim ” 4.
Tarbiyah, sebagaimana salah satu maknanya yang berarti berkembang atau bertambah5, tentunya juga menghendaki adanya penyesuaian-penyesuaian dalam penyampaiannya kepada masyarakat. Seperti penegasan Rasulullah dalam sabdanya yang mulia,” Berdakwahlah dengan bahasa umatmu ”. Alloh pun menurunkan Al-Qur’an kepada bangsa ’Arab, dengan bahasa arab, dan perumpamaan-perumpamaan syurgawi (misalnya) seperti yang mereka pahami akan syurga6. Jadi, sebuah pertanyaan yang harus dijawab adalah, ” Sudahkah pemahaman itu kita miliki ? ”

Ekspansi, antara realita dan konsekuensi
Sebagaimana kita ketahui bersama, dakwah ini telah melalui fase ta’rif (pengenalan) dengan berbagai dinamikanya. Setelah fase ini dilakukan, terjadi pelebaran ruang bagi para simpatisannya yang sangat signifikan untuk dapat melihat dakwah ini lebih dekat. Momen inilah yang harus dimanfaatkan oleh para kader dakwah dan memperkenalkan fikrohnya dengan bahasa yang lebih bisa diterima oleh pendukungnya.
Ekspansi dakwah ini menempatkan posisi kita pada tempat yang strategis di masyakat. Bahkan bukan tidak mungkin, hal-hal sepelepun akan menjadi penilaian di masyarakat awam yang cenderung sebagai pengamat,-seperti baju koko, jilbab, cara shalat, kerapihan, dan lain-lain. Jadi, strategi yang cerdas sangat dibutuhkan dalam menghadapi hal-hal semacam ini. Karena apabila tidak ditanggapi dengan bijak, akan menjadikan imej dakwah menjadi turun. Meski sungguh janji Alloh tetaplah yang pasti akan menjadi jaminannya, QS 61:9.

Adaptasi gaya dalam pergaulan yang terbuka
Seperti yang telah penyusun jelaskan di atas, melebarnya ruang interaksi du’at dengan para objek dakwahnya, ‘memaksa’ para da’i tersebut untuk mau dan mampu beradaptasi dengan konstituennya secara proporsional dan profesional. Inilah yang dahulu dilakukan oleh Rasulullah paska Liqo-at awal mereka di kediaman Arqam dan Abil Arqam . Ungkapan-ungkapan yang sering terdengar,- seperti salah satunya, “ Hari gini belum kenal ikhwan akhwat ? ”-, seharusnya menyadarkan kita akan daya adaptasi yang jauh lebih berat, tanpa penghilangan keaslian dan kekhasan yang sudah ada dari jama’ah ini.
Alloh dengan firman-Nya, “ Sesungguhnya Kami Yang Menurunkan Al-Qur’an dan Kami pulalah Yang akan Menjaganya “, menyuratkan sebuah awal akan karakter yang ada dan yang telah dihasilkan haruslah dikedepankan dan dijadikan sebuah misi yang harus dimenangkan dalam memahami Islam yang integral ini.

Al-Qur’an telah memberi pedoman kepada manusia untuk mendayagunakan pakaian yang telah Alloh anugerahkan kepada hamba-Nya. Yaitu menutup aurat, dan untuk perhiasan khususnya jika hendak pergi ke masjid atau bertemu dengan sesama manusia. Pada dasarnya Islam memberikan kebebasan kepada umatnya dalam cara berpakaian, asal tidak menyalahi syari’at Islam7. Dalam hal ini, penyusun menganggap bahwa ikhwah sekalian sudah cukup paham dengannya, Insya Allah.
Alloh berfirman, “ Hai anak Adam, pakailah pakaianmu yang indah di setiap (memasuki) masjid,…” (QS Al-A’raaf 31).
Dalam ayat ini, Alloh memerintahkan kepada manusia untuk selalu mempergunakan pakaian yang bagus dan indah saat berinteraksi dengan Rabb-nya, atau dengan sesama manusia. Hal itu dilakukan semata-mata sebagai wujud rasa syukurnya kepada Alloh . ” Itu semua merupakan karunia dan nikmat Alloh kepada manusia kepada keta’atan kepada-Nya ”, (Tafsir Ibnu Katsir). Dalam hal ini, Rasulullah bersabda, “ Sesungguhnya bila kamu datang kepada saudara-saudaramu, maka patutkanlah kendaraan-kendaraanmu dan pakaian-pakaianmu sehingga kamu tampak seakan-akan bunga yang harum di antara manusia…” (HR Abu Daud dalam hadits Qais bin Basyir at-Taghlaby dari ayahnya tentang perkataan Abi Darda).

Style dan Produktivitas Tarbawy.
Saat ada seseorang yang menanyakan mengenai hal tersebut, maka yang terbersit dalam pikiran kita tentu saja adanya pemahaman seorang al-akh yang mendalam mengenai karakteristik dakwah8 itu sendiri. Dunia yang senantiasa berubah tentunya menuntut perubahan strategi pula dalam berda’wah, meski harus tetap menjaga orisinalitasnya. Sehingga, adalah sebuah hal yang lucu9, atau boleh dibilang kurang pas, bilamana dakwah telah menyentuh golongan seperti kaum pemusik misalnya, menggunakan,-dalam hal ini-, sorban, tasbih, jubah menjuntai, wajah yang sangar dan muatan seruannya bernada sinis dan langsung memvonis, walaupun itu bukanlah sesuatu yang salah, hanya saja kurang tepat mungkin. Bisa jadi, sebelum kita berbicara, objek tersebut sudah kabur duluan, Wallahu ‘alam.
Asy-Syahid Hasan al-Banna,-semoga Alloh merohmatinya-, mendatangi warung-warung kopi10, yang saat itu dianggap sebagai pusat kegiatan yang sia-sia. Walaupun di awal sambutan yang di dapat kurang hangat, namun dengan kegigihan Imam Al-Banna dan pertolongan Alloh , para tukang nongkrong itulah yang kelak menjadi pilar awal kebangkitan Islam di zaman kontemporer ini.
John T. Malloy dalam Dress for Success mengatakan11 bahwa penampilan (pakaian,-peny) adalah sebagai simbol penghargaan dan tanggung-jawab. Lebih lanjut, penampilan mampu mempengaruhi persepsi orang lain terhadap kita mengenai siapa diri kita. Meski itu bukanlah jaminan yang shahih.
Penyusun sendiri saat pernah bergabung dengan salah satu harakah islam12, pernah mengalami ‘penolakan’ yang halus dan berulang dari orang tua objek dakwah saat anaknya akan didakwahi oleh penyusun. Ini mungkin saja terjadi hanya karena penampilan penyusun yang,-mungkin-, kurang membaur, atau terlihat ‘berbeda’. Atau sebuah cerita dari seorang teman yang merasa ketakutan didakwahi oleh seorang ikhwan dari harakah yang lain karena belum-belum sudah melarang ini dan itu, menilai ini dan itu, dan sebagainya. Akibatnya adalah, teman penyusun tersebut menjadi antipati dan tidak simpati, dan cenderung menjauh saat ikhwan tersebut menjelaskan sebuah perkara. Wallahu ‘alam.

Batasan Berpakaian Menurut Islam
Dalam hal ini, penyusun percaya bahwa para pembaca yang budiman sudah mengerti dan paham mengenai batasan dan kriterianya. Namun tidak ada salahnya untuk dipaparkan disini, sekedar untuk pengingat. Adapun batasan atau kriteria itu antara lain13 :
1. Sebagai penutup aurat
2. Bagi laki-laki, diharamkan untuk memakai sutra
3. Diharamkan penampakan kebancian dan menyerupakan diri pakaian perempuan secara umum
4. Tawadhu’ dan tidak berlebihan
5. Kesucian dan kebersihan
6. Bentuknya yang bagus
7. Wangi alias parfuman donk. Karena Nabi dapat dikenali tidak lewat telapak kakinya, namun lewat aromanya.
8. Tidak menyamai pakaian orang kafir, misalkan:
• Terdapat tanda-tanda kebesaran musuh, salib misalnya.
• Mengandung gambar orang kafir.
• Mengandung tanda yang merusak dan ungkapan yang negatif.
9. Bagi wanita;
• menutup selain selain yang dikecualikan.
• Bukan berfungsi sebagai perhiasan.
• Kainnya tebal dan tidak tipis.
• Tidak diberi wewangian atau parfum.
• Bukan libas syuhrah (pakaian popularitas)
Mengenai poin nomor 4 di atas, Imam Syafi’i, semoga Allah merahmatinya, berkata dalam sya’irnya14,

Baguskanlah pakaianmu semampumu
sesungguhnya hal itu adalah perhiasan bagi laki-laki yang membuatmu agung dan mulia
Jauhilah pakaian kasar hanya karena ingin disebut tawadhu’
Alloh Maha Tahu apa yang kamu rahasiakan dan apa yang kamu simpan
baju barumu tak berbahaya bagimu, setelah kamu takut pada Ilahi dan menjauhi apa yang dilarang
pakaian hina takkan mengangkat kedudukanmu di sisi Alloh
bila kamu hamba yang berbuat dosa

Dandan ? Harus itu…
Nabi Muhammad sebagai manusia yang mulia telah mengajarkan kepada umatnya agar memiliki penampilan yang terbaik dalam kesehariannya. Kita tentu masih ingat akan apa yang Amirul Mukminin ’Umar bin Khaththab lakukan kepada seorang lelaki yang akan diminta cerai istrinya hanya karena penampilannya yang buruk15. Sehingga demi menengahinya, beliau menyuruh lelaki itu untuk berdandan dan merapikan penampilannya. Berikutnya? Wanita itu membatalkan tuntutannya.
Juga sebuah hadits yang menyuruh seorang sahabat untuk merapikan penampilannya saat akan tampil di muka umum. Kita juga ingat akan Abu Dujanah , sahabat mulia yang senantiasa memulai perangnya melawan musuh islam dengan merapikan sorbannya terlebih dahulu16, dan masih banyak lagi kisah yang lainnya.
Mari bersama kita ikuti penuturan dari Ustadz ‘Umar Tilmisani rahimahullah berikut ini17; ” Penampilan adalah refleksi keharmonisan antara warna-warna yang ada pada jas, kemeja, dasi, sapu tangan, kaos kaki dan warna sepatu…Kami, pemuda-pemuda ikhwan, seperti yang biasa dikatakan, adalah pendeta-pendeta di malam hari dan satria-satria gagah di siang hari. Malam harinya kami beribadah dan memperbaiki hubungan kami dengan Alloh. Siang harinya kami tampil berani, dandy, dan selalu berbuat sesuatu yang mendatangkan manfaat bagi kaum muslimin serta menempatkannya secara benar dalam masyarakat dimanapun kami berada “. Subhanalloh, bukankah penampilan itu adalah sesuatu yang tidak main-main ?
Kalaupun hujjah mereka adalah untuk tawadhu’, bisa jadi itu kurang tepat, bilamana yang dihadapinya adalah umat yang belum paham18. Atau malah, itu bisa terjebak dalam Riya’ agar dibilang tawadhu’. Adapun bila penampilan yang baik itu sebagai wujud syukur kita kepada Alloh , maka itulah sebaik-baik amalan. Rasulullah bersabda,” Apabila Alloh memberimu harta, hendaklah kamu memperlihatkan bukti nikmat Alloh atas kamu dan buktikan bahwa kamu memuliakan Alloh ”. (HR Abu Dawud).

Sebuah Otokritik
Ustadz Ahmad Karzun dalam Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam menekankan kepada seluruh mukmin akan pentingnya memilih pakaian dalam menjalani kesehariannya. Berikut kutipannya, “ Adalah sangat penting memilih pakaian yang sesuai bagi manusia untuk menutup auratnya dan untuk menampakkan perhiasannya di hadapan masyarakat. Pakaian merupakan ungkapan perasaan hati, pancaran tingkah laku, bahkan pola pikir pemakainya. Masyarakat umum akan dapat mengetahui kepribadian seseorang dengan mengamati kepribadian seseorang dengan mengamati pakaian yang dikenakannya. Kepribadian tersebut meliputi akhlaqnya, jabatannya maupun karakternya. Orang memang lebih mudah dan lebih cepat menyimpulkan kepribadian seseorang dengan melihat pakaiannya ”. 19
Oleh karenanya, seorang ikhwah yang paham, akan mementingkan penampilannya (salah satunya) bilamana ia akan bertemu dengan khalayaknya. Tentunya penampilan yang sesuai dengan urgensi dan kapasitas pertemuan itu. Bukanlah sebuah hal yang baik, bilamana ada seorang ikhwah yang memiliki kedudukan yang baik di masyarakat tapi melalaikan aspek jasadinya, dalam hal ini penampilan. Mari kita simak penuturan Ibnul Qayyim20 dalam Zaadul Ma’ad, “ Nabi untuk setiap tempat, mengenakan apa yang sesuai “.
Mengenai ketawadhu’an, Rasulullah juga menekankan akan pentingnya hal tersebut, sebagaimana sabdanya, ” Barangsiapa meninggalkan satu jenis pakaian karena tawadhu’ kepada Alloh, sedang di mampu untuk memiliki pakaian tersebut, maka Alloh akan memanggilnya nanti di hari kiamat di antara makhluk-makhluk. Bila ia memilih perhiasan yang diinginkannya, maka Alloh akan memberikannya ”. (HR Tirmidzi). Yang dimaksud dengan tawadhu’ ini adalah bukan berarti memakai pakaian yang jelek (hina) sehingga dihina manusia21. Subhanalloh.

Khatimah : Penyimpangan dari Tujuan
Penyimpangan dari tujuan adalah merupakan penyimpangan yang paling berbahaya dan paling dahsyat daya hadangnya terhadap tarbiyah. Oleh karenanya, setiap murabbi harus memahami bahwa tujuan yang harus dicapai di jalan dakwah adalah Alloh . Jauhnya atau menyimpangnya seorang ikhwah dari tujuan itu, walaupun ’kecil’, akan menghadapkan manhaj tarbiyah pada cacat yang berbahaya.
Riya’, ghurur, congkak, merasa tinggi, ambisi duniawi, dan sebagainya adalah merupakan penyakit hati yang dapat menyimpangkan penderitanya dari tujuan. Maka hancurlah amalnya dan gugurlah pahalanya karena rusaknya niat dan hilangnya keikhlasan.
Yang disebut penyimpangan dari tujuan tidak harus dalam bentuk orientasi terhadap kepentingan-kepentingan dunia secara utuh. Sekadar adanya penyimpangan kecil misalnya dalam persepsi atau dalam amal, maka itu sudah cukup untuk menghambat manhaj tarbiyah yang benar. Wallahu ’alam. 

Berikut ini adalah sebuah kisah yang patut kita renungkan22

Midun, sebut saja demikian. Ia sudah cukup lama mengikuti proses tarbiyah. Midun memiliki halaqah yang cukup sehat. Ini bisa dilihat dari frekuensi pertemuannya yang cukup rutin dan jarang terputus-putus. Begitu pula kehadirannya, Midun dikenal sebagai anggota yang paling jarang absen. Rekan-rekan halaqah-nya pun tergolong ikhwah-ikhwah kelas berat. Kebanyakan mereka adalah tokoh kampus atau masyarakat.
Namun akhir-akhir ini ada perangai Midun yang berubah sejak dia lulus dari kuliahnya. Kini Midun tampak lebih gaul dan trendy. Apalagi sejak ia diterima di salah satu perusahaan bonafid di Jakarta, penampilannya menjadi lebih ‘metroseksual’.
Bukan hanya itu, kegemarannya pun kini mulai bergeser. Kalau dulu lebih suka mengoleksi kaset nasyid atau murottal, kini ia lebih suka mendengarkan kaset-kaset yang lebih nge-pop atau nge-rock. Bahkan beberapa kaset tersebut sudah mampir di kamarnya. Bila dulu lebih sering mengisi waktu malamnya dengan mengaji atau ikut kajian, kini dia lebih sering nongkrong di kafe bersama rekan-rekan kerjanya. Atau bahkan sekali-kali ikut juga nge-dugem, yang dikenal sebagai tempat mengumbar maksiat.
Gaya Midun ini mampu ditutupinya di hadapan Murabbi dan rekan-rekan halaqah-nya. Midun, di hadapan mereka, tetaplah seorang Midun yang tidak pernah bermasalah dalam hal kehadiran.
Kok bisa! ”Bagaimanapun, ane gak mau dibilang ikhwan futuris (Ikhwan yang futur,-peny) ”, begitu mungkin batinnya. Yang pasti, Midun tidak berniat menghilangkan status ‘ikhwah’nya di kalangan ikhwan yang lain. Karena bagaimanapun juga, menurutnya, pangkat ‘ikhwah’ itu masih amat berguna baginya. “Ya, paling nggak, peluang untuk mendapatkan akhwat sebagai istri masih besar “, barangkali itu semboyannya dalam hati.
Yah…semoga saja dia tidak mendapatkan akhwat yang suka nge-dugem juga.

Catatan kaki
Silahkan lihat di Majalah Al-‘Izzah Edisi no.06/Th.4/1-31 Juli 2004.
2 Silahkan baca Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin Jilid I halaman 31-33, Imam Hasan Al-Banna
3 Taushiyah ini penyusun dapatkan dari Nasyid yang berjudul ’Tombo Ati’ dalam Album Taushiyah, Dzikir, Nasyid, Ustadz Arifin Ilham.
4 Penyusun mengusulkan untuk membaca buku Tarbiyah Menjawab Tantangan, halaman 38.
5 Ushulut Tarbiyah, Ustadz DR Abdurrahman an-Nahlawi halaman 12, Ibid.
6 Kembali penyusun menyarankan untuk membaca buku Berinteraksi Dengan Al-Qur’an, karya al-‘Allamah asy-Syaikh DR Yusuf Qaradhawy terbitan Gema Insani Press.
7 Tafsir Fi Zhilal, Sayyid Quthb. Lihat Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam, Ahmad Hasan Karzun, hal. 24.
8 Untuk lebih memperjelas mengenai masalah ini, penulis menyarankan para pembaca yang budiman untuk membaca buku yang berjudul Fikih Dakwah Jilid I karya Syaikh Musthafa Masyhur halaman 6-12, terbitan Al-I’tishom.
9 Maaf bila ungkapan ini dirasa kurang pantas dimunculkan. Hanya saja ini merupakan sebuah kritisi dari penyusun akan kondisi dakwah yang jumud , terkesan emosional dan kurang kontekstual. Ini dikarenakan ,-sungguh-, ilmu penyusun masih sangat dangkal. Wallahu ’alam.
10 Untuk yang kedua kalinya penyusun menyarankan kepada para pembaca yang budiman untuk membaca buku Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin dan juga Memoar Hasan al-Banna Untuk Da’wah dan Para Da’inya. Keduanya merupakan karya dari Imam Syahid Hasan al-Banna, dan sama-sama diterbitkan oleh ERA Intermedia.
11 John T. Malloy, Dress for Success. Lihat Perilaku Organisasi, Anies S.M. Basalamah, halaman 177.
12 Penyusun tidak berniat menjelekkan atau mengomentari secara sinis mengenai cara harakah tersebut berdakwah, hanya saja ini sebagai sebuah pelajaran,-bagi penyusun khususnya-, akan pentingnya sebuah penampilan saat berdakwah. Wallahu ’alam.
13 Silahkan lihat di buku yang berjudul Kudung Gaul Berjilbab Tapi Telanjang, karya Abu Al-Ghifari halaman 51-61, dan Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam, Ahmad Hasan Karzun dari awal sampai habis.
14 Silahkan lihat dalam buku Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam, halaman 126-127.
15 Kepada para pembaca yang budiman silahkan membaca kisahnya di buku Nikmatnya Pacaran Setelah Pernikahan karya Salim A. Fillah, terbitan Pro U-Media.
16 Tak bosan-bosannya penyusun menyarankan untuk membaca sebuah buku yang sangat bagus yang berjudul Sirah Nabawiyah karya Syaikh Shafiyyur-rahman al-Mubarakfury. Cerita ini ada di dalam kitab tersebut.
17 Silahkan lihat dalam Bukan Sekadar Kenangan, ’Umar Tilmisani halaman 54-55.
18 Di beberapa daerah, ada masyarakat yang mementingkan penampilan dibandingkan kemampuan. Wallahu ‘alam.
9 Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam, hal 26-27.
20 Silahkan lihat dalam Zaadul Ma’ad, Ibnu Qayyim halaman 100.
21 Op.cit. hal 93. Lihat juga dalam Zaadul Ma’ad halaman 109.
22 Majalah Al-‘Izzah Edisi no. 06/Th. 4/ 2004/1-31 Juli 2004 halaman 19.

Sumber inspirasi penyusun dalam makalah ini

Alloh berfirman, ” Bacalah, dengan Nama Tuhanmu Yang Menciptakan..” (QS al-‘Alaq ayat 1)

1. Al-Qur’an al-Kariim dan terjemahannya.
2. Adab Berpakaian Pemuda Islam, Ahmad Hasan Karzun, Darul Falah.
3. Tsawabit Dalam Manhaj Gerakan IKhwan, Jum’ah Amin ’Abdul ’Aziz, Asy-Syaamil Press.
4. Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin Jilid I, Hasan al-Banna, ERA Intermedia.
5. Tarbiyah Menjawab Tantangan, Tim Penulis , Rabbani Press.
6. Fikih Dakwah Jilid I, Syaikh Musthafa Masyhur, I’tishom.
7. Memoar Hasan Al-Banna Untuk Dakwah dan Para Da’inya, Hasan al-Banna, ERA Intermedia.
8. Berinteraksi Dengan Al-Qur’an, DR. Yusuf Qaradhawy, Gema Insani Press.
9. Nikmatnya Pacaran Setelah Pernikahan, Salim A. Fillah, Pro U-Media.
10. Gue Never Die ! Kerenkan Diri Trus Nikah Dini, Salim A. Fillah, Pro U-Media
11. Perilaku Organisasi, Anies S.M. Basalamah, Usaha Kita.
12. Zaadul Ma’ad, Ibnul Qayim al-Jauziyah, Rabbani Press.
13. Bukan Sekedar Kenangan, ‘Umar Tilmisani, Rabbani Press.
14. Shirah Nabawiyah, Syaikh Shafiyyur-Rahman Al-Mubarakfury, Rabbani Press.
15. Buletin Tafakur, Edisi 316 Th. VII/ Jumadil Awal 1426 H/ Mei 2005, IKADI
16. Majalah Al-‘Izzah Edisi No. 06/Th. 4/ 2004.
17. Majalah Al-‘Izzah Edisi No. 04/Th. 4/ 2004.
18. Sumber-sumber lain yang tidak terdokumentasikan.

Penyusun yang fakir ’ilmu,
Ibnu Sa’id

Biodata Penyusun

Ibnu Sa’id atau Wahid Nugroho adalah putra pertama dari pasangan Nursa’id dan Warsiti. Kakak dari Aldino Soeharto ini lahir di Jakarta pada Rabu, 6 Agustus 1985. Saat ini penyusun tengah menyelesaikan studinya di Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara Spesialisasi Diploma Tiga Perpajakan. Sebelumnya, penyusun menuntaskan studinya di SMU Negeri 90 Petukangan Selatan, SLTP Negeri 245 Petukangan Utara dan SD Negeri 01 Petukangan Utara. Di samping kuliah, ikhwan yang memiliki hobi membaca ini juga aktif dalam berorganisasi, baik organisasi di lingkungan tempat tinggalnya maupun di kampus. Di lingkungannya, penyusun aktif dalam Pengajian Malam Jum’at Al-Faruq, dan sempat menjadi ketua pada tahun 2003-2004 yang lalu. Di kampus, ikhwan yang juga senang dengan es kelapa dan sate kambing ini aktif di Badan Legislatif Mahasiswa (2004- sekarang) sebagai ketua II, Ukhuwah Mahasiswa Muslim Pajak sebagai BPH (2003-2004) dan staf Bidang Dakwah (sekarang), Pjs Kadept Kastrat KAMMI Komsat Pondok Aren (2003- sekarang), staf ZISWAF MBM (sekarang) dan staf Kaderisasi MBM (2004- sekarang). Selain itu, ikhwan bertubuh gemuk yang juga anggota Tim Nasyid AZZAM ini juga menjadi Ketua Forum Komunikasi Alumni Rohis Alumni 90 atau FKAR (2003- sekarang). Sekarang, ikhwan yang masih single ini tinggal di Jalan Cipadu Raya (K.H. Wahid Hasyim Raya) Gg. H. Gojali RT 01 RW 005, No. 58 Jurangmangu Timur, Pondok Aren, Tangerang, Banten 15222, nomor telepon 0815 8434 5158.

Categories: Islamic Management


August 22, 2010 1 comment

At A Glance
Population, July 2006 est. 27,601,038 (including 5,576,076 non-citizens)
GDP Per Capita (PPP), 2006 est. $13,800
Human Development Index Rank, UNDP, 2006 76 (out of 177 countries)
Freedom House Rating, 2006 Not Free
Political Rights 7
Civil Liberties 7
Freedom of the Press Rank, Freedom House, 2006 172 (out of 194 countries)
Corruption Index Rank, Transparency International, 2007 79 (out of 180 countries)
Gender Empowerment Rank, UNDP, 2004 77 (out of 78 countries)


Updates and Forthcoming Events

• Saudi Information Minister Iyad Madani announced on January 30, 2008 a ban on all live broadcasts on Saudi public television. The announcement came two days after some viewers phoned in with critical comments about senior Saudi government officials, including the King, to a live program on the state-owned al-Ikhbariya news channel. The station’s director, Muhammad al-Tunsi, was dismissed. Click here for more information.
• The Interior Ministry confirmed on December 31, 2007 that Saudi blogger Ahmad al-Farhan was detained for questioning. Al-Farhan, who used his blog to criticize corruption and call for political reform, was arrested on December 10 “for violating rules not related to state security,” according to the ministry spokesman. Saudi authorities also blocked access to the leading blog publishing service, Blogger.com. The Saudi government’s official “internet blacklist” contains more than 400,000 websites, including political, religious, and pornographic sites. Click here for more information.
• President of the National Society for Human Rights Bandar al-Hajjar announced on January 5, 2008 that Saudi Arabia is moving toward incorporating a human rights curriculum into its higher education system. During the past year, the organization has established a human rights library in Riyadh and a data center for human rights research.
• The Saudi Shura Council approved on December 31, 2007 a draft civil society law that will regulate civil society organizations in Saudi Arabia. The law—the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia—calls for the establishment of a “National Authority for Civil Society Organizations” to supervise the activities of NGOs. The draft law is currently under discussion in cabinet. Click here an Arabic summary of the draft law.

State Institutions/ Separation of Powers

• The Quran and the Sunna constitute the effective constitution of Saudi Arabia. The Basic law (Nizam), a series of laws issued by King Fahd in 1992, serves as an informal constitution. The government-appointed clergy act as the nominal arbiters of constitutional matters, but the king retains absolute authority to determine the outcome of constitutional disputes.

Executive Branch

• The king is the head of state. He:

– Rules by decree in accordance with Islamic law (Sharia) and with the consensus of senior princes and religious officials.
– Performs legislative and executive functions.
– Acts as the ultimate source of judicial power. Through a royal order he can introduce new laws, amend existing laws or reinterpret them.
– Is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Appoints officers and revokes their duties.
– Is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.
– Approves and amends international treaties, agreements and regulations by decree.
– Approves all decisions of the Council of Ministers.

• There are no institutional checks on royal authority. The king is somewhat constrained by Islamic law—the importance of attaining consensus among royal family members, and the tradition of consultation—but in practice there is little accountability and he has wide-ranging discretion.

• Crown Prince Abdullah acceded to the throne in August 2005 following the death of King Fahd, who occupied the throne between 1982 and 2005. Crown Prince Abdullah had acted as de facto regent since King Fahd’s stroke in 1995.

• The prime minister:

– Is the head of the Council of Ministers.
– Can veto any decision of the Council of Ministers.
– Appoints and removes deputy prime ministers, ministers, and other members of the Council of Ministers by royal order.
– Has the right to dissolve and reorganize the Council of Ministers.

• The Council of Ministers authority is defined by the 1958 Law of the Council of Ministers, which was subsequently amended in 1961, 1964, 1971, and 1975. Most of these amendments solidify the king’s authority.

• The Council of Ministers:

– Consists of the king, the crown prince, three royal advisers who hold official positions as ministers of state, five other ministers of state, and the heads of the twenty ministries. The commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the governors of Medina, Mecca, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province, as well as the governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the head of the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (Petromin) hold ministerial rank and are members of the Council of Ministers.
– Has responsibility for drafting and overseeing the implementation of internal, external, financial, economic, education and defense policies, and general affairs of state.
– Has authority in financial matters, approving the annual budget and development plan.
– Can propose legislation, and approve draft laws, concessions and international agreements, which come into effect when they are ratified by the king. In practice, the king often passes and amends laws without first submitting them to the Council of Ministers.
– Imposes taxes and decides on the sale, lease and disposal of government property.

• The deliberations of the Council of Ministers take place behind closed doors. Its decisions are made public except for those which are considered to be secret by the Council.

• The term in office of the Council of Ministers runs for up to four years, during which it can be reformed by a royal order.

• Saudi Arabia’s defense forces consist of the armed forces, which report to the defense minister, and the National Guard. The National Guard is responsible for internal security, including the protection of the royal family and the prevention of military coups. While Abdullah was Crown Prince the National Guard served as a counterweight to the regular army and as his basis of support.

• Reforms Under Discussion

– Saudi King Abdullah issued a royal decree on October 8, 2007 outlining regulations to implement the October 2006 succession law aimed at ensuring a smooth transition of power. The succession law created a committee, to be comprised of sons and grandsons of Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the Kingdom’s founder, to select crown princes, thus future kings. The new rules will not apply to succession after King Abdullah, who has already chosen Prince Sultan al-Saud to follow him. Succession in the past has been decided by a small group of powerful royals; the new procedures aim to broaden the process.

Legislative Branch

• Saudi Arabia lacks a standard legislature. It only has a Consultative Council.

• The Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) was established by royal decree under the 1992 Consultative Council Law.

• The Consultative Council:

– Consists of 150 members selected by the king. They cannot include princes or serving ministers. Members serve for four-year terms. When a new Consultative Council is formed, at least half of those appointed must be new members.
– Can be restructured and dissolved by the king.
– Has historically acted mainly in an advisory capacity, debating, rejecting and amending government-proposed legislation.
– Was given the power to initiate legislation by a 2003 royal decree. The decree also amended the Council’s charter so that in the event of disagreement it would have the opportunity to respond to the government’s arguments, leaving the king as final arbiter and decision-maker.
– Adopts its decisions by an absolute majority. Its decisions are then transmitted back to the Council of Ministers which also has to decide on the same issues. In case of agreement between the two councils, the law is promulgated on the king’s consent. In case of disagreement the king is free to make a decision.
– Pronounces the general plan of economic and social development, laws, regulations, concessions, international treaties and agreements and annual reports submitted by ministries and other government agencies.
– Can hold ministries accountable in relation to their spending, but has no role in shaping the budget.
– Is required to operate on a special budget approved by the King, following rules set forth by a royal order.

• Reforms Under Discussion

– In October 2003, the Saudi press reported that the government would conduct elections for one third of the members of the Consultative Council within three years. Discussion about possible, at least partial, elections to the council has resumed after the fourth expansion of the council membership to 150 in April 2005. The government has issued no official pronouncements on the subject.


• Saudi Arabia’s legal system is based primarily on the principles of the Sharia. The Judiciary issues its rulings on the basis of what is stated in the Quran and in the Sunna. Sharia laws are supplemented by laws legislated by the government.

• The king is responsible for the implementation of judicial rulings.

• The Justice Ministry disciplines judges.

• The judiciary is subject to the influence of the royal family. Provincial governors (most of whom are members of the royal family) have the authority to exercise leniency and reduce a judge’s sentence.

• Codes

– The Judicial Law of 1975:
– Vests the authority of the Judiciary in the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) which is empowered to appoint, promote and transfer judges.
– Declares the judiciary independent. Judges are to be subject only to the dictates of Sharia and the law.
– Requires trials to be held publicly.

– The Statute on Imprisonment and Detention of 28 May 1978: bans torture.

– The Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventive Detention, was issued on 11 November 1983. It:
– Is the main law regulating this area of the criminal justice system. Includes most detailed legislation on the rules of arrest and detention.
– Prohibits arbitrary arrest. Authorities are not supposed to detain suspects for longer than three days before charging them.

– The Law of Procedure Before Sharia Courts of September 2001:
– Grants defendants the right to legal representation.
– Outlines the process by which pleas, evidence and experts are heard by the court.

– The Code of Law Practice of January 2002:
– Outlines the requirements necessary to become an attorney and defines the duties and rights of lawyers, including the right of attorney-client privilege.

– The Criminal Procedure Law of May 2002:
– Protects a defendant’s rights with regard to interrogation, investigation, and incarceration.
– Outlines a series of regulations that justice and law enforcement authorities must follow during all stages of the judicial process, from arrest and interrogation, to trial and execution verdicts.
– Prohibits torture, protects the rights of suspects to obtain legal council and limits arbitrary detention to five days.
– Criminal laws are vague and open to wide interpretation by judges. For example charges of “sabotage” and “corruption on earth” are not clearly defined even though they carry the death penalty.
– Has not been observed in practice:
– The system lacks safeguards and procedures to guarantee a fair trial. Hearings are often held in camera; there are summary court sessions in political cases and in cases of people charged with crimes punishable by death, amputation or flogging. Trials are normally held without counsel.
– In criminal cases detention is often extended in order to extract a confession and then proceed to trial. In the majority of political cases detainees are pressured to give information about their political beliefs and activities, and about other people working with them. They are usually made aware that their release is conditional on their repenting of their previous activities and on their signing an undertaking to cease these activities.
– Arbitrary arrest, particularly of suspected political and religious opponents of the government, is practiced. It is facilitated by the wide powers of arrest enjoyed by numerous bodies acting without judicial authority. These bodies include al-Shurta (the public security police), al-Mabahith al Amma (General Investigations) and religious police known as al-Mutawaeen or Hay’at al-amr bilmaruf wan nahi an al-munkar, (the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice). The first two are accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Al-Mutawaeen, which is mandated to ensure strict adherence to established codes of conduct, is in theory a semi-autonomous agency, but in practice works closely with the police and the governors of the localities. It is required to hand suspects over to the public security police after questioning.

• Courts

– There are four tiers of Sharia Courts, which hear cases involving criminal, family, personal injury, and property matters. Sharia courts fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, which was established in 1970.

– Limited or Summary Courts are empowered to hear civil and criminal cases in which the maximum penalty is limited. Cases handled in the summary courts can be appealed to the appeals court. Civil claims are often first filed with the Amarah, which will attempt to resolve the dispute by settlement. If a settlement is not possible, the case will be submitted to the courts.

– The general courts are the courts of first instance for all matters falling outside the jurisdiction of the Limited Courts. The jurisdiction of the General Courts extends to cases involving crime, tort action, personal and family law, and real estate. Cases handled in the general courts can be appealed to the Appeals Court.

– The Appeals Court is comprised of three departments: the penal suits, the personal status suits, and all other types of suits. The Appeals Court is presided by the chief justice and a panel of several qadis (judges). For most matters, the Court of Appeals represents the final court of appeal.

– The Grievance Board settles commercial disputes and grievances, tax disputes and contractual affairs. It also reviews complaints of improper behavior brought against both government officials and qadis. The President of the Board is appointed by the king. It is not a Sharia court, following a reorganization in 1982 which made it directly responsible to the king.

• Council and Committees

– In addition to the Sharia courts, there are numerous commissions and tribunals that adjudicate different matters. There is a number of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions with specialized jurisdictions such as commercial or labor law. Some of these specialized tribunals fall outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. They include the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Supreme Commission on Labor Disputes, the Commission on Impeachment of Ministers, and separate councils for civil servants and military personnel. Appeals are permitted from all these bodies to the Grievance Board which is also independent of the Ministry of Justice.

– The Supreme Judicial Council supervises the work of the courts, reviews all legal decisions referred to it by the minister of justice, expresses legal opinions on judicial questions, and approves all sentences of death, amputation (of fingers and hands as punishment for theft), and stoning (for adultery). It is a body of eleven members chosen from the leading ulema (religious scholars) of the country. The chief of the Supreme Judicial Council is appointed by the king from among the country’s most senior ulema. In addition to its administrative authority, it also serves in a limited capacity as a final court of appeal for the Sharia Courts. It is composed of two departments, the Permanent Commission and the General Commission.

– The Conflicts of Jurisdiction Committee resolves jurisdictional disputes involving a Sharia Court and another tribunal or committee. It is composed of two members of the Supreme Judicial Council and one member of the tribunal or committee in question.

– The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is an autonomous body of 20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in deciding cases. It is an advisory body to the king and cabinet.

• Reforms Under Discussion

– The Saudi King announced a comprehensive overhaul of the Kingdom’s legal system on October 3, 2007. The King issued a number of new laws regulating the judiciary and the Board of Grievances and allocated seven billion Saudi riyals (approx. $2 billion) for the planned reforms. The new rules, which emphasize the independence of judges, set up a supreme court whose main functions will be to oversee the implementation sharia as well as laws issued by the king, commercial courts, labor courts, personal status courts, and a fund for training judges. The Board of Grievances will continue to handle administrative disputes involving government departments. Currently, justice in Saudi Arabia is administered by a system of religious courts, and judges have wide discretion to issue rulings according to their own interpretation of Islamic sharia. Click here for the royal decree in Arabic.

– Saudi Arabia’s Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice will no longer be allowed to interrogate those it arrests for behavior deemed un-Islamic, under an interior ministry decree published on May 25 2006. According to the decree, “the role of the commission will end after it arrests the culprit or culprits and hands them over to police, who will then decide whether to refer them to the public prosecutor.” Commission members (mutawa’in) have until now enjoyed unchallenged powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of “moral infractions.”

Local Government

• The 1992 Law of Provinces regulates the relationship between central government agencies and regional governors.

• The kingdom is divided into 13 provinces, each of which is ruled by a governor. The provincial government oversees the local offices of the central government and municipal officials. In some of the provinces there is a public majlis where citizens can voice their grievances.

• Governors and members of provincial councils are appointed by the king. Local administrators are appointed by the minister of interior. Most governors are also members of the house of al-Saud.

• In 2003, the king approved the creation of consultative councils at the municipal level. Half of the officials in these bodies are to be elected by popular vote.

• The councils have a narrow mandate, which deals principally with the provision of services. Central areas of public policy, such as the allocation of public land (a matter important to curb corruption and abuse of office) remain in the hands of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. Duties of municipalities include planning of cities and villages (including roads and facilities), managing services to provide public health and cleanliness, and cultivating and improving rural areas.

• The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was established in 1975 and oversees all areas of municipal governance.


Personal Liberties

• The Basic Law does not include explicit guarantees of basic rights such as freedoms of belief, expression, assembly, or political participation. It does prohibit the government agencies from arbitrarily arresting citizens and from violating their privacy.

• Freedom of expression is restricted by prohibitions of criticism of the government, Islam and the ruling family. The U.S. State Department’s 2004 International Religious Freedom Report lists Saudi Arabia among the countries that violate or restrict the religious freedom of their citizens, for the first time designating it a “country of particular concern” (CPC).

• Public expression of non-Islamic religious beliefs is illegal, though private worship is permitted.

• Shi’i Muslims (estimates indicate that they make up between 8% to 20% of the population) face numerous restrictions on the public practice of their religion and encounter discrimination in all areas of public sector employment and are subject to abuse by government security services.

• The New York-based organization Human Rights Watch provides a comprehensive overview of human rights developments in Saudi Arabia. After its first significant fact-finding mission in the county that began on November 27, 2006, HRW reported numerous cases of unfair trials, prisoner abuses, labor abuses, restrictions on women’s legal identity, and cases of children’s detention. Click here for details.

Legislation Regulating the Exercise of Rights

• Electoral Law, Municipal Law

– The electoral law for municipal elections was formulated in 1977 but has not been put to use until municipal elections were held between February and April 2005.
– The language of the law is gender-neutral but women were not allowed to vote. The justification for their exclusion was the logistical problems related to the lack of photo identification cards for women and the difficulty of staffing separate voting centers for them.

• Law on Associations

– The Basic Law (Nizam) does not provide for freedom of association.
– Public demonstrations pertaining to political issues are prohibited.
– Trade unions, syndicates, collective bargaining and strikes are prohibited, with limited provisions for companies with over 100 workers (see Labor Laws). The government does license professional associations such as the Saudi Chemists Association and the Saudi Pharmacists Society.
– Governmental permission is required to form professional groups and associations, which must be non-political.

• Media Laws

– The 1982 Royal Decree on Press Publications guarantees freedom of expression within the framework of Islamic and national objectives and values. All criticism of the royal family and the religious authorities is forbidden.

– Article 39 of the Basic Law states that: “Mass media, publication facilities and other means of expression shall function in a manner that is courteous and fair and shall abide by State laws. They shall play their part in educating the masses and boosting national unity. All that may give rise to mischief and discord, or may compromise the security of the State and its public image, or may offend against man’s dignity and rights shall be banned.”

– The King announced the creation of an independent journalists’ organization in early 2003. The Saudi Journalists Association attracted some criticism because its founding documents were promulgated by the government, and the Information Ministry must approve all candidates for the board.

– The Ministry of Information regulates radio and television broadcasts.
– All Saudi newspapers and periodicals are created by royal decree as there are no licensing procedures.

– Newspapers are privately-owned but receive state subsidies. Their publishers and editors are appointed or at least approved by the government.

– The government owns the Saudi Press Agency which is controlled by the information ministry and expresses government views.

– The foreign press is systematically censored, with articles and pictures blacked out.

– Internet access is filtered to block Web sites deemed offensive to Islam or a threat to state security.

– A special CPJ report (“Princes, Clerics, and Censors”) released on May 9, 2006 finds that independent reporting on politics remains nearly absent from the Saudi press. According to the report, the country’s conservative religious establishment acts as a powerful lobbying force against enterprising coverage of social, cultural, and religious matters and government officials dismiss editors, suspend or blacklist dissident writers, order news blackouts on controversial topics, and admonish independent columnists over their writings to deter criticism or to appease religious constituencies.

– According to the annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, Saudi Arabia ranks 148 of 169 countries. The index runs from 1 (most press freedom) to 169 (least press freedom).

• Personal Status Law

– In October 2000, the Saudi government signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, with reservations concerning clauses that conflict with Islamic law. As a result, despite the signing of the Convention, Saudi laws systematically discriminates against women.
– Legal matters pertaining to personal status are usually the purview of Islamic courts that use Sharia as the basis for decisions. The Council of Senior Ulema issues the final interpretation of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia with the consent of the king.
– An unmarried woman is the ward of her father, a married woman is the ward of her husband and a widowed woman is the ward of her sons. Women cannot obtain a passport or an exit visa or be admitted to a hospital without the permission of their guardian.
– Women are segregated from men in public; prohibited from driving; unable to travel without a male relative; and required to wear the abaya outside the home.
– A man may receive a divorce upon request, while a woman must win a legal decision to separate.
– A man’s testimony is equal to that of two women in court.
– Women were only issued identity cards in 2001. To qualify for an identity card, a woman must have the written consent of her guardian and, if employed, a letter from her employer.
– In recent years, women have gained some economic rights, such as the right to establish companies and charitable institutions.

• Reforms Under Discussion

– The general committee on municipal elections has stated that women should be able to vote in the next municipal elections, scheduled to take place in four years.
– A new regulation for issuing women’s ID cards was approved on April 12, 2005 and will be publicized soon. Civil status departments in the Kingdom can now issue ID cards to women without a male guardian’s consent. A woman with a valid ID can verify the identity of another woman in order for that woman to get her ID card.
– Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal announced plans to appoint women to the Foreign Ministry for the first time in 2005.

• Labor Law

– The Labor and Workmen Law of 1969 does not set a legal minimum wage. Labor regulations establish a 48-hour workweek at regular pay and allow employers to require up to 12 additional hours of overtime at time-and-a-half pay. Labor law provides for a 24-hour rest period.
– In April 2002 a new law was issued, permitting Saudi workers to establish labor committees in companies with 100 or more employees. The committee members are chosen by the workers and approved by the Ministry. The committee may make recommendations to company management to improve work conditions, increase productivity, improve health and safety, and recommend training programs. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs may send a representative to attend committee meetings. The ministry may dissolve a labor committee if it violates regulations or threatens public security. Foreign workers may not serve on the committee; however, committee regulations provide that the committee should represent their views.
– Foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, estimated to represent a third of the country’s population, are not protected under labor law and are routinely exploited. Many women migrants are employed as household domestic workers, and are especially at risk for human rights abuses due to their isolation in private homes and their exclusion from many employment protections. Wages are set by employers and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of the worker.

Recent Government Initiatives Affecting Rights

• The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice announced on June 10, 2007 the creation of a “department of rules and regulations” to ensure the activities of commission members comply with the law. Eighteen commission members (mutawa‘in) were detained and questioned June 3. The governmental National Society for Human Rights criticized the behavior of the religious police in May in its first report (Arabic text). In May 2006, the interior ministry issued a decree stating that “the role of the commission will end after it arrests the culprit or culprits and hands them over to police, who will then decide whether to refer them to the public prosecutor.” Mutawa‘in had until recently enjoyed unchallenged powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of moral infractions.

• King Abdullah decreed the establishment of a government human rights agency on September 12, 2005 to “protect human rights and spread awareness about them … in keeping with the provisions of Islamic law.” The organization is chaired by former government official Khalid al-Sudairi, who will hold ministerial rank; the 18 board members will be appointed by the King.

• In March 2004, the Saudi government gave a green light for the establishment of the National Human Rights Association to review complaints about human rights violations and monitor the Kingdom’s compliance with international human rights agreements.

• In August 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah announced the establishment of the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue to promote public exchange of ideas. Four rounds of talks have taken place, covering standards of education, the emergence of extremism, the role of women and youth. Debates have taken place behind closed doors but with women present.

• In 2003, the government permitted the first visit of an international human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, but this was not repeated in 2004.

• The government views its interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect human rights.

• In 2003, the government publicly acknowledged human rights abuses by security forces and began a training program in interpersonal skills for Mutawwa’in. The President of the Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice acknowledged publicly that mistakes had been made and that the Mutawwa’in who overstepped their authority were subject to disciplinary measures. During the year Mutawwa’in abuses had attracted greater public attention then in the past.

• In March 2004, King Fahd approved the establishment of the first independent human rights organization, the National Society for Human Rights. It was formed following a human rights conference in October entitled “Human Rights in Peace and War.” The conference concluded with the issuing of the Riyadh Declaration.

Political Forces

Political Parties

• Political parties are prohibited.

Civil Society

• The main private sector umbrella organization is the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, an influential organization that helps mediate between Saudi companies and the state.

• Saudi reformers are a loose network, in which a core group of members have in recent years initiated petitions and sought to attract the signatures of like-minded people. The petition-writers for the most part favor gradual political transformation within the framework of the monarchy and the state’s Islamic character.

• In January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah issued a call for “self-reform and the promotion of political participation” across the Middle East. Later that month, 104 Saudi Arabian citizens sent a charter entitled “Vision for the Present and the Future of the Homeland” to Crown Prince Abdullah. The charter urged comprehensive reforms including guarantees of freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and requested release or fair trials for political prisoners. A second petition followed in September 2003. “In Defense of the Nation” criticized the slow pace of reform and the absence of popular participation in decision-making. Signed by 306 academics, writers, and businesspeople, including fifty women, it advocated popular election of the Consultative Council. Islamist reformers who had signed the “Vision” refused to join the second petition because its tone was viewed as too liberal and anti-Islamic.

• In December 2003, Islamists, liberals and Shi’a joined in calling for the implementation of the reforms outlined in the “Vision” and for the opening of a constitutional process.

• Saudi reform activists Matrouk al-Faleh, Ali al-Dimeeni, and Abdullah al-Hamed received prison sentences ranging from six to nine years on May 15, 2005. They were convicted on charges of sowing dissent, distributing political leaflets, using the media to incite opposition against the government, and causing political unrest, after they circulated a petition in January 2004 calling for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Ten other activists who were arrested along with them in March 2004 were later released after signing pledges not to circulate reform petitions or speak to the media. Upon assuming power in August 2005, King Abdullah issued a pardon for the three activists mention above, for their lawyer and another activist as well as for the Libyans allegedly involved in an attempt to assassinate him.

• There are two prominent political opposition movements, both of which operate from outside of Saudi Arabia: the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia (MIRA). The CDLR was established in 1993 by a group of Islamist academics and clerics to push for the range of human rights that they asserted are recognized by Islam, including political participation. It was quickly disbanded by the government and in 1994 two founders, Mohamed al-Massari and Saad al-Faqih, relocated to Britain and started a campaign calling for the ousting of the Saudi royal family. The two founders split in 1996 after a falling out. MIRA, headed by Saad al Faqih, is the more active of the two and is generally characterized as a militant Islamist movement. MIRA’s stated aim is regime change, whereby the royal family is replaced by an elected leadership and where there exists an independent judiciary and a new constitution with the stamp of Islamic law. MIRA and its leader Saad al Faqih have been added to the UNSC 1267 list of terrorist individuals and organizations. In December 2004 the United States declared that it had frozen their assets and submitted their names to the United Nations.

• Official clerics are those appointed by the government to positions in the religious hierarchy, including the mufti and members of the Committee of Senior Religious Scholars or of the Higher Judicial Council, and are expected to ratify and provide legitimacy to the regime’s policies. Informal or unofficial clerics derive their influence from their popular following and openly criticize the government and the ruling family. While the first constitute a key source of legitimacy for the ruling family, the second enjoy widespread popularity and play a major role in shaping public opinion.

Election Results

• Municipal elections have taken place in three rounds for half of the members of 178 municipal councils. The other half will be appointed by the government. Elections for the Riyadh province took place on February 10, for the 4 southern provinces and the eastern province on March 3, and for the rest of the country on April 21.

• Because candidates ran as individuals, not as members of parties, election results are difficult to interpret. But it appears that Shi’a won most of the seats in Eastern Province. Candidates who had clerical support most of the seats on the municipal council in other areas. Click here for detailed results.

Constitutional Revision

• Revisions of the Basic Law are carried out by decree.


• There is widespread public perception of corruption within the royal family, facilitated by the lack of transparency in government accounts. The royal family is perceived to abuse government funds, property rights and contracts. Royal influence is also thought to abuse civil and criminal justice procedure. Royal family members are seen to interfere or profiteer in contract awards, the allocation of money from oil sales, the profits from state-financed corporations and contracts for the delivery of arms imports and military services.

• The national budget does not include a precise breakdown of sources of state revenue and expenditure. Royal allocations are not published and public expenditures are not subject to independent oversight.

• Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2007 ranks Saudi Arabia 79th out of 180 countries.

Ratification of International Conventions

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR): not ratified

• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR): not ratified

• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT): September 23, 1997

• The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD): September 23, 1997

• The Convention of on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW): October 7, 2000

• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): January 26, 1996


August 22, 2010 Leave a comment


Shakeel Ahmad (shakeeluae@gmail.com)
Facilitator: Dr. H. K. Pradhan (pradhan@xlri.ac.in)

Executive Post Graduate Program (Ex-PGP) in Management
XLRI (http://www.xlri.ac.in), Dubai (http://www.xlri-dubai.net/)
Approved for submission: February 2004

I am grateful to Dr. H.K. Pradhan, my guide, for his continuous encouragement that enabled this study of a subject that had remained within my heart, since early ages. His teachings of International Financial Management provided insights beyond theoretical concepts, and his friendly style inspired the quest for excellence. I am thankful to XLRI, an institution that provided me with the opportunity to pursue this post graduate study in management, for which this dissertation project was undertaken.
I take this opportunity to express my sincerest gratitude to all the members of Islamic Banking and Finance Community (IBFnet) in the Yahoogroups mailing list. Islamic finance community has worked hard in providing a wealth of resources on the internet. They deserve appreciation and rewards from no less an entity than Allah SWT Himself.
Special thanks go to Dr. Obaidullah, the IBFnet’s founder. This dissertation work would not have been possible without the special help and encouragement from Dr. Shahid Ebrahim – it is difficult to express my special thanks for him, in a few words.
Finally, the time that I devoted on the Ex-PGP, and this project, was taken away from my family whose support acted not only as facilitator but also was a source of continuous inspiration.
Exploratory Channel:
Sequence Title Page
1 Introduction 3
2 Why Islamic Banking? 4
3 Islamic Banking and Finance (IFB) Sector, now 6
4 Why is Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF) creating ripples? 6
6 Literature Review 7
7 Islamic Banks 10
8 Brief History 11
9 Concepts behind Islamic Banking and Finance 13
10 Distinguishing Features 13
11 Role of Islamic Banks 14
12 Prohibition of Interest 14
13 Table-2: Comparison between Riba and Profit 15
14 Table-3: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking 16
15 Key Islamic Financial techniques/ Products 17
16 Box-1: Islamic Financial Instruments 19
17 Islamic Derivative Products 21
18 Advantages of Islamic Finance 21
19 Box-2: Landmark Islamic finance deal inked 23
20 Perceived Disadvantages of IBFs 24
21 Impediments to the growth of IBFs 24
22 Recommendations to counter Impediments to growth of IBFs 36
23 Latest Developments 38
24 Box-3: How Islamic is Bank Negara’s IIMM? 40
25 Islamic Bonds (Sukuk) Funds 41
26 Box-4: Conventional Investors find Islamic Bonds attractive 41
27 Box-5: US$250 Government Islamic Leasing Securities 42
28 Box- 6: Islamic Development Bank launches bond issue worth $400m 43
29 Box-7: Latest Trends & Challenges 45
30 Box-8: Bahrain: LMC to issue $1.2b bonds 46
31 Rating Agencies 48
32 Basel II Implications 49
33 Important Institutions 49
34 Conclusion 51
35 References 54
36 Appendix-A0: Estimation of TAI for UAE 59
37 APPENDIX-A: Competitiveness of Banking Sector In Case of Opening Local Markets to GCC Banks 59
38 APPENDIX-B: Islamic Financial Institutions in the World 61
39 APPENDIX-C: Islamic Equity Funds in the World
40 APPENDIX-D: The Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes 72
41 APENDIX-E1: Assets, Deposits and Loans of 53 Conventional local Banks in GCC 73
42 APENDIX-E2: Assets, Deposits and Loans of 8 Islamic local Banks in GCC 74
Introduction: To start with graphics may not be a novel idea, but if you are associated in any way with promoting deposits or instruments of a conventional bank anywhere in the world, these graphics must already have left some alarm bells ringing in your mind. 32.83% CAGR in Deposits and 24.69% CAGR in total assets over a four-year period in a country which was written off the books of financial wizards and stock-market punters after the Asian Currency Crisis. In figure–1, the rapid rise can be seen not in one aspect but in all major aspects of banking and finance reinforcing the belief that the growth rate witnessed was an all encompassing one. The question that arises at this moment is whether this growth rate is sustainable. An answer to that would be premature without looking at the reasons behind this phenomenon, and whether the same success story is repeated anywhere else in the world.
We will try to answer some of the above questions, and also try to see if the growth in Islamic banking and finance sector could have been better. If yes, we will try to peep into the reasons behind less than expected growth.
Much has been written by historians about the feudal lords who by virtue of charging high interest rates controlled those in desperate need to finance their survival. Financial clout led to political clout and ended up in enslaving the masses. Before the historians touched upon this exploitation of the masses, religious scriptures had already warned of usurious acts existing in the society.
In the Old Testament (King James Version), Exodus, Chapter 22, verse 25:
If you lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.
Leciticus, Chapter 25, verses 34-36:
And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay by thee; then thou shalt relieve him: yea though he be a stranger, or a sojourner, that he may live with thee.
Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.
Why Islamic Banking? The New Testament also contains edicts on the same line. Thus the very mention of usury and the suggestion to avoid indulging in this act in Judaism and Christianity implies its existence in ancient times and the ills that it carried along for the society.
Despite the warning against this practice, the system prospered. Modern financial system learnt a lesson from these religious warnings and tried to adopt a system that limited the extent of usurious exploitation to a great extent. By creating a market for debt, based upon ‘perfect competition’, it propounded an end to exploitative nature of usury and thus evolved the system of interest rates which was supposed to be determined by the market forces freely competing with each other. What we see today is an expansion of the ancient feudal system into a global arena with nations facing the same plight as did individuals earlier.
From the traditional Jewish lending system of the Shylocks to the Indian feudal system, there is no need to strain our memories much. What is definitely cause for stress is the false claim of the contemporary world order to have relieved the masses of this burden of debt. Figures 2a and 2b show how countries, instead of individuals, are getting trapped into slavery. There is no doubt that Debt to GDP ratio is a robust indicator of the Debt burden of countries. If we compare the ratios that triggered the 1980s Debt crisis with the levels being experienced, now, we can see that the situation is no better, and could be enough cause for the unipolar world of the day. Despite the claim that modern interest-based system is not exploitative or usurious, because the interest rates or debt-service payments are within limits, Figures 2c and 2d provide a different picture altogether.

The transition of the world from a multipolar world order to a unipolar one has not been without pain and suffering. It is not easy to emphatically pronounce that the cause for this has been the interest-based system, but nobody should doubt that the cause has been the financial system as a whole. Interest-based system is one component of the economic system where the concept of money itself, as a worthless piece of paper carrying immense power, may be ill-conceived.

Fig-3a and 3b: Interest rates and export prices in Latin America (1972-1986)
Source: Andres Bianchi et al., “Adjustment in Latin America, 1981-86,” in V. Corbo, M. Goldstein, and M. Khan, ed., Growth Oriented Adjustment Programs, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, 1987.
Similarly, the argument that low interest rates cannot cause countries to lose their sovereignty also does not hold much ground. The diagnosis of the Debt Crisis of early 80s suggests that even low interest rates (Figure-3a), acting as a trap (particularly when they are floating rate, as majority of debt was) could cause countries to come down to their knees. Flushed with funds, due to the sharp oil price increase in 1973-74 leading to booming deposits by Oil-rich countries, international commercial banks were eager to lend at lower interest rates enticing the third world to borrow more and more. The debt burden measured by Debt-to-GDP ratio (Fig-2b) is an indication of the inevitable crisis that was waiting to happen.
The urge to have a system that claims to provide a solution to such financial crises grows after every financial (monetary, exchange rate, stock market or Debt) crisis. It is not hard to understand that if the value of money carried its real worth, currency crises could be avoided. If the paper being traded in stock exchanges were actually trading at their genuine value, with no speculation, bubbles that occasionally burst would not exist. If the interest-free banking system could see the light of the day, no debt-crises would occur, as all the financing would be PLS (Profit-and-Loss Sharing arrangement of Islamic financial system). Islamic banking and finance based on the Islamic economic system must be taken seriously, therefore.
This paper looks into the realities associated with this system which is growing at a much faster pace than its counterpart, and is making its conventional competitors stand up and have a look. The success of the Islamic system can be gauged by the rush among the conventional banks to open their own ‘Islamic windows’ not just in countries dominated by Muslims but also in rest of the world. Some of the Western banks already having dedicated Islamic subsidiaries are: Citibank, HSBC, American Express, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas, Bank of America, Stantad Chartered, Commerzbank, Barclays, Deutche Bank, ANZ Grindlays, Golman Schs, Royal Bank of Canada, Pictet & Cie, UBS, Flemings, Merrill Lynch and Kleinwort Benson. And the list is growing. With countries like Pakistan, Sudan and Iran adopting 100% Islamic Banking, the prospects of more countries to follow suit rising, the conventional counterparts cannot sit back and see their market share being eaten away.
Islamic Banking and Finance (IFB) Sector, now: It is difficult to obtain exact figures on the size of the Islamic financial sector. Without doubt, it is small in comparison to the conventional financial sector but it is experiencing strong growth. Iqbal and Mirakhor (1999) report that Islamic banks grew from an asset base of $5 billion in 1985 to a level of over $100 billion in the late nineties. The chairman of Dubai Islamic Bank and Emirati Minister for Financial Affairs, Mohammad Khalfan bin Kharbash, recently noted that the number of Islamic banks has grown from 34 institutions in 1983 to 250 today, operating and managing assets of $200 billion (Phillips, 2001). The annual growth rate for Islamic financial institutions varies from 15 to 40 percent annually (Hamwi and Aylward, 1999). Yet, a comparison of the assets of all Islamic banks to HSBC, just one of the world’s largest banks with assets of $569 billion in 1999 (Azzam, 2000), demonstrates how small the Islamic sector remains on the world banking stage.
Nevertheless, Islamic banking is spreading and gaining acceptance in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. In 1999, the Middle East alone had 12 top-tiered Islamic banks with total capital of about $1.8 billion and assets of approximately $18 billion. Bosnia Bank International became operational in March 2001, positioned as a regional Islamic bank for the Balkan area, with wholesale and retail services in Bosnia (Carvalho, 2001). Many of the Islamic banks are gaining strength and achieving profits. For example, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation posted a net profit in 1997 of $347 million and return on capital of 25% (Hamwi and Aylward, 1999). Bank Al-Jazira, by far the smallest bank in the Saudi Islamic banking sector, grew profits by forty-one percent in 2000 (MEED, 2001).
Why is Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF) creating ripples?
Looking at the growth rates of IBF in comparison to the conventional banking, the reason may be obvious (Figure-4).

Malaysia being a pioneer in expansion of IFB products, our calculations for the CAGR for its leading bank BIMB (Bank Islamic Malaysia Berhard) between 1998 and 2002 yield the following results: Deposits grew at 32.4%, Investments at 39.3% and Total assets at 28.3%. It will be an impossible task for any conventional bank to match these figures during the period. For the sake of diversity in outlook, we compared the figures for two banks in UAE under the same ownership – National Bank of Abu Dhabi, a Conventional Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, an Islamic bank. The results are even more astounding, as depicted in Figure-5.
None of the Islamic banks yielded any negative growth rates during the period under study while thirteen conventional banks in terms of Loans, seven in terms of Assets and eight in terms of Deposits reported negative CAGR. The data for all these banks are provided in Appendices-E1 and E2.
Table-1: Comparison of CAGR for 53 conventional and 8 Islamic banks in GCC
Average CAGR (1999-2001) Financing (Loans) Deposits Assets
Local Conventional Banks 7.3% 7.6% 9.5%
Local Islamic Banks 19.2% 21.4% 18.6%
Western banks and financial institutions, like Chase Manhattan, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC, Citicorp and Bankers Trust, have joined the race for providing Islamic products, but they currently exist in trade and other forms of short-term finance, mostly. Independent financial institutions based on Shari’ah are also becoming common for the Western banks and financial institutions. Citicorp’s Islamic banking unit in Bahrain established in 1996 is an example. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd. is planning to extend its Islamic banking services to become a total money management and financial provider within two to three years (The Star, May 17, 2001). From less than 10 Islamic mutual funds a decade ago to over 90, now, according to a report by Wall (2001), is no mean achievement. High-tech fever has not caused Islamic financial Web sites to crop up and grow along with Islamic Finance.

Literature Review: The information on Islamic Banking & Finance is available in many forms, e.g., PhD dissertations (El-Bdour, 1984; Khan, 1983), books written by leading academics and practitioners (e.g. Homoud, 1985; Shirazi, 1990), published research in the form of reports (Ahmad, 1987; Iqbal and Mirakor, 1987) and journal articles (e.g. Erol and El-Bdour, 1989; Erol et al., 1990; Shook and Hassan, 1988; and Sudin et al., 1994). Because of Riba, Islamic banks have had to develop financial products which are not in conflict with the Sharia’h. The task has been achieved by creating a number of special financial products (Ali and Ali, 1994).
The main thrust of Islamic financial contracts is on profit and loss sharing, which can be deemed as equity (Musharakah) and hybrid (modified Mudharabah and Ijara) facilities (Ahmad, 1994). However, the risks of these vehicles are inherently higher than conventional ones as espoused by Ebrahim (1999). One definition of an Islamic Bank is a bank that, by its own choice, opts to comply with two sets of law: the law of the Land (Jurisdiction); and the Islamic Law (Shari’ah). This is why Islamic bankers have two types of legal counsel: traditional “lawyers” and “Shari’ah Councils” (Al-Bahar, 1996).
“Islam is deeply concerned with the problem of economic development, but treats this as an important part of a wider problem, that of total human development. The primary function of Islam is to guide human development on correct lines and in the right direction. It deals with all aspects of economic development but always in the framework of total human development and never in a form divorced from this perspective” (Al-Harran, 1993). The Shari’ah specifies, inter alia, rules that relate to the allocation of resources, property rights, production and consumption, and the distribution of income and wealth (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987).
Islamic banking advances the following set of beliefs: interest as a reward for saving does not have any basis as a moral foundation; abstinence from spending of present income does not deserve a financial reward; and to benefit from money is to transform the money into investments, conditioned to accept risks and bringing the knowledge of other factors of production together (Presley, 1988).
Rayner (1991) lays down four elements of a contract on a property (mal): they are lawfulness, existence, deliverability and precise determination. Ebrahim (1999) explains that profits on Murabahah facilities are generally higher than conventional loans because Islamic instruments are structured to share the risk of the asset or venture. Hence, the “profits” and “interest-charge” implied are similar in outcome, although not by design (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1999; Rosly, 1999). Thomas (1995) is of the view that Riba, Gharar and Maysir manifested in the conventional system can wreak havoc in an economy as advanced as the USA, as depicted by the massive failures of US savings and loans institutions of the 1980s. Islamic banking aims to promote economic growth through risk-sharing instruments whose payoffs fluctuate with economic output and do not structurally impair the economy in the manner of excessive fixed-interest debt does in a poor economic environment such as a recession (Asquith et al., 1994; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998).
The potential of Islamic fixed income securities backed by an Ijara facility is discussed by Kahf (1997).
Islamic Derivatives: These comprise both Islamic Futures and Embedded Options in a contract. However, the development of it is largely unrealized (Khan, 1995). Ebrahim (2001) recommends to design, develop and implement Islamic hedging and risk minimizing facilities such as Islamic futures (Bai Al-Salam/Istisna), Islamic swaps, etc. (Iqbal, 1999). (Ebrahim, 2000) further recommends to design, develop and implement Islamic facilities that enhance the competitive ability of Islamic banks and reduce their risk exposure.
The excessive use of credit facilities by Islamic banks globally has drawn the ire of scholars such as Ahmad (1989) and El-Naggar (1994). Conventional futures are very controversial with the Ulema – religious scholars (Kamali, 1999). It should be noted that certain Ulema such as Justice Taqi Usamani have given their verdict allowing contracts with embedded options (Kahn, 1999).
Part of the study of Erol and El-Bdour (1989), conducted in Jordan, aimed at establishing the attitude of local people towards Islamic banking. The results suggest that religious motivation did not appear to play a primary role in bank selection; the opening of new branches was not an important factor in increasing the utilization of financial services provided by Islamic banks; while 39.4 per cent of respondents would withdraw their deposits if an Islamic bank did not generate sufficient profit to make a distribution in any one year, 30.4 per cent would retain their deposits because the Islamic bank could distribute a higher dividend the following year.
Gerrard & Cunningham’s (1997) study establishes that, in Singapore, which has a minority of Muslims in its population, both Muslims and non-Muslims are generally unaware of the culture of Islamic banking. Also the two separate groups have different attitudes towards the Islamic banking movement, with the degree of difference depending on the nature of the respective matter put to them. For example, when asked what they would do if an Islamic bank did not make sufficient profits to make a distribution in any one year, 62.1 per cent of Muslims said they would keep their deposits within the Islamic banking movement, while 66.5 per cent of non-Muslims said they would withdraw their deposits.
Much has been written since the early 1960s on the theme of the bank selection process (see, for example, the published articles of Anderson et al. (1976); Holstius and Kaynak (1995); Kaynak (1986); Kaynak et al. (1991); Laroche et al. (1986), and the working paper of Chan (1989)). Erol & El-Bdour (1989) and Erol et al. (1990) compared the bank selection process in relation to “conventional” and Islamic banks. Sudin et al. (1994) compared responses about the bank selection criteria of both Muslims and non-Muslims.
In addition to establishing attitudes towards Islamic banking, Erol and his co-researchers (1989 and 1990) sought to establish, then compare, the bank selection criteria of customers of conventional and Islamic banks in Jordan. Sudin et al. (1994), among other things, sought to establish the relative importance of certain bank selection criteria using a sample of Muslims and non-Muslims, none of whom had to be patronizing an Islamic bank at the time of the study. The three most important criteria in the bank selection process for Muslims were: first, “the provision of a fast and efficient service”; second, “the speed of transaction”; and third, “friendliness of bank personnel”. As regards the non-Muslims, the three most important bank selection criteria were: first, “friendliness of bank personnel”; second, “the provision of a fast and efficient service”; and third, “the reputation and image of the bank”.

ISLAMIC BANKS: An Islamic bank is an intermediary and trustee of other people’s money like any conventional bank with the possible difference that the payoff to all its depositors is a share in profit and loss in one form or the other. This difference introduces an element of mutuality in Islamic banking, making its depositors as customers with some ownership rights inherent within it. However, in practice, Islamic banks hardly look different from its conventional counterpart in terms of organisational set-up (Dar and Presley, 2000).
Islamic banking has been defined in a number of ways. General Secretariat of the OIC’s definition goes like this: “An Islamic bank is a financial institution whose status, rules and procedures expressly state its commitment to the principle of Islamic Shariah and to the banning of the receipt and payment of interest on any of its operations” (Ali & Sarkar-1995)
Unlike conventional banks, however, Islamic banks offer PLS accounts, among others, which do not guarantee a fixed certain return on investment deposits. This leads to a reluctance of deposit holders, who have no representation in the organisation, to use PLS accounts. The bank faces a similar problem on the assets side when it comes to investing on PLS.
The essential feature of Islamic banking is that it is interest-free. Although it is often claimed that there is more to Islamic banking, such as contributions towards a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, and increased equity participation in the economy (Chapra l982), it nevertheless derives its specific rationale from the fact that there is no place for the institution of interest in the Islamic order.
It is simply an accepted fact that there are sufficient Muslim investors and borrowers in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries to warrant the attention of traditional banks who seek to serve such clients and capture a potentially profitable slice of a still relatively untapped market. Just as interesting and useful for non-Islamic bankers are the lessons learned from the innovation and creativity applied in meeting Islamic criteria.
Some products are more Islamic and than others. The basic principle is that interest – usury or Riba used interchangeably – is prohibited on the principle of no pain no gain. What a “pure” Islamic banking seems to be structurally very similar to venture capital finance, non-recourse project finance or ordinary equity investment. The investor takes a share in the profits, if any, of the venture and is liable to lose his capital. It involves investing but not lending and therefore on a systemic basis is similar to the German, Japanese and Spanish banking systems rather than the British or American systems.
Just as in the process of converting interest into capital gains for tax purposes, early Islamic investors were content to enter into zero-coupon bonds or discounted Treasury bills and receive the interest foregone in the form of capital gains.
Beyond the question of interest or Riba lies an ethical issue. Islamic investments exclude tobacco, alcohol, gaming and other “undesirable” sectors. Islamic investors, by and large, are motivated in their choice of investments by much the same criteria as their Western ethical counterparts. The search for acceptable investments is balanced by natural risk-aversion. Islamic borrowers, on the other hand, also demonstrate a reluctance to give away a share in the profits of their enterprise. It is not therefore surprising that most of Islamic banking takes the form of one type of mark-up or other rather than profit-sharing.
An analysis of the products suggests that Islamic banking has six key features:
• free of interest,
• trade-related and there is a perceived “genuine” need for the funds,
• In its purest form, it is equity related,
• meant to avoid exploitation – no usury,
• invests ethically,
• there are retail and wholesale applications.
Under the current interpretation of the rules governing Islamic banking, Usury and Riba are regarded as synonymous. The prohibition is on interest and not just on usurious interest. In practice, there appears to be more emphasis on the prohibition and restructuring of interest than on the potentially exploitative aspect of financing.
Brief History: It is worth noting that there is nothing new or particularly Islamic or Christian about Usury or interest controls. In 24th century B. C. Manu established a rate ceiling of 24% in India. Later, Hammurabi, King of Babylon, authored laws around 19th B. C. established a cap on lending rates. On loans of grain, which were repayable in kind, the maximum rate of interest was limited to 33 1/3% per annum. On loans of silver, the maximum legal rate was 20% although it appears that in some cases rates of 25 per cent per annum were charged. The law remained for most of the next 12 centuries but as with any law “regulatory arbitrage” took place and was subsequently eliminated. Unfair practices also existed. For example, creditors were forbidden from calling a loan made to a farmer prior to harvest. If the crop failed due to weather conditions, all interest on the loan would be cancelled for that year. In the case of houses, due to the scarcity of wood, a door could be used as collateral and was considered to be separate from a house. The 6th century Greeks, through the laws of Solon, lifted all maximum limitations on the legal rate of interest a moneylender might charge. The temple at Delphi was the “City” or “Wall Street” of the Greek Empire lending money for interest regularly. Credit regulation was once again part of the legal code at the start of the Roman Empire. The legal limitation on interest was established at 8 1/3% per in the 5th century B.C. Julius Caesar’s attempts to control interest rates could well have been the real reason for his assassination since many the Roman senators were the main moneylenders. (This section is drawn from Edwardes-2000. The reader is also referred to Armstrong-1987, for more details).
Back to the present day, quite a few Western countries have Usury laws that prohibit excessive interest rates. The UK’s usury laws which prevented “excessive” interest were abolished in 1854. South Africa and the US still have usury laws. Usury results when a lender charges more than the legal amount of interest permitted in that geographical area. Usury percentage limits vary by state, in USA, and at least one state, Virginia, has no usury limit. Today most of the states have had their ability to limit interest rates curtailed by over-riding US Federal law. Higher than permissible rates have been regarded by US Federal banking authorities as penalty fees and insurance premiums. And the federal rate limits are high. (Refer to Edwardes-2000).
In some states there is no restriction on the rates used for lending to incorporated entities. The controls are often on lending to persons. The usury rate usually is variable depending on market rates. In September 1998 in North Dakota it was 10.556%. California has recently imposed strict consumer lending limits. But these only apply to state banks and not to national banks. The California Constitution allows parties to contract for interest on a loan primarily for personal, family or household purposes at a rate not exceeding 10% per annum (compound annual percentage rate). The allowable rate in California is 5% over the amount charged by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on advances to member banks on the 25th day of the month before the loan. The usury laws do not apply to any real estate broker if the loan is secured by real estate. This applies whether or not he or she is acting as a real estate broker. The limitations also do not apply to most lending institutions such as banks, credit unions, finance companies, pawn brokers, etc. State laws place limitations on some of these loans, but at a higher percentage rate than the usury laws listed above. (Refer to Edwardes-2000).
In the Old Testament (King James Version), Exodus, Chapter 22, verse 25:
If you lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.
Leciticus, Chapter 25, verses 34-36:
And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay by thee; then thou shalt relieve him: yea though he be a stranger, or a sojourner, that he may live with thee.
Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.
THE New Testament also contains edicts on the same line. Thus we can see that Judaism and Christianity are no different in terms of prohibition of usury.

Chronology of recent historical events in the industry:
1963: Egypt interest free savings banks, not overtly Islamic – invested in trade and industry on the basis of share in profits.
1971: Egypt Nasr Social bank, still no overt reference to Islam.
1973: Conference of Islamic finance ministers.
1975: Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, fee based and PLS, revolving capital.
1975: Dubai Islamic Bank, UAE, first Islamic Commercial Bank in the world.
1970’s: Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan / Egypt; Bahrain Islamic Bank; Malaysia, Philippines, Nigeria, Indonesia; Islamic Finance House, Luxembourg; DMI Geneva; Al Rajhi London, Denmark, Australia, South Africa; HSBC Amanah Fund; ANZ First ANZ International Murabah Ltd., IBU of United Bank of Kuwait.
Time payment contracts such as retail installment contracts are not generally treated as loans and the usury laws normally do not apply to them. There are no limits on finance charges for the purchase of personal, family and household goods or services at this time. The maximum interest rate for car loans is almost 22%. Banks also treat interest charges for third party credit cards such as Visa, MasterCard and American Express as not being subject to Usury law limitations. (Refer to Edwardes-2000).
In transactions for the purchase of goods or services which are not for personal, family or household purposes, there are normally no limits to finance charges except those set by the parties. Limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships can no longer assert usury as a defence in civil recovery actions. The usury interest limit that applies to limited liability companies and limited partnerships has been raised from 30% per annum to 50% per annum to equate to the level that applies to corporations. (Refer to Edwardes-2000).
But there is a problem with usury laws as can be seen in South Africa. If there is a particularly risky investment and an interest rate limit, then banks will simply not lend. The poorest will find themselves deprived of financing, and under a free market there will be a shift to quality or to those that do not really need financing. Unless there is government imposed mandatory or tax driven lending to certain sectors or public opinion pressure, certain sectors or individuals deemed risky by the banks will simply not get the funding required. (Refer to Edwardes-2000).
The Concepts behind Islamic Banking and Finance:
Distinguishing Features: The economic doctrine of Islam is based on encouraging free markets, discouraging price controls and forbidding financial contracts based on riba, gharar and maysir.
Riba (Charging of Interest): Taking or paying of interest (riba) is prohibited by Shariah (Islamic law). The concept of riba extends beyond interest and usury, and volumes have been written by scholars to explain the concept. In simple terms, riba can be considered as exploitation of one party who owns a product (that includes money and capital) and which another party wishes to acquire. Although interest comes very close to this concept, it is still better to consider riba as “unfair exploitation”.
Ebrahim (1998) explains that “Riba is expounded by Ibn Qayyim & Al-Jawziyya (n.d.), another prominent Islamic scholar, to imply (i) any form of unfair trade, market manipulation or engaging a market participant to trade under duress (riba-al-fadl) and (ii) risk-free debt contracts (riba-al-nasi’ah). From a financial economist’s perspective, riba-al-nasi’ah can be defined as a risk-free return from an investment vehicle or strategy.” (see also Chapra-1986, Rahman-1969, Saeed-1995, Thomas-1995).
Gharar (Uncertainty): The existence of uncertainty in a contract is prohibited because it requires the occurrence of an event which may not ultimately occur. “Full disclosure” by both parties is the norm in contractual relationships. Any type of transaction where the (i) subject matter, (ii) the price, or both are not determined and fixed in advance amounts to “uncertainty”. Thus hedging and dealing in derivatives is not allowed.
Maisir or Speculation: Speculation is equivalent to gambling, and therefore is prohibited. Derivative transactions like Options, Futures, Swaps and forward contracts (that insure profit) are considered un-Islamic. They are also considered un-Islamic because for most of them, rates are determined by interest differentials.
Zaka’h: A taxation system inherent in the Islamic system based on the principles of social justice and equity.
Implying social justice and general welfare: The basic principle is that everybody should be able to fulfill at least the basic needs.
Conforming to Shariah: The Quran and Hadith clearly specify the guidelines for individual, social, organizational, governmental behaviour, and thus become the basic pillar for any Islamic system, with the banking and financial system being no exception.
Qard-e-hasna (benevolent loan), or Qard Hassan: Qard-e-Hasna means an interest free loan and is the only type of loan permitted by the Shariah. The loans are made from the pooled donations of the members and are generally granted to those who are facing emergency personal crisis. This form of finance is very important part of Islamic financial system and all members are encouraged to become regular donors so that the fund may be strengthened for the benefit of all Muslim The guiding principle again is the social justice and general welfare. Some Islamic banks provide the privilege of interest free loans only to the holders of investment account with them. Some extend to all bank clients. Some restrict it to needy students and other economically weaker sections of the society. Yet some other Islamic banks provide interest free loans to small producers, farmers and entrepreneurs who are not qualified to get finance from other sources. The purpose of these loans is to help start them their independent economic life and thus to raise their incomes and standard of living. Banks usually charge a small fee (say, 1.5%) annually to cover their administrative costs, etc.
Profit and loss sharing (PLS): It is an alternative to interest-based transactions.
Risk sharing: No risk, no gain is the basis.
Prohibited Investments and Permissibility of Activities: Investments should only support Halal (permitted) activities. So, investments involving products like pork, alcohol, pornography, arms & ammunitions, Cinema, Tobacco, Conventional Financial Services and activities like gambling are prohibited.
Hoarding: Hoarding money is considered improper in Islam; money is merely a means of exchange and should not be treated as a commodity. Islam encourages Trade and Enterprise, which can generate wealth for the benefits of the community as a whole with PLS as its core.
Role of Islamic Banks: The role of Islamic banks becomes difficult compared to their conventional counterparts because of the basic principle that money is not supposed to earn interest. This eliminates a major role of the financial institution. So, what do they do? They invest in viable projects, with reliable borrowers. If the project succeeds, the banker shares in the profit, if it fails, he suffers the losses.
Prohibition of Interest: Prohibiting the receipt and payment of interest is the nucleus of the system, supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals’ rights and duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts. Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking, but covers capital formation, capital markets, and all types of financial intermediation. Since prohibition on transactions based on interest payments is the most important factor and is at the heart of the Islamic financial system, it will be unjust not to provide some light on it.
The basic philosophy underlying transaction of money is that the one who is offering his money to another person has to decide whether:
(a) He is lending money to him as a sympathetic act or,
(b) He is lending money to the borrower, so that his principal may be saved or,
(c) He is advancing his money to share the profits of the borrower.
Table-2: Comparison between Riba and Profit
Riba Profit
1. When money is “charged”, its imposed positive and definite result is Riba 1. When money is used in productive activity (e.g., in trading), its uncertain result is profit.
2. By definition, Riba is the premium paid by the borrower to the lender along with principal amount as a condition for the loan. 2. By definition, profit is the difference between the revenue from production and the cost of production.
3. Riba is prefixed, and hence there is no uncertainty on the part of either the givers or the takers of loans. 3. Even if a sharing ratio is agreed in advance, profit is still uncertain, as its amount is not known until the activity is completed.
4. Riba con not be negative, it can at best be very low or zero. 4. Profit can be positive, zero or even negative.
5. From Islamic Shariah point of view, it is Haram (prohibited). 5. From Islamic Shariah point of view, it is Halal (allowed).
Making Money from Money is not permissible – the basic points of difference between money and commodity are highlighted to justify this. Money (of the same denomination) is not held to be the subject matter of trade, like other commodities. Its use is restricted to its basic purpose i.e. to act as a medium of exchange and a measure of value.
If money is to be exchanged for money or it is borrowed, the payment on both sides must be equal, so that it is not used for trade in money itself. In short, money is treated as “potential” capital. It becomes actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources to undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time value of money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is “potential” capital.
Muslim scholars term interest as Riba. Under Shariah, Riba technically refers to the premium that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its maturity (Chapra 1985, p.64). In other words, Riba is the predetermined return on the use of money. In the past there has been dispute about whether Riba refers to interest or usury, but there is now consensus among Muslim scholars that the term covers all forms of interest and not only “excessive” interest (Khan 1985, p.52).
The most important characteristic of Riba is that it is the positive and definite result of money when changed. In other words, when money begets money, without being exchanged for goods or services, or without indulging in any productive activity, it is called Riba. The basic characteristics of Riba are:
• It must be related to loan;
• A prefixed amount of money to be paid when due;
• A time is fixed for the repayment; and
• All these elements for repayment are taken as conditions for loan.
Since Interest or Riba has emerged as the basic alternative for Profit, a comparison is justified between the two (Table-2).
Table-3: Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banking:
Islamic Banking System
Conventional Banking System

Guiding principle
Guided by Quranic edicts, Hadeeth, Islamic ethics and Islamic laws.
Guided by profit motive alone, with no religious or ethical considerations.
Ethics of financing
Financing being asset-backed, and meant for productive use helps reduce the overall debt burden.
Debt burden arising out of excessive use of credit leads to bankruptcies, and waste of financial resources.

Liquidation Assets An Investment Account Holder will have similar rights as shareholders. Depositors are paid before the shareholders.
Involvement of risk & Equity financing
Equity financing is available to a project or venture that involves profit-and-loss sharing. Risk-sharing and profit sharing go together.
Commercial banks do not usually indulge in equity financing, only venture capital companies and investment banks do. Conventional banks carry much less risk, major part of the risks being transferred to the borrowers.

Return on Capital Depends on productivity, idle money cannot earn any return. Money is not capital per se, only potential capital . Even idle money in bank deposits earns returns.
Prohibition of Gharar (uncertainty)
The existence of uncertainty in a contract is prohibited because it requires the occurrence of an event which may not ultimately occur. “Full disclosure” by both parties is the norm in contracts. Derivatives trading e.g. options are considered as having elements of Gharar. Trading and dealing in derivatives are widely considered as the main source of liquidity in the conventional financial, commodity and capital markets.

Profit and Loss Sharing
Most transactions are based on this variable returns, dependent on lenders’ performance. Greater share of risks forces them to manage risks more professionally, to ensure better returns than conventional accounts. Depositors & investors have opportunity to earn higher returns than in conventional systems.
There is no relationship between bank performance and returns to the depositors or investors, who mostly enjoy a risk-free return. Conventional institutions mostly act as intermediaries between lenders & borrowers enjoying almost a risk-free spread.

Zakat It has become one of the functions of the Islamic banks to collect and distribute Zakat. Government Taxes perhaps serve the same purpose – mode and rate of charging are different, though.
Compounding or Interest on interest The Islamic banks have no provision to charge any extra money from the defaulters. It can charge additional money (compound rate of interest) in case of defaulters.
Money-Market Borrowing For the Islamic banks, it is comparatively difficult to borrow money from the money market. For commercial banks, borrowing from the money market is the main source of liquidity.
Developing expertise Since it shares profit and loss, the Islamic banks pay greater attention to developing project appraisal and evaluation systems. Since income from the advances is fixed, it gives little importance to developing expertise in project appraisal and evaluations.
Viability v/s credit-worthiness The Islamic banks, on the other hand, give greater emphasis on the viability of the projects. The conventional banks give greater emphasis on credit-worthiness of the clients.
Relationship with Clients The status of Islamic bank in relation to its clients is that of partners, investors and trader. The status of a conventional bank, in relation to its clients, is that of creditor and debtors.
Capital Guarantee No guarantee. Built into the system.
Deposit insurance None An integral component
Key Islamic Financial techniques: Islamic banking and financial institutions have developed a wide rage of techniques which allow them to uphold the religious and legal principles while enabling them, at the same time, to offer viable financial products. The search is actually still going on to find newer techniques, and for variations based upon the existing ones to offer more attractive and useful instruments for the investors. The following list covers many of them, but must not be considered as exhaustive:
Mudaraba (Participation or trust financing): It involves two parties, the managing trustee (Mudarib) and the beneficial owner (Rub-ul-Maal). Usually the investment account holders are the provider of funds, and the Islamic Banks are the managing partner (mudarib). The Islamic Financial Institution may either put up all the funds itself and undertake responsibility for investing in them, or alternately it can provide funds to a customer who then acts as Mudarib. The borrower retains a fixed percentage of profits, the Islamic Financial Institution’s reward is a fixed percentage in the balance of the revenue generated by the investments and the remainder goes to the investors. Underlying principle is ‘no-pain-no-gain’, i.e., no one is entitled to any addition to the principal sum if he does not share in the risks involved. Although profits are shared on a pre-agreed basis, losses are wholly suffered by the Rub-ul-Maal.
Musharaka (Equity Financing): It is quite similar to the Mudarabah contract. It involves financing through equity. Here the partners or shareholders for a Project use their capital through a Joint Venture, Limited Partnership to generate a profit. Profits or losses will be split between the shareholders according to some agreed pre-formula depending on the investment ratio.
Difference between Mudaraba and Musharaka Contracts: In a Mudaraba contract, the managing agent (beneficiary or the borrower, called the Mudarib) does not have any financial participation. In a Musharaka contract, the agent is a financial partner along with the provider of fund (Rubb-ul-Maal of Mudaraba contract) sharing the gain or loss at the pre-designated ratio which is likely to be higher than what he is likely to get in a Mudaraba contract. Thus, in Mudaraba, the agent acts as a working partner who does not bear any losses and simply manages the fund (the project in which the fund is invested), whereas in Musharaka, all the parties are shareholders in the venture.
Murabaha (Cost-plus financing): This technique is extensively used to facilitate trade financing activities of Islamic Financial Institutions. The Mudaraba and Musharaka transactions are often seen on the retail liability side of Islamic banks. The asset side whether retail or wholesale is quite risky. The most common such financial instrument is the ‘mark-up’ structure called Murabaha. It sounds quite similar to a “repo” agreement commonly used in the West.
In a Murabaha transaction, the bank finances the purchase of an asset by buying it on behalf of its client. The bank then adds a “mark-up” in its sale price to its client who pays for it on a deferred basis. The ‘cost-plus’ nature of Murabaha sounds very much like the interest into capital gains manipulations of tax-avoiders. Islamic banks are supposed to take a genuine commercial risk between the purchase of the asset from the seller and the sale of the asset to the person requiring the goods. The bank stands in between the buyer and the supplier and is liable if anything goes wrong. There is thus some form of guarantee with respect to the quality of the goods provided by the bank to the end user in the strict form of Murabaha. Title to the goods financed may pass to the bank’s client at the outset or on deferred payment. From the perspective of modern finance, a Murabaha facility is equivalent to an asset-backed risky loan. If the capital markets are perfect and all agents in the economy have equal access to information, then competition between Islamic banks and conventional banks would result in Murabahah having the same expected return as that of conventional loans.
Baimuajjal (Deferred Payment Sales): The payments for this sale could be either in installments or a one-off deferred payment as per agreement between the parties at the time of the sale, and cannot include any charges for deferment. This is like as a Murabaha mode of investment with an exception that the sale under this cost-plus sale mode of investment is made on a credit basis rather than cash. It is deemed acceptable to charge higher prices for deferred payments. Such transactions are regarded as trades and not loans.
Ijara (Operating Lease): It involves leasing of machinery, equipment, buildings and other capital assets. The financier purchases the asset and leases it to the end-user for an agreed rental which may be fixed in advance or subject to occasional review by a mutually acceptable third party, e.g. an international firm of accountants. Insuring of the asset remains a contentious issue.
Ijara wa iqtina (Financial Lease): This is a leasing structure coupled with a right available to the lessee to purchase the asset at the end of the lease period (Bay’ al Wafa). The lessee agrees to make payments into an Islamic investment account (with right to all profits) to be used in or towards financing the ultimate purchase of the asset. The instrument has been used increasingly in a range of asset classes including ships, aircrafts, telecom equipment and power station turbines, etc.
Baisalam or Bai’ Salaf (Purchase with deferred delivery): It is a short-term commodity finance contract in which the buyer (usually of agricultural or manufactured products) pays the seller full negotiated price of a product that is promised for delivery at a later date. It has similarities with the forward contracts of conventional financial systems except that in Islamic instruments the rate of return is tied to each transaction rather than to a time dimension. Another difference lies in the fact that in Salam, the buyer pays the entire amount in cash, at the time of contract. Both the quality and quantity of the sold products are definitely specified in the contract. The counter-party risk in Al Salam is one-sided as it lies with the buyer alone (the IBF) unlike the forward contracts in which it affects both parties. Hence, it is expected that this risk will be priced one way unless a security is provided by the seller. This involves the bank paying for the producer’s goods at a discount before they have been delivered or even made. Difference of opinion exists on whether the subject of Bai Salam transaction should be available in the market at the time of the contract or whether it is enough that the asset will be available at the date set in the contract for delivery. Difference of opinion also can be seen on the minimum time period between the date of contract and delivery of assets.
The party on the purchase side of the contract may sell the asset back to the party on the sale side of the contract or to a third party for a profit. The purchaser/ financier may also sell the assets by way of a parallel Bai Salam contract (a salam contract with a third party) to hedge the asset-risk or for profit.
The stipulation of full cash prepayment in Al Salam contracts is meant to facilitate working capital finance wherein the party on the buyer side is the IBF institution. Since full prepayment is involved, the price paid is lower than the future spot price of the goods in question unlike the futures or forward price which is always higher than the spot price. An important feature of Al salam contract is the underlying asset which must be standardizable, of determinate quality and easy to be quantified.
Istisna and Parallel Istisna: It involves a deferred delivery sale contract similar to salam. It is also similar to conventional work-in-progress financing of capital projects like construction. It is also used for trade finance such as pre-shipment export finance. In this contract, the seller ( Al Sani’), based upon an order from purchaser (Al Mustasni’), undertakes to manufacture or have manufactured/ acquired the subject item (Al Masnoo’) as per purchaser’s specifications. The price, payment structure and the date of delivery are fixed in advance. In parallel Istisna, the Al-Sani’ may enter into a second Istisna’ contract (subcontract) with a third party to manufacture the subject item unless Al Mustasni’ (ultimate purchaser) has stipulated in the contarct specifically for Al Sani’ to manufacture himself.
Similarity with Bai Salam contract: Sale of a product not available at the time of the deal.
Difference with Bai Salam contract: In Bai Salam, full price for the asset must be paid at the outset, whereas in Istisna, payment in full or in installments may be made at any agreed upon time (even beyond delivery date).
Similarity with Ijarah: In Istisna, al-sani’ may either provide the raw material or labour. The labour part is the similarity with Ijarah.
Arbun or Urboun (Pre-purchase of right to acquire asset): The purchaser makes a deposit (a down-payment, which may be a fraction of the price) for the purchase of an asset at a later date on the understanding that, should the sale of the assets not proceed (say, if the purchaser chooses not to proceed), the seller will be permitted to retain the deposit. Because of its similarity to an option, it has met with varying levels of approval from the schools of Islamic jurisprudence. A lot of work will be required to mould the instrument so as to remove any possibility of speculation ensuring total acceptability.
Khiyar al-shart: This is a sale contract concluded at the time of signing the agreement, but where one of the two parties to the contract has a right to cancel the sale within a stipulated time. Cancellation is not contingent upon any uncertain future event. For example, party A enters into a contract with party B to sell a given quantity of equity stock on an agreed price, today. Party A has the right to either confirm or rescind the contract by a certain time in the future (let’s term it as “maturity”). If Pmaturity > Pcontract, A may choose to rescind the contract and instead sell the stock in the market. The similarity of the exercise features of this contract with the conventional Put Option invites some controversy.
Al Bay Bithaman Ajil: BBA, popular in Malaysia, is a mark-up sale in which payments are delayed and made in equal installments. Theoretically, in the contract of BBA the bank sells the product (a house, equipment or machinery, etc.) to the customer at a mark-up price, whose content consists of the cost price plus a profit margin. The client may be allowed to settle payment by installments within a pre-agreed period, or as a lump sum. It is similar to a Murabaha contract, but with payment on a deferred basis. The BBA facility can also be utilised for refinancing of assets owned by the Customer, and the proceeds to be utilised for the Customer’s working capital.
Syndication: Islamic Financial Institutions are increasingly prepared to participate in large project financing, and are getting ready to compete with their conventional counterparts. The syndication works on the techniques discussed above, most popular being the Mudarabah contract modified to suit the technicalities.
Jo’alah: A party undertakes to pay another party a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specified service in accordance with the terms of the contract stipulated between the two parties. This mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations and professional services, fund placements, and trust services.
Certificates of sale: It has been suggested that consumers buying consumables on credit would issue ‘certificates of sale’ similar to letters of credit. These could be encashed by the seller at the bank at a discount. This seems very similar in structure to Baisalam.
Prizes and bonuses: Iran and Pakistan have both attempted to fully Islamise the entire banking. Iran converted to Islamic banking in August l983 with a three-year transition period. In Iran banks accept current and savings deposits without paying any return. The banks are permitted to offer bonuses and prizes on these deposits very similar to the UK’s premium bonds. This is apparently not regarded as gambling by the Iranian Islamic banking units.
No fee accounts: There is a substantial Muslim population in South Africa and they are serviced by two small Islamic banks. The main product being offered is the “no fee” current account which is also provided by the conventional banks by arrangement. Transaction charges are waived and interest is not paid on current accounts.
Gifts: Gifts to depositors are given entirely at the discretion of the Islamic banks on the basis of the minimum balance. These gifts may be monetary or non-monetary are based on the banks’ returns.
Non PLS Modes: Non-Profit-and-Loss Sharing Modes. They are used in cases where PLS modes cannot be implemented, e.g., in cases of small-scale borrowers or for consumption loans.
Qard Al Hasnah (Beneficence Loans): Zero return loans that Islam edicts for Muslims to make to the needy. Banks can only charge the borrowers a one-off service fee to cover the administrative expenses, but this fee cannot be related, by any means, to the loan amount or its maturity.
Islamic Derivative Products: Salam (Bai Al Salam), Urboun (Arbun) and Khiyar al-shart are the existing derivative products approved by some schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Dr. Kenneth Baldwin has suggested some Profit Rate Swaps that replicate the risk management capability of conventional interest rate swaps, using Sharia-compatible building blocks (existing and extensively used instruments).
It is generally assumed that the term “Islamic Derivatives” is a contradiction. The requirements of derivatives and rules of Shariah at first sight are diametrically opposed and all derivatives are therefore Haram. But it is important to recall the generalised definition we use of a financial derivative. It is simply a financial instrument that is derived from another financial instrument or a combination of such instruments. It is argued that as derivatives “unquestionably” involve interest or interest-based products they are contaminated and should be prohibited. Well, derivatives only involve interest if one or both parties using the derivative seek to hedge the derivative. It could be argued that Murabaha could involve interest if the parties seek to match the interest free but guaranteed return product with an interest-bearing equivalent. Islamic banking derivatives should be perfectly acceptable so long as they do not involve interest.
The literature contains hardly any serious criticism of the interest-free character of the operation, since this is taken for granted, although concerns have been expressed about the lack of adequate interest-free instruments. There is a near-consensus that Islamic banks can function well without interest. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study by Iqbal and Mirakhor (l987) found Islamic banking to be a viable proposition that can result in efficient resource allocation.
Advantages of Islamic Finance:
 Efficient allocation of funds: Since allocation of funds by banks will be dependent upon the soundness of projects under the PLS arrangements, the allocation is more efficient.
 Productive use of capital: Banks are likely to know their fund users better in order to ensure that the funds are used for productive purposes. In this way, both the fund providers and the financial intermediary contribute to promoting productive economic activities and greater financial responsibility. Thus, IBFs would promote economic growth [Chapra (1998), Siddiqui (1983)]
 Similarly, since banks have no pressure of fixed regular payments on deposits, the efficiency of allocating resources to profitable and more productive use is further boosted.
 Equitable distribution of wealth: The efficiency in allocation leads to this, and creates additional wealth as well. Interest distribution is considered unjust and inequitable because it is not based on any productive use of capital, and it exploits the misfortune of the borrower (who has run out of money).
 Generation of employment: Productive use of capital implies investments and creation of jobs. The investment is not dependent upon the cost of capital (and positive NPVs) or time value of money, hence number of investible projects is likely to be much higher resulting in larger capital formation.
 Saving in information costs: Being a partner of the entrepreneur (or a firm), the financial institution has easier and cheaper access to information on matters relating to the firm. This may make credit rating agencies redundant, and lending more efficient.
 Saving in deposit insurance costs: Risk-sharing concept built into the IBF system, there will be no need for deposits to be insured.
 Reduction of debt burden: The IBF system of equity financing encourages debt to be swapped with equity which can help many developing countries get rid of the immense debt-burden. Instead of rescheduling of existing loans or selling Brady bonds at heavy discounts, which does not help relieve the pressure much, converting debt to equity promises a much more fruitful alternative.
 Promoting Ethical behaviour: Because of its strong emphasis on the ethical and moral dimensions of doing the business and selecting the activities/ commodities to be financed, the Islamic financing institutions could play an important role in promoting socially desirable investment and corporate behavior. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Islamic financing institutions are subject to Shariah (Islamic Law) regulations in addition to conforming to the conventional regulatory standards. This is further expected to ensure greater prudence and responsibility.
 Higher profits: Account holders under Islamic finance could expect higher profit from their investment as Islamic banks are required to share the entire net profit according to the agreed formula rather than just a portion of the profit, as is the conventional practice.
 Reduction in run-on-deposits: Banks using profit and loss sharing (PLS) to mobilize resources are less likely to face a sudden run on their deposits.
 More stable economic environment: The perspective of investments is long-term in comparison to short-term expectations of returns in conventional financial system – this may result in a more stable economic environment less dependent on business cycles.
 Less likelihood of flight of capital: Under Islamic finance, debt instruments that may be created through selling goods and services on credit are not readily tradable. This greatly eliminates the possibility of sudden mass movement of funds from one country to another.
 Reduction in speculative transactions: Examination of daily records of trading in financial markets vividly shows that institutional participants carry out huge speculative transactions. More often than not, such transactions are sources of instabilities. In contrast, Islamic banks and financial institutions are inherently prevented from carrying out such activities. As a result destabilizing speculations would be significantly curtailed in financial markets, although liquidity will remain with secondary market trading allowed in stocks or investment certificates.
 Reduction of inflationary pressures: Under Islamic economics the inflationary pressures would be reduced to a great extent, as over or under-supply of money with respect of supply of goods is not allowed (money directly linked to supply of goods in the economy).
 Reduction in unproductive use of borrowings: By eliminating unnecessary and excessive borrowing (borrowing beyond productive use), risk to lenders is reduced under PLS, as lending is directly related to project appraisals and feasibility.
 Automatic Shock-absorption: For banks involved in the equity-based system, Khan (1986) argues that the shocks to asset positions are immediately absorbed by changes in the values of shares held by depositors in the bank. This makes the real values of assets and liabilities of banks equal at all times, preventing banking crises. Nienhaus (1986) agrees with the argument.
 Guaranteed market of practicing Muslims. Islam being the fastest growing religion in the world further enhances the potential marketability of IBF instruments.
Perceived Disadvantages of IBFs:
 With PLS, the role of the bank undergoes a change from being an intermediary trader of money, earning profits from the margin between lending and borrowing, to being an investing partner. The role of an investment bank brings in added costs:
o Search cost resulting from the need to decide on the most profitable ventures. With an Islamic bank required to finance so many different kinds of businesses, acquiring skills in all of them may be immensely costly.
o Monitoring costs resulting from the need to prevent mishandling of the venture and fraudulent means (including creative accounting) adopted by borrowers/ partners are in addition to those involved in conventional financial system.
o Managing costs incurred because of its obligation as a partner in the PLS deals.
 Determination of mechanism for profit sharing in the short-term is difficult in a PLS system based on returns only from productive deployment of funds. In the absence of a standard mechanism for profit/ loss sharing (both for short-term as well as long-term), the possibility of exploitative contracts cannot be eliminated.
 Eliminating interest may reduce the propensity to save (with banks) or invest (considering the risk associated with returns), thus curtailing economic growth affecting employment (Pryor-1985), generation of wealth and its distribution. Of course, IBF proponents do not agree, as an opportunity for equitable sharing of wealth earned from productive activities could be enough stimulant for investors.
 Dispute settlement mechanism adds to the cost further, as the account put forward by the borrower (entrepreneur) may not be convincing enough for the banks or other investor partners. Fixed return of the conventional system has no such costs.
 A risk sharing proposition of IFBs and resulting absence of deposit insurance system leaves small investors in the risky avenues, particularly when the Islamic financial institution carries fraudulent intentions.
 Curtailing speculative activities in the secondary market would be extremely difficult resulting in the same risks and costs that the conventional financial systems carry.
 The mark-up system of most of the non-PLS schemes resembles the interest-based system to the extent of becoming indistinguishable, sometimes, and provides unscrupulous financiers opportunity to replicate the conventional system.
 Additional cost of supervision by the Sharia Board: Product development, its offering, agreements between counterparties, functioning of the IBF system, accounting, etc need to be Sharia compliant which needs certification by the Sharia Boards resulting in additional cost burden over the IBF Operators.
 Account holders under Islamic finance could expect higher profit from their investment as Islamic banks are required to share the entire net profit according to the agreed formula rather than just a portion of the profit, as is the conventional practice.
Impediments to the growth of IBF: The impediments are being discussed in this paper after grouping them in seven broad categories: (1) Social Impediments, (2) Economic Impediments, (3) Financial Impediments, (4) Structural Impediments, (5) Institutional Impediments, (6) Political Impediments, Technological Impediments, and (7) Religious Impediments.
1. Social Impediments: Humans are undoubtedly the most important resource endowment for any country. Their development is the key to the competitiveness of any nation in any sphere. Even in the field of IBF, it is the level of human development in the promoter nations that will ultimately steer the IBF into a competitive arena. The Human Developed Index (HDI) available with the Human Development Report brought out by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a composite index that measures achievements of a country in three basic parameters of human development (HDR 2003). These are: (i) longevity measured by life expectancy at birth, (ii) knowledge, measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, and (iii) standard of living, measured by GDP per capita.
It is worthwhile, then, having a look (Figure-7) at the HDI of member nations of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), having some kind of IBF (as they are the promoters of IBF), in comparison with some of the world leaders (promoters of Conventional banking & financial system).
Accumulation of human capital is an indicator of endogenous growth and is often used in empirical growth models. In most regressions, this variable turns out with a positive coefficient (Barro, 1991). The highest ranked country among the Islamic countries, in terms of HDI, is Brunei with a rank of 31, the second highest being Bahrain at 37, both of them with so small a population that their impact on the development of as important a system as IBF is not expected to be large. However, in terms of developing a financial market (and related systems, also in terms of IBF) the maximum effort has been made by Bahrain after Malaysia (Countries with 100% Islamic Financial system in place, i.e., Iran was placed at 106, Sudan at 138 and Pakistan had a rank of 144 in HDR of 2003). The development in the area is not likely to bear much fruit unless the promoter countries of IBF take giant steps towards developing their most important infrastructure element, i.e. the Human Resources. The initial successes may remain at superficial levels, and sustainability of growth and the challenges posed to the conventional financial system may remain feeble otherwise. At the moment, it poses a significant impediment to the growth of IBF.
(a) Societal Impediments: The basic societal fabric builds the psyche of the masses. Coming out of this box, then, is not easy. After initial leadership over a long period, when the Islamic society ultimately lost its primacy to the Western world because of their consistent multi-dimensional development activities, it seems the members of the Islamic society also lost the motivation to win back. This has had a lasting impact on the society in all spheres that are cited next. Islamic Financial Institutions as part of this society have a strong barrier to scale, and along with its parent society has a backlog of many generations to clear.
Social alienation, particularly in the wake of 11th September, may detract non-Muslims even further away from anything Islamic, and act as a major source of impediment.
(b) Educational Impediments: Education is the backbone of any development, and is one of the most important reasons behind the lost glory of the Islamic society. The absence of Islamic Banking and Finance from the horizon, for centuries, is pointer enough towards lack of education and research. However, figure-8 provides the status of education in the Islamic World represented here by countries of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Countries that have IBFs in comparison with some of the world leaders.
In terms of Adult literacy and Education Index (a measure that provides a composite indicator of the level of education), all the countries in the OIC sample lag behind the world leaders. In terms of Public Expenditure on education reported as percentage of respective GDPs, Saudi Arabia’s figure is encouraging as it leads the sample in this respect (except Yemen, whose ratio could be misleading as the GDP figure is too small) but also increased from 6.5% in 1990 to 9.5% during 1998-2000 (data refers to the year during this period for which it was available) which shows its recent commitment towards educating its citizen. But the scenario in all other countries even in this respect is no different from what is projected by the Adult literacy or the Education Index.
The enrolment into educational institutions provides indication towards the future of education in a country. From the data available in the Human Development Report 2003 (HDR 2003) for 175 countries, we find that, among the OIC countries, only Guyana with 91% enrolment (although its overall HDI rank is a poor 92) was part of the top quartile of Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, during the year 2000-01 compared with thirty (30) non-OIC members. The second quartile of ranks had twenty (20) OIC members while the third quartile had seventeen (17) and the last one had sixteen (16) of them. More than sixty-one percent (61%) OIC members fell in the lower half, compared with thirty-three percent (33%) of non-OIC members. The full list of 174 countries had 31% OIC members (54 numbers), whereas the lower half of the ranks, based on combined enrollment, had 45% of them. This presents a gloomy picture not only for the present but has repercussions for the foreseeable future. Only exponential growth in enrollments, now, can provide some hope of catching up with rest of the world.
(c) Psychological Impediments: Psychological mindset needs to change for those who have been using the conventional banks and FIs as well as those for those who have been abstaining from them due to their anti-usurious beliefs. This tantamounts to a paradigm shift that is not easy to happen in a short period and it requires a lot of concerted effort on all fronts. On the other hand, psychological pressure on the Islamic institutions, in general, from fundamentalist organizations is keeping a check on declaring innovations that they could launch otherwise.
2. Economic Impediments: Size of the economy is an important indicator of the kind of flow passing through the banking and financial channels that the IBF have to chase. Considering that home banking and financial institutions have a clear advantage over foreign institutions, GDP should be a good indicator for development of these institutions. Looking at the GDP of the IBF promoter countries (our sample of OIC having some type of IBF) vis-à-vis rest of the world provides some clue as to why it may be difficult to promote the IBF in the era of opening economy where they have to compete with the world players too. The GDP of all the sample Islamic countries put together was less than 17% of the GDP of USA. When we add Japanese GDP to the GDP of USA, the sample Islamic countries do not reach even 12%. What influence an economy like USA or Japan can have on the prosperity of a financial system can be seen from this fact. The chart (Figure-9) therefore excludes USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, China and Italy the top seven nations (constituting of 68.75% of World GDP, the world being represented, here, by 170 nations included in the HDR 2003) so that the remaining figures could be comparable.
3. Financial Impediments:
a. Lack of active capital market: Equity is an excellent source of capital and organizations are likely to exhaust this source before exploring other means when planning to acquire, upgrade or produce technology to sell as a product. An absence of active capital market hinders technology intensive, high capital endeavors as well as any expansion of such projects. Since acquisition of technology is capital-intensive, the payback period for which is usually long, whereas bank borrowings seldom indulge in 100% financing or long-term financing, it is almost an impossible source for the start-ups, capital markets have proven to be the most successful and feasible means of financing.
b. Lack of active debt market: The absence of secondary debt market in UAE is also a serious handicap for the investing community. As a result, debt issues become illiquid and costly. There is no scope of long term debt financing and with bank financing catering to short term or medium term finance, it acts as a deterrence to technology intensive ventures. At the same time, bank finance is mostly suitable for Working Capital financing rather than Capital Expenditure funding that is required for Technology-intensive ventures.
c. Lack of Money Market: It is another major impediment leaving the market not just illiquid and costlier, but also leaves the government devoid of financing its expenses through a cheaper and liquid medium.
d. Supportive Institutions for Venture Capital Financing: The strongest form of Islamic financing being the PLS forms of Mudarabah and Musharakah, Venture Capital financing (VCF) should have been the strongest in the countries that promote the IBFs, but the reality is surprisingly different. VCF needs institutional support in terms of an active network of financiers, entrepreneurs, technology promoting institutions like Private and Government R&D laboratories, Universities, Stock Exchanges and regulatory framework, etc. A Silicon Valley type network of alliances is required which is largely absent in the OIC. Some efforts in the direction of establishing technology parks and business incubators have started in some countries, but they have a long way to go. For individual small economies it may take a lot of time to achieve the critical mass, a strong need therefore is for the association of countries like the GCC or ASEAN to pool their resources.
e. Lack of an active secondary market: Secondary markets are in the process of evolving and it will take time before they could really provide this market with the required liquidity. Secondary markets do not just become meeting points between the investors and the corporates, they become a benchmark for the health of the whole financial system.
f. Lack of Business incubators: Incubators connect talent, technology, capital and know-how to leverage entrepreneurial talent, accelerate the development of new knowledge-based businesses and thus speed up the commercialization of new knowledge and technology. Although the system has started in some countries like UAE, it will take time in shaping up to a stage where it could be of real use. There is a strong relationship between the financial institutions and the business incubators. Business incubators cannot grow without financial support and growth in the sector means a growth in demand for the financial sector. Hence a lack of this system, in the Islamic countries, is an impediment to the growth of IBF system.
4. Structural Impediments:
• Financial Engineering: The structuring of any new system that can pose real competition to an existing well-established system requires not just a robust structure to start with but a structure that supports innovation and continual improvement. Financial Engineering is an integral part of the financial service provider so that innovative products can be offered regularly to keep the depositors/ investors interest in the system alive. For a relative newcomer, with variants far less in number and the scope limited by restrictions by Sharia, Financial Engineering acquires all the more importance, more so because of the need to differentiate itself from the conventional products.
• Lack of Islamic credentials of the product: The products based on Sharia Committee of banks do not necessarily satisfy the psyche of the masses unless backed by religious edicts and logical reasoning. Currently, all products except those based on Mudaraba and Musharaka principles leave doubts in the minds of people who want Sharia-compliant products. The penetration would have been much faster had these doubts been cleared.
• The mark-up system of most of the non-PLS schemes resembles the interest-based system. As discussed above, if the stronger Islamic instruments based on PLS principles were dominant, the IBF system could attract more investors to its fold. The current scenario can be judged from the proportion of funds based on the two types of systems, namely PLS (stronger Islamic system) and the mark-up type systems (weaker Islamic system).
It is obvious from Fig-10a that the depositors’ preference is for PLS type deposits (ready to take larger risk, and choose stronger Islamic products) whereas the banks are more risk averse and prefer to indulge in Mark-up type financing, as can be seen from Fig-10b. The Bahrain market’s position is even more tilted towards the non-PLS schemes for deposits.
• Maturity mismatch: It can be seen from the maturity structure for the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhard (BIMB) that the maturities on the deposit side (Figure-11a) are totally different from the maturities of the financing side (Figure-11b). The situation of other IBFs in the world is not much different in terms of maturity-mismatch. This creates problems in the cash-flow matching, too. Deposits with maturity of more than one year being less than 1% is a clear sign of lack of investors’ confidence in the system. This may be as a result of other impediments under discussion.
• Unclear product proposition or processes: Competing with the conventional counterpart in marketing abilities is not easy for a relatively new entrant like IBF. Lack of skills that help in the matter is currently an impediment that can be removed only through learning which is path-dependent and will take time to set in.
• Additional risks: The PLS mode has its inherent risks similar to those of Venture Capital Financing or those faced by Equity financiers rather than the Debt financiers. In fact, PLS modes have in-built risk component wherein the financier has to share the risk of failure (loss) along with the entrepreneur (the borrower). Even the operational mode is more complex than the Conventional Debt financing, e.g., calculation of the share in profit and loss, feasibility and profitability studies of ventures being financed and their continuous monitoring and audit. Further, PLS modes of financing are not ted to collaterals, as do the conventional loans.
Even no-PLS modes have unique risks, e.g., the Salam or Bai Salaf contracts expose them to commodity risk in addition to the credit risk. Similarly, the Ijara contracts differ from conventional lease contracts in that the leased assets have to be carried on the Balance Sheet of the Bank which limits the transferability of substantial risks and rewards to the lessee. The Finance by IBFs are mostly backed by tangible assets whose market value may not be constant over time. This volatility is in addition to the normal depreciation of assets. Basel Committee’s recommendation for Capital Adequacy does not incorporate this volatility. Another example is that of the Displaced Commercial Risk which endangers the competitiveness of IBFs in the long run. It is the pressure on the IBFs to pay higher returns than that it is obliged to (as per agreed terms) in order to make its returns more lucrative than the market returns, this involves paying the investors from its own share of profits which actually belonged to the IBFs’ sharehlders.
Conventional financiers as well as the investors can use derivative instruments to hedge various types of risks to a great extent which is largely absent in IBF System, and this poses a major impediment to the growth of this system unless alternative comparable or better mechanisms are evolved. Lack of liquidity itself poses a major risk, both for the borrower as well as for the lender. For detailed insight into unique risks involved in Islamic Banking, the reader may refer Chapra & Khan (2000) and Hassan (2000).
• Financially weak institution offering the product: In a market with very high prospects for growth there is always a rush for every Tom, Dick and Harry to adopt a me-too strategy and entering without having a look at their own credentials. Islamic Financial Institutions are weaker, in general, compared to the Conventional ones, and the rush to launch a new institution to grab the fast buck exposes the weakness further. For weaker institutions, it becomes much more difficult to convince customers on the viability of their products and services. The need for Sharia Compliance makes the task even more difficult.
• Size of the IBFs: Most of the IBFs are extremely small in size compared with the multinational banks operating in their markets. All the IBF fund put together does not match the funds with Multinational banks like HSBC or Citibank. Size carries the power in the market, and smaller size of IBFs, at present, does prove to be a source of impediment in that respect.
5. Institutional Impediments:
(a) Absence of a uniform regulatory framework: It is still evolving in some areas whereas in some other areas it is entirely absent. For example, the oldest of such institutions, AAOIFI had come out with only 16 financial accounting standards in the ten years since its inception in 1991 [October issue of the quarterly “Islamic Banking Hub” of Bahrain reports ‘43 standards and statements’ having been issued]. Formation of such organizations is taking time mainly because of difficulty in developing consensus among Islamic nations, and also because of difficulty in making the regulations compatible with the conventional regulations.
(b) Lack of acceptance of existing Regulatory bodies: For example, even after twelve years of existence, the AAOIFI’s standards are mandatory only in Sudan, Bahrain and Jordan. Saudi Monetary Agency just ‘requests’ Saudi banks to seek guidance from the AAOIFI standards. Zaher and Hassan (2001) provide a comparative study on the salient features of Islamic Banking Supervisory Systems in 15 countries.
(c) Absence of an Islamic Financial Network free from ribawee dealings: Networks play a major role in encouraging a system to grow and sustain the growth over longer terms, in the absence of which the growth may be lumpy in nature. Mutual cooperation in the networks helps pooling of resources and optimizing their exploitation to gain competitive advantage. What is seen today in the IBF world is some pockets of excellence in countries like Malaysia and Bahrain with a few institutions like Islamic Development Bank (IDB) playing some inspiring roles, but to bridge the huge gap with respect to the competitors in the conventional sector, a lot more is required a lot more quickly.
(d) Absence of Islamic Central banks except in three countries (Pakistan, Sudan and Iran) that have converted their banking system to 100% Islamic. In other countries, even after twenty eight years of the modern Islamic Banking and Finance experience, dependence on the conventional systems of the Central banks is a good explanation why the growth in this sector with immense potential is not happening at the desired pace.
(e) Clash with the mainstream regulations, particularly in the non-Islamic nations. Some examples: (i) the treatment of Ijara as Lease instead of mortgage, (ii) imposition of taxes despite the zakat, as an integral part of Islamic system, having the same functionality – amounting to double taxation effectively, (iii) regulatory fees – double payment due to the requirement to meet dual regulations.
(f) Limited availability of risk management and analysis tools to hedge against volatility poses an additional burden for IBFs and results in maintaining higher levels of liquidity.
(g) Lack of trained personnel: With the number of educational institutions and training centres catering to the need of this rapidly growing segment being limited, non-availability of qualified personnel who can analyse and manage portfolios is a major impediment.
6. Political Impediments:
• Political pressure, in general, on Islamic institutions from the Western World, particularly in the wake of 11th September not only affects the system physically but it has an impact on the psyche. For, example, almost every financial transaction (particularly relating to an Islamic Institution) is being monitored. From UAE, no amount in excess of AED 2,500 can be repatriated without leaving a copy of identity which then goes into the system under scrutiny.
• Lack of economic, military and political prowess of countries sponsoring the Islamic Financial system, only adds to the other weaknesses of the system. Freezing of accounts by the super-powers at short notices, and arbitrarily, is only a symbolic threat to this institution.
A country’s environment conducive to investments boosts the growth of financial systems. An environment fraught with risks, on the contrary, impedes it. Many organizations try to capture countries’ environment to reflect this aspect. Freedom indices like “Index of Economic Freedom” developed by Heritage Foundation of USA, “Freedom in the World” by Freedom House (emphasis on Political and civil rights) of USA and “Economic Freedom of the World” by Frazer Institute of Canada capture the economic environment of countries. All of them point towards an overall lack of freedom in most of the OIC countries. Erb et. al. (1996) report country risk analysis being carried out by organizations like (a) Bank of America World Information Services, (b) Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) S.A., (c) Control Risks Information Services (CRIS), (d) Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), (e) Euromoney, (f) Institutional Investor, (g) Standard and Poor’s Rating Group, (h) Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), (i) Political Risk Services: Coplin-O’Leary Rating System, (j) Moody’s Investor Services. They provide ratings that try to capture ratings based on qualitative and quantitative information into a single index.
In the ICRG composite risk ratings for March 2003, the least risky OIC country (Brunei) was ranked six (6). The top twenty (20) least risky countries included only three OIC countries (Brunei, UAE and Kuwait) out of the forty-four (44) OIC countries for which ICRG provides country risk ratings. Top half had just fourteen (14) countries (32%) whereas the bottom half had thirty (30) countries (68%) of them.
Table-5: ICRG composite risk ratings for 44 OIC member countries (March 2003)
Top quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Bottom quartile Total OIC countries
Numbers 6 8 15 15 44
Percentage 14% 18% 34% 34% 100%
The trend indicates that OIC member countries are considered as riskier than non-OIC countries for financial investments. This is also reflected in the incoming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in these countries, and suggests that the Governments and Institutions in these countries need to do a lot.
7. Technological Impediments: The Islamic world has not kept pace with the developments in rest of the world. Technology being the backbone of banking and financial system and the main driver of market power today, lagging behind in technology means backwardness in every sector of the economy. Various measures of Technological strength like Technological Achievement Index developed by UNDP is a composite index providing enough indication of the level of Technology in a country. The promoters of IBFs, Islamic countries, fall far behind the promoters of conventional financial system. Other indicators have developed by many other agencies and independent researchers point towards the same backwardness of the group.
Indicator of new technology diffusion has been considered as ICT (Information and Communications Technology) by many agencies including UNDP, as this is what has revolutionized the integration of the world into a global village speeding up innovations by pooling talents together. Figure-13 represents a comparison between the Islamic world with a few of the world leaders. The picture is not much different from what is seen with other indicators. Except for United Arab Emirates (UAE), we hardly see any potential competitors to the countries promoting conventional systems of banking and finance. The best performer in Telephone Mainlines per thousand people from the Islamic world is placed at 31st position with a value of 259. Similarly, in terms of Internet Users per thousand people, the highest place for an Islamic Country goes to UAE at the 19th position (315 users), next best is Malaysia at the 26th place (273 users); in terms of Cellular penetration per thousand people, the highest ranked Islamic country is UAE at the 24th place with 616 users, but the next best falls at 32nd position with 460 users. From the chart in Figure-13, we can see that almost half of the Islamic countries have no significant place. This, then, poses a significant impediment to the developments in the area of IBF in the modern world driven by ICT.
Technology Achievement Index (TAI), developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focuses on achievements of a country as a whole in the technological arena. The Index has been found to be relevant for the least developed countries to the same extent as for the most highly developed countries. The index is based upon the four elements: Technology creation: number of patents per capita and royalty/ license receipts per capita, Diffusion of recent innovation: internet users as percentage of population, Diffusion of old innovation: electricity and telephone consumption per capita (logged), Human skills: Mean years of schooling and gross enrolment in tertiary science and mathematics education (Desai-2001). Figure-14 compares OIC member countries for which the Index value is available (and UAE as per authors’ own calculations presented in the Appendix A0) with others.
Archibugi and Coco (2004) have developed a New Indicator of Technological Capabilities for Developed and Developing Countries (ArCo). This index is an improvement upon the TAI and UNIDO’s Industrial Performance Scoreboard. This index takes into account more variables associated with technological change. Similar to TAI, three main components considered are: (a) the creation of technology, (b) the technological infrastructures and (c) the development of human skills. Eight sub-categories have also been included. ArCo also allows for comparisons between countries over time. Figure-14 provides a comparison in this respect.
8. Religious Impediments: For a detailed treatise on the effect of religion on economic or development activities, the reader is referred to Noland (2003)
• Lack of consensus on issues: Developing a consensus on any religious matter has always been a difficult task. It becomes even more difficult when a matter as complex as the financial system comes up for discussion. Despite Quran being the most lucid religious book, creative minds tend to interpret the verses to their own benefit. Thus, just on the matter of interest there are many schools of thought, e.g., although the vast majority accepts that all forms of interest are un-Islamic and therefore prohibited, one group believes that only exploitative interest rates fall under the category of Riba, and prohibited (and what is the dividing line between the exploitative and the non-exploitative?), yet another group believes that despite the interest declared as un-Islamic, there is no need for a regulatory system to control dealings in interest and people should be free to follow whichever system suited them best, postponing God’s judgment for the Last Day (Khan-2000).
• Absence of a central religious body with universal appeal or control only exacerbates the matter. Some even argue that religion must not be mixed with the daily lives of people. But Islam does not distinguish between the two. Although religious faith cannot be forced upon people, clear guidelines and regulatory mechanisms would help those who wish to become a part of Islamic way of life.
• Divided House: Despite being the most promising religion capable of maintaining its structure through guaranteeing a non-modifiable holy book in the form of the Quran, the world of Islam is divided among sects some of which would like to oppose a proposal just for the sake of it. The flexibility in religious practices and the heterogeneity in the thought-patterns of groups could actually act as facilitator of innovation as can be witnessed in developments in Malaysia, Bahrain and UAE, but the same to diffuse to the rest of the Islamic world needs a change in paradigm that will need institutional support in limiting other impediments.
• Rise of fundamentalism: Despite the tenets of Islam being strongly based upon “tolerance”, and “peace”, the shift from a tolerant society to an intolerant one (whatever be the reasons) is diverting the attention of Muslim youth away from acquiring knowledge and making best use of it to prosper in all aspects of human life.
Recommendations to counter the impediments to the growth of IBFs: The recommendations obviously emerge from the above discussion on impediments. For the Islamic Financial System to exploit its competitive advantages for maximum benefits, it has to remove the impediments in its way. It must control the impact of those factors that are not directly under its control.
Educational: The foremost and urgent requirement is the advancement in the educational arena supported ably by research work in all areas that can enrich the level of education. It is important to understand that the people of the OIC region have different socio-cultural and religious orientations from those in the Western world. Therefore, simply adopting the Western system may not be so useful. In fact, there is a real threat of an increase in the level of confusion in the minds of the students if the available systems are not adjusted to suit their special needs.
The Western educational system has advanced so well that it cannot be dumped without jeopardizing the educational development of the young generation. Further, it is no use re-inventing the wheel all over again. Therefore, a framework that can properly adapt the Western system of education to the local needs of the region in every respect (language, socio-cultural and religious requirements, educational level of parents, pace of learning, etc.) is preferable. Development of a workable and sustainable infrastructure requires a lot of time, effort, investment and will power. Coordination between countries with similar cultural background, in this respect, and pooling of their resources will help speed up the process of building the required infrastructure related to research & development of educational media as well as related to actual imparting of education to the needy. These efforts have to consider education at all levels. The system has to be attractive enough for the students to reduce their dropout ratio at all levels. Since dropout ratio is also tied up with the state of economy, efforts towards making the region’s economy stronger are required. Thus, we can visualize the strong inter-relationship between various aspects that need attention, all at the same time, in order to provide a recipe for success. Figure-15 tries to capture this inter-relationship.
Societal and Psychological: The social fabric needs to undergo deep introspection to trace the reasons behind the declining value systems followed by concerted efforts to build them back to their original levels where they were so attractive to the outside world that societies as a whole adopted them voluntarily. This requires a deep-rooted support from institutions and government agencies. At the psychological level, the confusion in the minds of the modern youth craving for modern ways of life and at the same time seeking solace in the roots have to be cleared. Islam is the only religion that clears the air of confusion through an authentic institution in the form of Quran by clearly recommending Muslims to pursue the worldly pleasures without compromising with the religious value system. Guidelines cannot be any clear, which means that there is something wrong with the educational, political, and socio-cultural systems prevalent today. Thus, there is a need for thorough overhaul.
Economy: Economy is the backbone without which no system can stand on its own, and if it does seem to do so for a while, it cannot sustain for long. Therefore, there is a need for accelerating the growth in all spheres of economic activity, at a much faster pace than others, in order to overtake them soon. This needs efforts to come out of isolation, develop common markets among member countries, and make a combined effort towards capturing the global markets backed by competitive products manufactured indigenously. The countries will have to graduate from their trading paradigm to an all-encompassing capability-building paradigm. This needs cooperation at all levels for pooling of resources, but demands a lot of sacrifice from individual nations. Alternative options hardly exist.
Financial: There is an urgent need for an active capital market, an active debt market, an Islamic money market, Supportive Institutions for Venture Capital Financing and business incubators, an active secondary market for Islamic debt instruments and Sharia-compliant equities, etc. to bring dynamism into the Islamic Financial Sector. Dynamic Financial Engineering is the need of the hour for a nascent financial sector with great potentials. It needs a lot of effort towards the development of a research base supported by an innovative educational and training system. Islamic credentials of financial products must be established in order to gain acceptability and remove any confusion from the minds of those craving for ethical or Islamic products. Clarity in product propositioning and processes is vital in this respect. Survival of a banking or financial system is contingent upon controlling the maturity mismatch in Islamic debt portfolio. Mechanisms need to be devised to contain additional risks inherent in the Islamic Financial systems. This needs additional efforts from Financial Engineers to develop Sharia-compliant hedging instruments. It also requires much better coordination between Sharia Boards and Financial Engineers across borders.
Institutional: A uniform regulatory framework is an ideal proposition, but if complete uniformity is difficult to achieve in the short run, the existing regulatory frameworks must attempt to limit the mismatch to the minimum, and continue with their goal of having one such framework in the long run. This requires the coming together of not only the regulatory authorities but also the religious scholars on a common platform to sort out any differences that are natural to exist. These differences can be positively utilized to boost creativity and innovativeness. Lot of examples exist to take inspirations from. To start with, acceptance of existing Regulatory bodies is vital, and must be encouraged at all costs. A head-on clash with the mainstream regulations must be avoided, at least in the beginning, so that the Islamic financial instruments can be marketed in countries where there is little possibility of establishing an Islamic regulatory system in the near future.
The wings of institutions must spread to reach every nook and corner of the world which requires an Islamic Financial Network to be established. Pooling of resources together, and establishment of an Islamic Central bank with its branches in every country will enhance the pace of development in the Islamic financial arena, provide strength to match (and later, supersede) the conventional counterparts, and encourage others to join the bandwagon. Religious: The whole basis of this sector of financial system is based on religious edicts. Therefore, it is essential that consensus on issues related to Sharia is established. Since it is not an easy task for intellectuals to reach an absolute consensus on all issues, a working mechanism needs to be established to limit misunderstandings to the minimum and exploit the differences to generate creativity and innovativeness. A central religious body may sound like a distant dream today, but a Central Sharia Board to deliberate on matters related only to Islamic Finance should not be so difficult after all, particularly when the ultimate goal is the same, and the means to reach those goals (Quran and Hadeeth) are the same.
Finally, fundamentalism is the biggest enemy of anything Islamic. Although there is nothing wrong with the Islamic fundamentals, which are stronger than any other fundamentals, a lot of misunderstanding exists in the minds of not just the non-Muslims but also in the minds of Muslims. Lack of education is to blame. Islamic educational system is way behind other educational systems, and thus is unable to control the damage done to it by unscrupulous agents from within the community and beyond. It is not difficult for a religion whose fundamentals are built upon ‘peace’ and ‘patience’ to remove the tag of fundamentalism.
Political: All the recommendations are dependent upon governmental and institutional support, which makes it extremely important to have a political system that is conducive to development of Islamic Financial system.
Technological: There is no doubt in any mind that technology is an essential tool to gain competitive advantage in the modern world. It is an excellent medium to build capabilities and core competencies. Hence efforts are required not just towards use of latest technologies but also towards developing, on its own, compatible technologies and continuously upgrading them to keep ahead of the conventional counterparts. This needs emphasis on research & development activities and establishment of an infrastructure (soft as well as hard) base. Technology parks and establishment of a NASDAQ type stock exchange may not seem to be direct enablers for this purpose, but they would act as catalysts, and provide ingredients for long-term competitiveness.
Latest Developments: Bahrain Monetary Authority (BMA)’s efforts in establishing Bahrain as a hub of Islamic Banking, the future support from the planned Bahrain Financial Harbour and the launch of Dubai International Financial Centre – launched to coincide with Dubai 2003 (IMF/ World Bank Board of Governors Meet – September 2003), the improved regulatory controls promised by IIFM, IIRA and IFSB are certainly important developments in the recent past. Challenges of developing and sustaining the market for Islamic finance is no easy task, and concerted efforts from many sides are required.
The success of Dubai 2003 and the concurrent International Islamic Finance Forum, have been an exceptionally large morale booster for the Islamic Financial Community. The Forum marked coming together of the Institute for International Research (IIR), Dow Jones Indexes, the Saudi Economic & Development Company (SEDCO), iHilal Financial Services, Dubai Islamic Bank, Shariah Funds Inc. – a division of US-based Meyer Capital Partners, Oasis Global Management Company of Guernsey and South Africa and International Brunei Exchange, etc. Networks and alliances will decide the future of IBFs in a world where the conventional financial system is quite well entrenched.
Some of the latest developments are briefly discussed hereunder:
(i) Commodity Murabaha (Short-term Inter-bank deposit or placement): “Islamic Banking & Finance in the Kingdom of Bahrain”, a publication of the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) provides the structure of Commodity Murababha contract in the Figure-16:
The process of Commodity Murabaha involves a Conventioanal Bank as a commission agent whose payment to Broker A on the Value Date includes interest for the period between the buying of Commodity and the deferred paymnet date (Value Date). The commodity provides the asset backing for the short-term inter-bank deal between the Islamic Bank and the Conventional Bank. The deal between the two banks involves the Murabaha mark-up only, and therefore accepted as Islamic. But, the deal does promote payment of interest between the commodity broker and the conventional bank which raises questions about the validity of Islamic spirit in the contract. But, Bahraini banks have utilised this innovation extensively ‘to bridge the liquidity gap’.
(ii) Islamic Credit Cards: Dubai Islamic Bank Visa card provides credit facilities and all the benefits of a normal credit card without any interest charges. So do other Islamic banks. This is one sector where it was difficult to imagine how the concept of interest-free credit could succeed. But, it gives us a picture of the level of convergence that is taking place. For a detailed discussion on these credit cards, the reader is referred to Darwish (2003).
(iii) Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM): Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) has been operative in Malaysia since October 1998. Liquid money market is an important issue in the Islamic Financial system. The main concern of financial experts is how to improve liquidity in the Islamic financial markets with the Islamic concept of money as not being able to generate any income on its own. Money has to be associated with goods or service to generate income. Making Money from Money is not permissible – that is the basic difference between money and commodity. Money (of the same denomination) is not held to be the subject matter of trade, like other commodities. It can only be used as a medium of exchange and a measure of value.
If money is to be exchanged for money or it is borrowed, the payment on both sides must be equal, so that it is not used for trade in money itself. Money is just “potential capital”; to become real capital it must associate with other resources and undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time value of money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is “potential capital”.
For the conventional banking system, the inter-bank money market serves as an efficient means to transform excess money into income by short-term placements or overnight lending. With modern technology assisting such activities almost eliminating geographical barriers, transaction time and costs, this trade has been on the rise helping achieve great deal of liquidity in the money market. Interest-based system through inter-bank deals not only helps tackle the asset-liability mismatch but also allows generation of income out of it.
The Islamic banking system needs to tag some productive activity to every transaction which becomes an impossible task particularly for overnight trades. This means that Islamic banks have no motivation to deal in such trades making the money market highly illiquid. Although regulations can force a bank to part with its excess money to help another bank in need of cash without charging any interest on it. The Central banks can play an important role in this respect.
Bank Negara Malaysia allows Malaysian Islamic banks to participate in the interbank money market in order to prevent illiquidity. It also participates in open market operations to stabilize the market. A recent mechanism introduced for accepting “Islamic interbank deposits under the liquidity management operations based on the Islamic concept” is termed as “Wadiah Yad Dhamanah (Guaranteed custody). Under this concept, the Islamic banking institutions will offer to deposit their excess funds with the Central Bank over a period of time, as agreed between both parties. As a custodian to the deposits, the Bank is not under obligation to promise any return to the depositors. However, based on the Central Bank’s discretion, a sum amount of money may be paid as hibah (gift) to the depositors on the maturity date.” The total volume of Islamic money market instruments traded in the IIMM reached RM32.7 billion in the year 2002.
(iv) Islamic Bonds (Sukuk) Funds: The Islamic Bond market is becoming vibrant with successful large issues at international levels by Malaysia, UAE, Bahrain and IDB. Fig-4, showing growth of Malaysian Islamic Bond Market, provides us with a glimpse of growing Islamic bonds market. Recently, there has been a flurry of Bond issues by Islamic Financial Institutions, led by Bahrain and Malaysia. The news clip in Box-8 gives us an idea about the sincerity of the Bahraini Institutions in developing the primary as well as secondary Bond market. The biggest challenge for the bond market, of course, is acceptability of the fixed nature of return on these bonds by the Islamic scholars. The rental return on the Islamic leasing bonds (Ijara sukuk) is 60 basis points over the LIBOR for six months. Finding it difficult to understand how this bond was any different from a conventional bond, and whether this could be called an Islamic Bond at all, I posed the question to Islamic Financial Scholars on ibfnet@yahoogroups.com. [the most successful virtual discussion forum related to Islamic principles and the IBFs, launched by Dr. Obaidullah of XIM, Bhubneshawar]. Numerous responses came to the author including one from Dr. M Shahid Ebrahim (four of his papers are cited in this dissertation). They tried to convince us that the bond does not lose its Islamic character just because it is pegged to the LIBOR. But why LIBOR? Simply because, they do not have an alternative. It will take time, but the growth rate of innovations is encouraging. The only fear is whether we are proceeding on the right path, or are we straying towards the path followed by our cousins, and falling into a trap?
A general belief among the Islamic financiers is that any benchmark can be used, in calculating profit or rent, so that compliance with Shari’a principles is indicated. They think that as long as the document does not explicitly indicate that the profit or rent is LIBOR but only the benchmark for calculations is LIBOR, nobody would object. But, it will be too naïve a belief, as for many of us it is difficult to see a real financial difference between the conventional and Islamic financing when the actual amount paid by a customer under an Islamic financing has a link to LIBOR.
Structure of Sukooks in Bahrain:
(a) Al Salam Sukook (Figure-17): These Government securities are equivalent to Treasury bills, and the margin to the buyers (syndicate of Islamic Banks) is competitive with respect to returns from other conventional short-term money market instruments. The counterparty and the market risks involved are the sovereign risks, with Government acting as the seller and buyer of goods (Aluminium, in the case of Bahrain).
(b) BMA Ijara Certificates: BMA issued these 5 year 5.25% rental return Islamic Leasing Certificates worth $100 million, on the 3rd September 2001, another first by an Islamic Central bank. The second sukook (Issue size of $ 70 million) with a maturity of 3 years, annual lease rental return of 4.52% (paid semiannually) was issued on 27th February 2002.
Steps in an Islamic Leasing (Ijara) Sukook deal:

(i) Central bank, as Mudarib, issues Participation Certificates (backed by Special Purpose Mudarabah) to the market and collect subscription money.
(ii) The Mudarabah purchases specified tangible assets and Central Bank as Mudarib executes the deed. Property rights of the assets is transferred to the certificate holders with the possibility of further transferability of ownership and inherent benefits built-in.
(iii) Purchased tangible assets are then leased out on the basis of Ijara-wa-iqtina to earn rental income. Mudarib executes the Ijara contract against collaterals & security from the lessee, and collects rentals. The certificate holders having the property rights on the assets are the lessors and thus entitled to the rental proceeds.
(iv) Mudarib executes a contract for sale of the leased assets on maturity. Mudarabah is then liquidated and Sukook redeemed. The leased assets in this Sale deed may be purchased by the lessee or his agent, or any third party at a fixed price on maturity of Ijara. The property right to the asset is represented by the Ijara certificate.
(v) The Participation Certificates can be traded in the secondary market during the validity of Mudarabah.
So, how Islamic are these bonds? The debate on how far the fixed rentals/ guaranteed margins, or a fixed spread over LIBOR in the Islamic sukooks differ from the interest rates of the conventional bonds will continue. One simple test that can be applied to ascertain whether or not these returns are same as the interest rates is whether or not the asset or commodity backing is genuine. Asset or commodity backing can be considered as genuine if it satisfies the basic tenet of the Sharia, i.e., the transactions actually result in producing the asset or commodity at some level. The whole cycle of activity does result in some productive economic activity unless it is purely speculative, in any system whether conventional or Islamic. But, the test for Islamic sukook deal is whether the economic activity is related to the asset or commodity that is used as backing for the deals. A cursory look at the whole cycle leaves an impression that in the whole process, the asset or commodity acts like the hypothetical Eurodollar deposit used for the Eurodollar interest-rate futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). As in the case of the futures, the underlying asset may never actually change hands in the sukook deals. But jumping to conclusions so easily would be negating all the efforts put into these excellent innovations accepted by the Sharia Supervisory Boards.
The question whether or not the asset or commodity backing is genuine may not be answered easily, but what about the fixedness of returns guaranteed by these bonds? The price of an asset or commodity widely fluctuates in the market due to supply and demand factors in case perfect competition exists. In such a scenario, the prices can be predicted in the short run based upon the factors that govern the demand and supply. In case speculative players dominate the market or in case where cartels exist, which is the case in many product/ commodity markets (particularly in Aluminium) of the contemporary world, how can the prices be guaranteed? If the future prices cannot be guaranteed, how can a return from a deal in such products/ projects/ commodities be guaranteed? Is it not speculation? This is one of the arguments that form the basis for prohibiting a guaranteed return to investors.
The discussion on the BMA’s Al Salam Sukooks (described above) may yield interesting insights. It provides us with some explanation why the Ijara based bonds are replacing the Salam based bonds. Under Ijara concept, fixing a rent in advance may not be considered un-Islamic whereas in Al Salam concept, a fixed rate of return may be termed speculative and thus may not be allowed. Considering the fact that BMA’s Al Salam Sukooks are based on Aluminium as the underlying commodity, let us examine the fluctuation in the price of Aluminium during last five years. With Aluminium prices being so volatile, and guided by large international players, can the sovereign guarantee be sustainable? It is not difficult to conclude from the guaranteed rate offerings tagged to the recent bond issues that the necessity to provide the fixed returns as competitive as the returns from conventional securities of similar maturity may actually be guiding them instead of any forecasting methodologies.

This may be the main reason why some scholars have termed only two modes of transactions, Mudarabah and Musharakah as strongly Islamic (Siddiqui-1982, Mohsin-1982, Qureshi-1984, Qureshi-1985, Chapra-1982). Khan and Mirakhor (1987) argue on the same line and suggest “all other modes of operations … are recommended only in cases where risk-return sharing (i.e., Mudarabah and Musharakah) cannot be implemented.”
The size of the disposable funds owned by high networth Arabs is estimated to exceed $11 trillion. After 11th September 2001, in particular, there has been a rush to tap this fund which used to be mostly invested in the US markets. In this mad rush, is it a possibility that Islamic Shariah principles are being kept aside or backdoors are being invented in the name of innovation? A more transparent system will provide better explanation apart from being helpful in clearing doubts from investor’s minds.
(v) Global Bond Market Growth: As reported by failaka.com, USD180bn worth of funds were available for investment in Islamic-approved holdings worldwide as of mid-2002, an amount anticipated to grow by 15% YoY. Some indications of things to come are provided by the news item in Box-8. Some more developments are described below.
(vi) When Issue (WI): Players in the Islamic money market of Malaysia are allowed to perform WI transactions prior to the issuance date of the Islamic securities. WI is a pre-issuance transaction of debt securities that will be issued in the Islamic debt market to facilitate players in estimating the appropriate price to bid on the issuance date. The Council viewed that the WI transaction is allowed based on the permissibility to promise for sale and purchase transactions …… Bank Negara.
(vii) Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA): The SBBA transaction is permissible, in Malaysia, as long as it is an outright sale and purchase and enforced by two different contracts for each transaction. In addition, compensation can only be effected on the party who defaulted on his promise …… Bank Negara.
(viii) Collateralised Borrowing: The National Shariah Advisory Council of Malaysia approved the proposal to introduce the collateral borrowing transaction in the Islamic money market based on the principle of Rahnu. The transaction is an alternative to the SBBA and the loan extended is based on the concept of Qardh. Although there is no profit element being introduced in the transaction, the banks are expected to prefer this transaction due to its simplicity and its mutual-help feature …… Bank Negara.
(ix) Islamic Securitization: Islamic Securitization in a wider sense is defined as the process of pooling assets, packaging them into securities, and making them marketable to investors. In Islamic finance, the concept of securitization is in consonance with what is known as Taskeek in Arabic, which is a process of dividing ownership of tangible assets, usufructs, or both, into units of equal value and issuing securities as per their value. The underlying assets, contracts, and payment mechanism, while being commercially viable must be aligned with the requirements of Sharia. By and large, the Sharia treatment of sukuk is similar to an equity security where shares are evidence of ownership in a going concern.
Islamic Development Bank’s recent debut issue of US$400 million Islamic sukuks received overwhelming response from both conventional and Islamic investors around the world. The issue size originally targeted at US$300 million was increased based on strong demand for the high quality instrument. The issue is unique in almost all its aspects ranging from the issuer, the guarantor, the arranger and more importantly the innovative structure of the deal, which is a combination of securitization of Ijarah, Mudaraba and Istisna contracts with a minimum of 51% on the Ijarah assets.
It should be noted that although some of these securitized financial instruments have been generally accepted as being in compliance with Islamic principles so that they can be traded in the secondary market, the negotiability of certain others still remain controversial due to their legal acceptability or compliance with Sharia. For instance, Murabaha is a transaction, which cannot be securitized independently to create a negotiable instrument to be traded in the secondary market. The certificate representing a monetary obligation from a third party or dayn arising out of a Murabaha transaction can be traded at face value and any difference in value will be tantamount to riba. However, if the security represents a mixed portfolio consisting of a number of transactions like Musharaka, leasing and Murabaha, then this portfolio may issue negotiable certificates, subject to certain conditions.
(a) Securitization of Mudaraba Bonds: AAOIFI’s Sharia standard No-18 defines the arrangement of Mudaraba bonds as below:
“The issuer of the certificates is the Mudarib, the subscribers are the capital owners and the realized funds are the Mudaraba capital. The certificate holders own the assets of Mudaraba operation and profit share as per agreement. The certificate holders, being the capital providers, bear the loss, if any.”
Mudaraba means an agreement between two parties where one partner gives money to another for investing in a commercial enterprise. The investment comes from the first partner who is called “Rab-ul-Maal” while the management and work is the exclusive responsibility of the other, who is called “Mudarib” and the profits generated are shared in a predetermined ratio.
The objects of a Mudaraba are restricted to only such businesses as are permitted under the Sharia. The concept of mudaraba is akin to revenue bond financing in the conventional system. Revenue bonds are generally backed by revenue generated mainly for public sector projects funded by the bond issue. The bondholders are solely dependent on the revenue generated by the project being financed and in the event of non-performance of the project, there is no recourse to the local government’s general treasury fund.
Likewise, the Mudaraba bonds give its owner the right to receive capital at the time the bonds are liquidated, and an annual proportion of the realized profits in accordance with the predetermined profit sharing ratio. The Mudaraba bonds can be instrumental in the process of development financing because it is related to the profitability of the projects.
(b) Securitization of Musharaka: AAOIFI’s Sharia standard No 18 defines the arrangement of Musharaka bonds as follows:
“The issuer of the certificates is the inviter to a partnership in a specific project or activity. The subscribers are the partners in the Musharka contract. The realized funds are the share contribution of the subscribers in the Musharaka capital. The certificate holders own the assets of partnership and are entitled to profit, if any”.
Musharaka bonds are relatively similar to Mudaraba bonds. The only major difference is that the intermediary-party will be a partner of the group of subscribers represented by a body of Musharaka bondholders in a way similar to a joint stock company while the Mudaraba capital is only from one party. In securitizing a Musharaka arrangement, every subscriber can be given a participation certificate, which represents his proportionate ownership in the assets of the venture or project for which financing is being raised.
Subsequent to the acquisition of substantial non-liquid assets, these Musharaka certificates can be treated as negotiable instruments and can be bought and sold in the secondary market.
There is a strong Sharia opinion against the trading of these certificates if the underlying assets of the Musharaka are in liquid form (i.e. in the shape of cash or receivables or advances due from others).
(c) Securitization of Ijarah: Ijarah sukuks have aspects in common with conventional asset-backed securities and are of particular interest to a broad range of investors representing both the conventional and Islamic financial communities. Benchmark for lease rentals can be based on a conventional index such as US$ LIBOR which can be either fixed or floating. Since Ijarah sukuks evidence the undivided pro-rata ownership of the underlying leased asset, it could be freely tradable at par, premium or discount. Such flexibilities can allow Ijarah sukuks to be priced at par with their conventional counterparts. A case in point is the issue of US$ 600 million 5-year floating rate trust Ijarah certificates by the Malaysian government in 2002. The issue was priced flat to the country’s conventional credit curve and attracted no premium despite being a new deal structure.
Ijarah is a contract, according to which a party purchases and leases out equipment required by the client for a rental fee. The duration of the rental and the fee are agreed in advance and ownership of the asset remains with the lessor. The lessor in Ijarah owns the leased assets, he can sell the asset, in whole or in part, to a third party who may purchase it and may replace the seller in the rights and obligations of the lessor, with regard to the purchased part of the asset. Typically, the issuer of the Ijarah certificates acquire assets, transfer its ownership to a special purpose vehicle (SPV, then sell investors shares in the SPV. The returns on the shares, which come from leasing out the assets owned by the SPV, could be either fixed or a floater. Thus, the expected returns are fixed and can be treated as predictable as the coupon on a conventional bond. A third party can also guarantee rental payments and since the yield is predetermined, the underlying assets are tangible and secured, the Ijarah certificates can then be traded in the secondary market.
The securitisation of leasing transactions and the creation of tradable, liquid investment funds have facilitated Islamic secondary market, which is instrumental in alleviating the liquidity constraints of Islamic financial institutions.
(x) Islamic hedge fund: At the outset of September 2003, the Saudi Economic and Development Company (SEDCO) launched the world’s first-ever hedge fund compliant with Islamic Sharia’h law, in conjunction with Saudi Arabian financial services group Permal. Fund managers Fostman-Leff of New York were responsible for managing the fund which were expected to start doing business by early October 2003 (as per their press release).
SEDCO has been examining possible alternatives to prohibited derivates. One such alternative is based on an innovative concept like “stipulated options” – a buyer makes an advanced partial payment for deferred delivery of a product, and if he decides not to buy this later, the seller keeps the advance – closest analogy to an option in IBF system. Another such alternative likely to be used by them is the old concept of Al Salam, where one sells a commodity to a buyer against full up-front payment for delivery at a future date. An investor can hedge his downside risk by selling stocks to be delivered later, receive payment in advance for productive use without bearing the price risk.
SEDCO claims that the fund is fully transparent to investors. An existing Sharia’h compliant offer from this group is a 5-year medium-term note with 100% principal protection provided by Societe Generale.
Rating Agencies: Do we need separate rating agencies for the IBFs? Perhaps, yes. We have seen that the system in its purest form is entirely different from its conventional counterpart, hence the rating methodology has to be uniquely suited to the IFBs. This will be important for inter-bank dealings. Credit ratings for customers may not be different simply because the target customers are mostly the same for both. However, project evaluation becomes an important and integral role for pure IBFs based mainly on the PLS principles. This may require specialized technical skills largely absent in the present lot of banks the world over. Apart from the evaluation of projects, its monitoring during execution and participation in managing the project may be important to avoid false reporting by the other party. In an age where creative accounting is considered as creativity rather than sin, costs to the IBFs may escalate beyond expectations. On the other hand, the benefits resulting from IBFs are likely to far exceed the costs.
IDB initiated a scheme to establish an Islamic Rating Agency recently called the “International Islamic Rating Agency”(IIRA) to be incorporated as a profit-making independent company. IBFs will hold a total of 35% of the capital, the IDB 15%, and 50% will be held by rating agencies. A working group comprising of representatives from IDB, AAOIFI, selected Islamic banks and Malaysian Rating Corporation (MARC) has been formed.
Basel II Implications: The Basel Committee guidelines do not specifically focus on the Islamic Banking and Financial System, but still the adequacy norms and risk management are areas that affect them as much as they affect the conventional banks. The BMA has developed a framework, known as Prudential Information and Regulations for Islamic Banks (PIRI) which takes into consideration standards developed by AOOFIFI and the Basel Committee’s various guidelines. When the International Islamic Financial Market, being developed in cooperation with the Islamic Development Bank and other central banks, will be operational the need to comply with the Basel II regulations would be felt even more.
The main problem for the IBF, today, even after more than twenty eight years in operation is in defining what they are all about, i.e., the confusion as to whether they are banks, mutual funds, asset managers, or investment funds. Although some of the regimes regulating Islamic financial institutions are already very stringent, and some like Bahrain which may claim to be over-regulated as they have started applying Basel II in terms of liquidity risk issues.
Some implications that can be more easily visualized are as follows:
– Cost implications (mainly for estimation of new risk components like operational risks). Majority of Islamic banks have no such liberty in investing a large amount for that purpose. Speculations are rife that banks will need to invest additional amounts (in millions) to comply with Basel II.
– CAR implications: There is much debate at present amongst western banks if Basel II will be implemented or not. This is because of the cost implication to implement operational risk monitoring which may cost billions.
There are views that in western countries it may likely improve the capital risk weighting for Islamic products. Products like mortgages already benefit from Murabaha structure in terms of capital risk weighting (50%) but Murabaha is not considered efficient in terms of early repayment, or determining a profit amount etc. Ijara is the preferred mode at present for developing mortgage products, but it attracts 100% capital risk weighting. One could argue that if Islamic mortgages based on Ijara are more efficient, they should attract less capital risk weighting. The Basel committee is unlikely to allow lesser risk weighting for lease across the board, as all banks will rush to reap benefits from Islamic leases. Modaraba and Musharika will continue to still attract 100% capital risk weighting.
Important Institutions supporting the development of IBF:
Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance:
Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami (DMI): HQ in Geneva
Al-Baraka: HQ in Jeddah.
IIBI Established in 1991
Publications: (a) International Directory of Islamic Banks and Institutions 2000, (b) International Directory of Islamic Insurance 2000
AAOIFI: The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions is an Islamic international autonomous non-profit making corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shari’a standards for Islamic financial institutions.
Managed funds: over $200 billion
Agreement of Association signed by Islamic financial institutions on 26 February, 1990 in Algiers. AAOIFI was registered on 11 Ramadan 1411 corresponding to 27 March, 1991 in the State of Bahrain.
The International Islamic Rating Agency
The Islamic Financial Services Board
The International Islamic Financial Market, and
The Liquidity Management Center
The Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes:
Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Titans 100 Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Asia/Pacific Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Europe Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Canada Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Japan Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.K. Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index
Dow Jones Islamic Market Technology Index
Some statistics related to the above indices are presented in Appendix-D
FTSE Global Islamic Index Series:
The FTSE Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS) are equity benchmark indices targeted at those who wish to invest according to Islamic investment guidelines. Islamic investing is growing by 12-15% per annum, as more and more international investment bodies stake an interest in this specialist service. The FTSE Global Islamic Index Series addresses this demand by creating a standard for applicable Islamic equity investing.
Initially pioneered in January 1999 by The International Investor (TII) and calculated by FTSE, the series was the first truly global Islamic Index series. It was designed to track the performance of leading publicly traded companies whose activities are consistent with Islamic Sharia principles.
Due to its success over the past months, the Global Islamic Index Series will now be incorporated into the FTSE family of indices. Using the FTSE World Index as the universe, TII applies Sharia principles, following guidelines provided by its Fatwa and Sharia Supervisory Committee to rule out those companies whose business activities are incompatible with the Islamic law.
After removing companies with unacceptable core business activities, the remaining list is tested by a financial-ratio “filter”, the purpose of which is to remove companies with an unacceptable debt ratio. Finally, any “tainted percentage” of any cash dividend received by a company which is not in accordance with Sharia law is computed, and should be donated to a proper charity.
Sub-component Indices:
FTSE Americas Islamic Index
FTSE Europe Islamic Index
FTSE Pacific Basin Islamic Index
FTSE South Africa Islamic Index
Sector Screens:
By way of guidance, stocks whose core activities are or are related to the following are excluded:
a) banking or any other interest related activity
b) alcohol
c) tobacco
d) gaming
e) insurance
f) pork production, packaging and processing or any other activity related to pork
g) activities deemed offensive to the principles of Islam
h) sectors / companies significantly affected by the above
The companies that have incompatible lines of business are removed from the “universe” of stocks included in the FTSE World Index. Companies classified in other industry groups may also be excluded if deemed to have a material ownership in, or revenues from, prohibited business activities.
Financial Screen:
Debt ratio: (exclude companies) if Interest-Bearing Debt divided by Assets is equal to or greater than 1/3 or 33.33%. Companies that pass these screens are generally eligible for inclusion in the FTSE Global Islamic indices’ investable universe.
Dividend Cleansing: “Tainted dividend” receipts relate to the portion, if any, of a dividend paid by a constituent company that has been determined to be attributable to activities that are not in accordance with Islamic Sharia principles and therefore should be donated to a proper charity or charities.
Sharia Scholars: The screening criteria of the FTSE Global Islamic range of indices is supported by the credibility of TII’s Fatwa and Sharia Supervisory Committee (Sharia Board).
Conclusion: Dr. Ebrahim (1999) argues that the modes of financing selected should not only avoid riba, gharar and maysir but also be economically efficient. In search of this economic efficiency, Islamic Banks now participate in a wide financing domain stretching from simple Sharia-compliant retail products to highly complex structured finance and large-scale project lending. Muslims (and non-Muslims) can now obtain Islamic credit cards, can insure themselves and their property Islamically, can invest on line in Islamic funds can track their investments Islamically and can even get a Sharia-compliant mortgage from a US firm. Islamic banks are now better positioned than ever to participate not only in large scale corporate financing but also more complex wholesale transactions such as syndications and securitization. Bahrain’s recent $255mn al-Hidd power financing is a case in point. Lead arranged by BNP Paribas, HSBC Amanah, Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait and Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, the $55mn Islamic tranche arranged by the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank and Kuwait Finance House was hailed as a landmark in regional power finance. KFH had earlier helped set an inter-creditor agreement precedent when it secured in 1995 a $200mn Islamic tranche for Kuwait’s $1.2bn Equate petrochemical project.
This convergence is evidence of how the Islamic financial sector is part of the globalizing trend and not rejectionist. In essence, Islamic finance offers another set of well-understood tools within the understood frameworks of modern banking and finance. – Abdulkader Thomas

At first glance, it looks like many techniques that the interest-free banks are practising are neither in full conformity with the spirit of Shari’ah nor practicable in the case of large banks (or the entire banking system). Moreover, they seem to have failed to do away with undesirable aspects of interest, and thus, they seem to have retained what an Islamic bank should eliminate. This is because these institutions have attempted to start from where the conventional banking system has left. The innovations, however genuine and worthy, seem to be swamped within the muddle of well-developed and widely accepted financial system of conventional banking and finance. For a commoner, it becomes very difficult to distinguish the Islamic instruments from the conventional ones. The solution lies not in changing the look or personality (face value) of the conventional instruments – which is the primary reason for all the confusion – but in evolving afresh. We feel that the basic infrastructure necessary for building an entirely new structure for the Islamic Financial System is not just available but is quite strong already. What is needed at this moment is an out-of-the-box thinking even if sounds like reinventing the wheel. This will require a bold initiative towards a total unwinding of the current system and a lot of unlearning before we could even conceive of a reasonable amount of success in clearing the clouds of ambiguity. Even if one concludes that the resource available with Islamic Financial System is peanuts compared to its conventional counterpart, there is no need to despair. The ultimate winner is the one who dares to dream. What is required at the moment is the “strategy as stretch and leverage” that Hamel and Prahlad (1993) advises.
Haron et al (1994) who pioneered the research on bank patronage in Malaysia found that almost 100 percent of Muslims and 75% non-Muslims were aware of the existence of Islamic banks. While applying Haron et al’s study, Gerrard and Cunningham (1997) found that just like their Malaysian counterparts, Singaporean Muslims were more aware of the existence of Islamic banking than the non-Muslims. Similarly, this study found no evidence of Muslims and non-Muslims differing in their bank’s selection criteria. In another study wherein the respondents were individuals who had financial decision-making authority in the Malaysian corporate sectors, and 80% of which were non-muslims, Ahmad & Sudin Haron found that more than 55 per cent perceived that both religion and economics were the patronage factors in this system. About 50 percent of the respondents believed that Islamic banking products and services had a good potential to be accepted by customers. About 75 per cent indicated that Islamic banks in Malaysia however had not done enough marketing in promoting their products and services to corporate customers. Almost half of the individuals surveyed believed that the Islamic banking system had a good potential as an alternative to the conventional system.
The future is definitely bright for the Islamic banking and finance. They have already established a niche by roping in the Muslim community. And their appeal is expanding, particularly with the number of proponents of Ethical Banking and Finance on the rise in other communities. In order to give the conventional system any semblance of competition, it has to grow out of the niche, and convince everybody not just about the ethical aspects but also the economic benefits that it carries – in fact it will have to prove that it is more profitable than its conventional counterpart.

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104. Web Sites: http://www.ajif.org , American Journal of Islamic Finance
http://www.hifip.harvard.edu, Harvard Islamic Finance Information Program
http://www.aaoifi.com, The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
http://www.ihilal.com: online distributor of Islamic financial products and services
http://www.islamic-banking.com, The Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance
http://www.islamic-finance.net/, Islamic Business and Finance Network
http://www.cbuae.gov.ae, Central Bank of UAE
The Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes (http://www.djindexes.com/jsp/islamicMarketOverView.jsp)
AAOIFI (http://www.aaoifi.com/)
FTSE Global Islamic Index Series, http://www.ftse.com/ebox/TII.html

APENDIX A0: Estimation of TAI for UAE
Estimation of TAI for UAE to compare with TAI values of other countries in HDR (2001) is shown as below:
(A) Calculation of the Technology Creation Index:
Patent Index = (0.990 – 0)/ (994 – 0) ………………. (1999 figure taken from USPO for number of Patents) = 0.001
Royalty and Licence fee Index = 0 (assumed to be zero)
Technology Creation Index = (0.000 + 0.001)/ 2 = 0.0005
(B) Calculation of Diffusion of Recent Innovations Index:
Internet Host Index = (20.9 – 0.0)/ (232.4 – 0.0) = 0.090
High and Medium Technology Export Index (ERF-2002) = (16.0 – 0.0)/ (80.8 – 0.0) = 0.198
Diffusion of Recent Innovations Index =( 0.090 + 0.198)/ 2 = 0.288
(C) Calculation of Diffusion of old innovations Index:
Telephony Index = [log {407 (Tel mainlines per 1000 people) + 347 (Cellular mobiles per 1000 people)} – log(1)]/ [log(901)-log(1)] = 0.974
Electricity Index = 1, because its consumption of 9,892 KWH per capita is above the goalpost (6,969)
Diffusion of old innovations Index = (0.974 + 1.000)/ 2 = 0.987
(D) Calculation of the Human Skills Index:
Mean Years of Schooling Index = (10.5 – 0.8)/ (12.0 – 0.8) years: Expected Years of schooling from ERF (2002)
= 0.866
Gross Tertiary Science Enrolment Index = (3.2 – 0.1)/ (27.4 – 0.1) = 0.114
Human Skills Index = 0.980/ 2 = 0.490
Technology Achievement Index (TAI ) = (0.0005 + 0.288 + 0.987 + 0.490) / 4
= 0.441
APPENDIX-A: Competitiveness of Banking Sector In Case of Opening Local Markets to GCC Banks
(Kuwait Foundation For Advancement of Sciences)
Ghanem, AlMahmeed, AlMejren, ElSakka, Paul, Al MASARAF, (the official journal of the Union of Kuwaiti Banks, Issue no. 2, 2002).
1. Mudaraba and Murabaha services came at the forefront of Islamic banking services.
2. The Islamic financial institutions are seen as a strong competitor for the banks in Kuwait, now and in the future. Other banks in the GCC countries share the same view with the Kuwaiti banks.
Recommendations of the Study
By reviewing the weaknesses of the Kuwaiti banks compared to other GCC banks, we find that the Kuwaiti banks need to take the following actions:
– Explore methods to increase the return on their assets up to the levels prevailing at non- Kuwaiti banks.
– Increase the level of expenditure on training and human resources development.
– Increase the size of investment in information technology and communications up to the levels prevailing at non-Kuwaiti banks. – Increase the level of experience for national manpower.
– Increase the awareness as to the international financial developments and their local implications.
– Enhance their confidence in the ability to face foreign competition, and upgrade their readiness to meet the challenges of GCC banks or international banks.
– Exploit the opportunities offered by the GCC agreement on the liberalization of banking services.
– Increase the attention given to the evaluation and review of training activities, and ensure the good quality of the training provided to their staff , so as to more positively reflect on their performance.
– Create more stability for staff in order to avoid the adverse implications of the high turnover. – Improve staff productivity.
– Study the problem of staff absence and its reasons and treat it more seriously.
– Allocate more financial resources to enhance staff flexibility and reinforce their ability to work as a team.
– Periodic review of benefits and incentives, so as to ensure staff satisfaction and consistency of those systems with the standards prevailing in the industry.
– Improve annual planning and control systems.
– Improve FX and foreign operations risks management.
– Develop an IT strategy.
– Upgrade capital adequacy ratio to be in line with the levels prevailing at other GCC banks.
– Consider the opportunities of merging with other banks, whether local, Gulf or international.
– Study the opportunities of forming unions with other banks, whether local, Gulf or international.
– Adopt plans for diversifying products and markets in line with other GCC banks, and enhance the readiness for expansion in new markets.
– Adopt more intensive plans for automating banking operations in line with other GCC banks.
– Reinforce relationships with the segments of the general public and multi- national companies, likewise Qatari and Omani banks.
– Strengthen their presence in the areas of advisory and investment services, such as money markets, capital markets, futures, options, investment portfolios management, private funds management and investment advisory services.
– Reinforce their Islamic banking services in the areas of Murabaha, Mudaraba, Musharaka and Istisna.
– Start to use the Smart Cards, and expand in the areas of issuing certificates of deposits and rendering brokerage services, because their share of these services is the least among GCC banks.
– Activate the role of foreign exchange services and certificates of deposits in revenues generation, as these services rank the first at Omani banks and the second at Saudi and UAE banks.
– Expand services delivery through the internet, likewise the banks in UAE.
– Enhance the role of Musharaka and Istisna services as sources of income.
– Expand in advisory and investment services in the manner mentioned above, as such services represent an important source of income, particularly investment advisory services and investment portfolios management. There is also a need for expansion in futures and options.
– Expansion in insurance services to strengthen the role of these services as a source of income.
– Establish and enhance the presence in GCC and Arab markets in general, because the results of the study indicated that the strength of Kuwaiti banks association with their customers in GCC markets is the weakest, with the exception of Omani banks, and their association with their customers in Arab markets is also the weakest, with the exception of Omani and UAE banks.
APPENDIX-B: Islamic Financial Institutions in the World (Source: Islamic Institute of Banking and Insurance; http://www.islamic-banking.com/ibanking/ifi_list.php#albania)
1. Albania
a. Arab Albanian Islamic Bank, Tirana
2. Algeria
a. Banque Albaraka D’Algerie, Algiers
3. Australia
a. MCCA (Muslim Community Co-operative, Australia)
b. MCCU (Muslim Community Credit Union)
4. Bahamas
a. Akida Islamic Bank International Ltd
b. Bank Al Taqwa Ltd
c. Dar al Mal al Islami Trust, Nassau
d. Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf Ltd, Nassau.
e. Istishara Consulting Trust, Bahamas
f. Massraf Faysal Islamic Bank & Trust, Bahamas Ltd.
5. Bahrain
a. ABC Investment & Services Co EC
b. Al Amin Co. for Securities and Investment Funds
c. Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank
d. Arab Islamic Bank E.C
e. Bahrain Islamic Bank Bsc.
f. Bahrain Islamic Investment Co. Bsc. Closed
g. Bahrain Institute of Banking & Finance
h. Bank Melli Iran
i. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.
j. Citi Islamic Investment Bank (Citicorp)
k. Dallah Albaraka (Europe) Ltd
l. Dallah Albarakah (Ireland) Ltd
m. Faysal Investment Bank of Bahrain
n. Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain (Massraf Faisal Al Islami)
o. Gulf International Bank BSC
p. Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf
q. Islamic Trading Company
r. ABC Islamic Bank
s. ABN Amro Bank
t. Deutsche Bank Rep office
u. Investors Bank
v. TAIB Bank of Bahrain
w. Turk Gulf Merchant Bank
x. Bahrain Monetary Agency
y. Shamil Bank
z. Khaleej Investment Company
aa. First Islamic Investment Bank
6. Bangladesh
a. Albaraka Bangladesh Ltd (Dallah Al Baraka Group), Dhaka
b. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd, Dhaka
c. Faisal Islamic Bank
7. British Virgin Islands
a. Ibn Khaldoun International Equity Fund Ltd
8. Brunei
a. Islamic Bank of Brunei Berhad
b. Islamic Development Bank of Brunei Berhad
c. Tabung Amanah Islam Brunei
9. Canada
a. Islamic Co-operative Housing Corporation Ltd, Toronto
10. Cayman Islands
a. Ibn Majid Emerging Marketing Fund (International Investor Group)
b. Al Tawfeek Co. for Investment Funds Ltd. Subsidiary of Albarka Group “DBG”
11. Denmark
a. Faisal Finance (Denmark) A/S
12. Djibouti
a. Banque Albaraka Djibouti
13. Egypt
a. Alwatany Bank of Egypt, Cairo
b. Egyptian Company for Business and Trade S.A.E
c. Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank (Dallah Al Baraka), Cairo
d. Gulf Company for Financial Investment
e. Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, Cairo
f. Islamic Bank International for Investment and Development, Cairo
g. Islamic Investment and Development Co., Cairo
h. National Bank for Development, Cairo
14. France
a. Algerian Saudi Leasing Holding Co. (Dallah Al Baraka Group)
b. Societe General
c. Capital Guidance
d. BNP Paribas
15. Gambia
a. Arab Gambian Islamic Bank
16. Germany
a. Bank Sepah, Iran
b. Commerz Bank
c. Deutsche Bank
17. Guinea
a. Massraf Faisal al Islami of Guinea, Conakry
b. Banque Islamique de Guinee
18. India
a. Al Ameen Islamic Financial & Investment Corp. (India) Ltd., Karnatka
b. Bank Muscat International (SOAG)
c. Al-Falah Investment Ltd
19. Indonesia
a. Al Barakah Islamic Investment Bank
b. Bank Muamalat Indonesia, Jakarta
c. Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust
d. PT Danareksa Fund Management, Jakarta
20. Iran
a. Bank Keshavarzi (Agricultural Bank), Tehran
b. Bank Maskan Iran (Housing Bank), Tehran
c. Bank Mellat, Tehran
d. Bank Melli Iran, Tehran
e. Bank Saderat Iran, Tehran
f. Bank Sanat Va Maadan (Bank of Industry and Mines), Tehran
g. Bank Sepah, Tehran
h. Bank Tejarat, Tehran
21. Iraq
a. Iraqi Islamic bank for Investment and Development
22. Italy
a. Bank Sepah, Iran
b. International Trading Co. of Africa
23. Jordan
a. Jordan Islamic Bank (Subsidiary of Dallah Al Barka Group)
b. Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment, Amman
24. Kuwait
a. Gulf Investment Corporation
b. The International Investment Group
c. The International Investor, Safat
d. Kuwait Finance House, Safat
e. Kuwait Investment Co – Dar Al-IsethmarSecurities House
25. Lebanon
a. Gulf International Bank, Bahrain
b. Al Barakah Bank
c. Bank of Beirut
26. Luxembourg
a. Faisal Finance (Luxembourg) S.A
b. Faisal Holding, Luxembourg
c. Takafol S.A
d. Islamic Finance House Universal Holding S.A
27. Malaysia
a. Adil Islamic Growth Fund (Innosabah Securities Sdn Bhd), Labuan
b. Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
c. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
d. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
e. Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
f. Dallah Al Baraka (Malaysia) Holding Sdn Bhd
g. Lembaga Urusan Dan Tabung Haji (Fund), Kuala Lumpur
h. Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank), Kuala Lumpur
i. Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
j. United Malayan Banking Corp. Berhad, Kuala Lumpur
k. Bank Muamalat Berhad, Malaysia
l. Securities Commission
m. Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA)
n. Islamic banking & Takaful Dept, Bank Negara Malaysia
28. Malaysian banks with Islamic windows
a. Commercial Banks:
i. Affin Bank Berhad
ii. Alliance Bank Berhad
iii. Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad
iv. Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad
v. Citibank Berhad
vi. EON Bank Berhad
vii. Hong Leong Bank Berhad
viii. HSBC Bank (M) Berhad
ix. Malayan Banking Berhad
x. OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad
xi. Public Bank Berhad
xii. RHB Bank Berhad
xiii. Southern Bank Berhad
xiv. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad
b. Finance Companies:
i. Alliance Finance Berhad
ii. Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad
iii. Asia Commercial Finance Berhad
iv. EON Finance Berhad
v. Hong Leong Finance Berhad
vi. Kewangan Bersatu Berhad
vii. Mayban Finance Berhad
viii. MBf Finance Berhad
ix. Public Finance Berhad
x. United Merchant Finance Berhad
c. Merchant Banks:
i. Alliance Merchant Finance Berhad
ii. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad
iii. Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad
iv. Malaysian International Merchant Bank Berhad
v. Affin Merchant Bank Berhad
d. Discount Houses:
i. Abrar Discounts Berhad
ii. Affin Discount Berhad
iii. Amanah Short Deposits Berhad
iv. BBMB Discount House Berhad
v. KAF Discounts Berhad
vi. Malaysia Discount Berhad
vii. Mayban Discount Berhad
29. Mauritania
a. Banque Alabaraka Mauritaninne Islamique (Dallah Al Baraka Group), Mauritania
30. Morocco
a. Faisal Finance Maroc S.A
b. The Netherlands
c. Faisal Finance (Netherlands ) B.V
d. Faisal Finance (Netherlands Antilles) N.V
31. Niger
a. Banque Islamique Du Niger, Niamey
32. Nigeria
a. Habib Nigeria Bank Ltd
b. Ahmed Zakari & Co
33. Oman
a. Bank Muscat International
b. Bank Saderat Iran, Muscat
c. Oman Arab Bank
34. Pakistan
a. Al Faysal Investment Bank Ltd, Islamabad
b. Al Towfeek Investment Bank Ltd (Dallah Al Baraka Group), Lahore
c. Faysal Bank Ltd, Pakistan
d. National Investment Trust Ltd., Karachi
e. Shamil Bank
f. Meezan Bank Limited
35. Palestine
a. Arab Islamic Bank
b. Arab Islamic International Bank (AIIB) Plc
c. Cairo Amman Bank
d. Palestine International Bank
e. The Palestine Islamic Bank
36. Qatar
a. Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf Ltd, Sharjah
b. Qatar International Islamic Bank, Doha
c. Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ, Doha
37. Russia
a. BADR Bank
38. Saudi Arabia
a. Albaraka Investment and Development Co., Jeddah
b. Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp., Riyadh
c. Arab Leasing International Finance (ALIF) Ltd
d. Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain E.C., Dammam
e. Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah.
f. National Commercial Bank Ltd, Jeddah
g. Riyad Bank
h. Saudi American Bank, Jeddah
i. Saudi Holland Bank
j. Bank Al Jazira
39. Senegal
a. Banque Islamique Du Senegal
40. South Africa
a. Albaraka Bank Ltd, Durban (Dallah Al Baraka Group)
41. Srilanka
a. Amana Islamic Bank
b. Amana Takaful Limited
42. Sudan
a. Al Baraka Al Sudani, Khartoum. (Dallah Al Baraka Group)
b. Al Shamal Islamic Bank
c. Al Tadamon Islamic Bank, Khartoum
d. Animal Resources Bank
e. El Gharb Islamic Bank (Islamic Bank for Western Sudan)
f. Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, Khartoum
g. Islamic Bank of Western Sudan, Khartoum
h. Islamic Co-operative Development Bank, Khartoum
i. Sudanese Islamic Bank
43. Switzerland
a. Cupola Asset Management SA, Geneva
b. Dar Al Maal Al Islami Trust, Geneva
c. Faisal Finance (Switzerland) SA, Geneva
d. Pan Islamic Consultancy Services Istishara SA, Geneva
e. United Bank of Switzerland (UBS)
f. Pictet & Cie
44. Tunisia
a. Beit Ettamwil al Tunisi al Saudi, Tunis (Dallah Al Baraka Group)
b. B.E.S.T. Re-Insurance (Dallah Al Baraka Group)
45. Turkey
a. Albarakah Turkish Finance House Istanbul
b. Emin Sigorts A.S
c. Faisal Finance Institution, Istanbul.
d. Faisal Islamic Bank of Kibris Ltd, Turkey
e. Ihlas Finance House
f. Kuwait-Turket Evkaf Finance House
g. Asya Finans Kurumu A.S
46. United Arab Emirates
a. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank
b. Bank Muscat International (SOAG)
c. Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai
d. Gulf International Bank, Bahrain
e. Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf Ltd, Abu Dhabi.
f. Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf Ltd, Sharjah Subsidiary of Dar Al Maal Islami Trust
g. National Bank of Sharjah
h. HSBC, Dubai
i. National Bank of Dubai
47. United Kingdom
a. Albaraka International Ltd, London
b. Albaraka Investment Co. Ltd, London
c. Al Rajhi Investment Corporation, London
d. Al Safa Investment Fund
e. Bank Sepah, Iran
f. Dallah Al Baraka (UK) Ltd., London
g. Takafol (UK) Ltd, London
h. Barclays Capital
i. HSBC Amanah Finance
j. ABCIB Islamic Asset Management, Arab Banking Corp
48. United Kingdom banks with Islamic windows
a. ABC International Bank, London
b. ANZ International Merchant Banking, London
c. Arab Bank Plc, London
d. Riyadh Bank , London
e. Citibank International Plc, London
f. Cedel International, London
g. Dawnay Day Global Investment Ltd
h. Global Islamic Finance, HSBC Investment Bank Plc
i. Gulf International Bank Bsc, Bahrain
j. The Halal Mutual Investment Company Plc
k. IBJ International, London (Subsidiary of Industrial Bank of Japan)
l. J. Aron & Co. (Goldman Sachs International Finance) Ltd., London
m. Islamic Investment Banking Unit (IIBU), United Bank of Kuwait, London
49. Ireland
a. Al Meezan Commodity Fund Plc, Dublin
b. Jersey, UK (+534)
c. The Islamic Investment Company, St Helier.
d. MFAI (Jersey) Limited (formerly – Massraf Faysal Al-Islami Ltd, Jersey)
50. United States of America
a. Abrar Investments, Inc., Stamford CT
b. Al-Baraka Bancorp Inc. Chicago
c. Al-Madina Realty, Inc., Englewood NJ
d. Al-Manzil Islamic Financial Services
e. Amana Mutual Funds Trust, State St. Bellingham WA
f. Ameen Housing Co-operative, San Francisco
g. American Finance House
h. Bank Sepah, Iran
i. BMI Finance & Investment Group, New Jersey
j. Dow Jones Islamic Index Fund of the Allied Asset Advisors Funds
k. Failaka Investments, Inc., Chicago IL
l. Fuloos Incorporated, Toledo OH
m. Hudson Investors Fund, Inc., Clifton NJ
n. MSI Finance Corporation, Inc., Houston TX
o. Samad Group, Inc., Dayton OH
p. Shared Equities Homes, Indianapolis IN
r. MEF Money, USA
s. Islamic Credit Union of Minnesota, (ICUM)
t. United Mortgage
51. Yemen
a. Islamic Bank of Yemen for Finance and Investment, Sana
b. Saba Islamic Bank, Sana
c. Faisal Islamic Bank
d. Yemen Islamic Bank, Sana
e. Yemen National Investment Co., Sana

APPENDIX-C: Islamic Equity Funds in the World

List of Islamic Equity Funds (www.failaka.com)
Fund Name Fund Manager(s) Fund Promoter(s) Inception Min. Invest
Global Equity Funds
1 Al Baraka Global Equity Mercury Asset Management Al Baraka Investment Bank Dec-97 $25,000
2 Al Rajhi Global Equity UBS Asset Management Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Jul-96 50 Shares
3 Al-Ahli Global Trading Equity Wellington Management Co. LLP National Commercial Bank (NCB) Jan-95 $2,000
4 Al-Bait Global Equity Fremont Investment Advisors Inc. Securities House Apr-00 $50,000
5 Al-Bukhari Global Equity Wafra Investment Advisory Group Wafra Investment Advisory Group Aug-98 $100,000
6 Al-Dar World Equities Pictet & Cie The International Investor/Pictet & Cie Feb-98 $100,000
7 Alfanar Investment Holdings Worms & Cie/SEDCO Permal Asset Management Dec-97 $5,000
8 Al-Firas Global Equity Arab Bank Plc Arab Bank Plc Oct-00 $10,000
9 Al-Kawthar Fund Wellington/Al-Ahli Global Trading Eq. National Bank of Kuwait Jan-95 $10,000
10 Al-Khair Global Equity Fund Pictet & Cie Bank Al-Jazira Sep-98 $5,000
11 Al-Safwa International Equity Roll & Ross Asset Management Al-Tawfeek Co. for Investment Funds May-96 $10,000
12 Arab Investor Crescent Fund Schroder Investment Mgmt Int’l Arab National Bank Apr-99 $5,000
13 Arzaq Investment Fund Global Alliance/Securities House Securities House Mar-98 $50,000
14 Bank Kanz Global Islamic Equity Bank Kanz Bank Kanz N/A $100,000
15 Barclays Global Equity Wellington Management Co. LLP Barclays Private Bank Feb-00 $1,000,000
16 Caravan Fund Wellington Management Co. LLP Commerical Bank of Qatar/BNP Dec-99 $10,000
17 Citi Global Portfolios SSB Citi Asset Management Citi Islamic Investment Bank Oct-97 $10,000
18 Dow Jones Islamic Index Fund Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Wafra Invest. Advisory / AlTawfeeq Jul-99 $10,000
19 Global Equity 2000 Sub-Fund Alliance Capital Management LP First Investment Co Mar-00 $10,000
20 Hegira Global Equity Wellington Management Co. LLP Wellington Management Co. LLP Sep-96 $5,000,000
21 HSBC Amanah Global Equity HSBC Investment Funds (Lux.) SA HSBC Amanah Finance May-00 $5,000
22 Islamic Global Equity * N/A HSBC Bank USA Late 2001 $2,500
23 Miraj Global Equity Royal Bank of Canada Miraj International Investment Ltd. Aug-98 $10,000
24 Musharaka Equity Fund N/A Riyad Bank Jun-97 $10,000
25 Parsoli Global Equity Parosoli Capital & Finance Ltd. Parosoli Capital & Finance Ltd. Jun-01 £1,000
26 QIB Global Equities Global Asset Management (GAM) Qatar Islamic Bank N/A
27 SAMBA Global Equity SAMBA Capital Management SAMBA Capital Management Dec-99 $2,000
28 SUT Ethical Growth Fund Singapore Unit Trust Ltd. Malayan Banking & Daiwa Securities Aug-01 S$1,000
29 SUT Ethical Value Fund Singapore Unit Trust Ltd. Malayan Banking & Daiwa Securities Aug-01 S$1,000
30 TAIB Crescent Global Fund Wright Investors’ Service TAIB Bank of Bahrain Mar-00 $100,00
31 UBS Islamic Fund Global Equities UBS, AG & UBS Brinson UBS Islamic Fund Mgmt Co May-00 $100,000
North American Equity Funds
32 Al-Ahli US Trading Equity INVESCO Capital Mgmt Inc. National Commercial Bank (NCB) Dec-92 $2,000
33 Alfanar US Capital Growth Worms & Cie/SEDCO Permal Asset Management Jun-99 $5,000
34 Alfanar US Capital Value Worms & Cie/SEDCO Permal Asset Management May-99 $5,000
35 Amana Growth * Saturna Capital Saturna Capital Feb-94 $100
36 Amana Income * Saturna Capital Saturna Capital Jun-86 $100
37 Azzad DJIM Index Fund * Azzad Asset Management Azzad Asset Management Dec-00 1,000
38 Azzad Growth Fund LP Azzad Asset Management Azzad Asset Management Feb-98 $50,000
39 Azzad Income Fund Azzad Asset Management Azzad Asset Management Sep-01 $1,000
41 Dow Jones Islamic Index (US) Fund * Allied Asset Advisors Funds Allied Asset Advisors Funds Jun-00 $500
42 SAMI Navigator Nova Bancorp Group Nova Bancorp Group Jul-99 C$500
European Equity Funds
43 Al-Ahli Europe Trading Equity Gulf Int’l Bank (UK) Ltd. National Commercial Bank (NCB) Nov-94 $2,000
44 Al-Dar Europe Equities Pictet & Cie The International Investor/Pictet & Cie Feb-98 $100,000
45 Alfanar Europe Worms & Cie/SEDCO Permal Asset Management Jan-99 $5,000
46 Al-Sukoor European Equity Commerz Int’l Cap Mgmt/Al-Tawfeeq Co. Commerz Bank/Burgan Bank Mar-00 1 Share
47 Al-Thoraiya European Equity Lomard Odier & Cie Bank Al-Jazira Sep-99 $5,000
Small Cap & Technology Equity Funds
48 Al Rajhi Small Companies Franklin Mgmt & Lord Abbott Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Jun-99 200 Shares
49 Al-Ahli Small-Cap Trading Equity Wellington Management Co. LLP National Commercial Bank (NCB) Aug-98 $2,000
50 Alfanar Essex Technology Worms & Cie/SEDCO Permal Asset Management Jun-99 $5,000
51 Orbitex Islamic Comm. & IT Fund Orbitex Management Ltd. Orbitex Management Ltd. Dec-99 $50,000
52 TII Small Cap Equity (European) Pictet & Cie The International Investor Dec-96 $100,000
Balanced, Secured & Other Equity Funds
53 Al Hilal Fund Mercury Asset Management Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) Apr-00 $10,000
54 Al Kawthar Global Equity Secured National Commercial Bank (NCB) National Bank of Kuwait Sep-99 $10,000
55 Al Rajhi Balanced Fund I Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Nov-98 $5,000
56 Al Rajhi Balanced Fund II Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Dec-98 $5,000
57 Al-Ahli Global Equity Secured (Series B) Wellington Management Co. LLP National Commercial Bank (NCB) Nov-99 $25,000
58 Al-Ahli International Equity Secured Deutche Bank National Commercial Bank (NCB) Feb-00 $25,000
59 Al-Ahli US Equity Secured Deutche Bank National Commercial Bank (NCB) Oct-99 $25,000
60 Alkhawarizmi Fund AXA Rosenberg The International Investor Jul-97 $100,000
61 BHLB Pacific Dana Al Mizan (Balanced) BHLB Pacific Trust BHLB Pacific Trust Mar-01 RM 1,000
62 Faysal Shield Fund Banque National de Paris Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain Nov-99 $100,000
63 Mutajarah Fund (Balanced) Swiss Alternative Investment Strategies Group (SAIS) Towry Law International Oct-01 $100,000
64 Profit Sharing Fund (Aman-1) (secured) Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Al Rajhi Banking & Investment N/A $2,000
Emerging Market & Country Equity Funds
65 Al Arabi Saudi Co. Shares Arab National Bank Arab National Bank May-93 SR 10,000
66 Al Rajhi Egypt Equity EFG Hermes Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Jun-97 200 Shares
67 Al Rajhi Local Share Fund Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Jul-92 1 Share
68 Al Rajhi Middle East Equity Bakheet Financial Advisors Al Rajhi Banking & Investment May-98 200 Shares
69 Al-Ahli Saudi Trading Equity Bakheet Financial Advisors National Commercial Bank (NCB) Jun-98 SR 5,000
70 Al-Dar Eastern Europe Equities Pictet & Cie The International Investor/Pictet & Cie Feb-98 $100,000
71 Al-Taiyibat Fund (local share) Bank Al-Jazira Invesmtent Services Bank Al-Jazira Sep-98 SR 10,000
72 First Arabian Equity 2000 N/A First Investment Company N/A
73 Ibn Majid Emerging Markets UBS Brinson The International Investor Nov-95 $100,000
74 Khaled Ibn el-Waleed Fund PrimeCorp. Investment Management Al-Mal Islamic Company N/A
75 Oasis Crescent Fund Oasis Asset Management Ltd. Oasis Asset Management Ltd. Jan-99
76 Parsoli Islamic Equity Parosoli Capital & Finance Ltd. Parosoli Capital & Finance Ltd. 1996
77 Pure Specialist Fund Futuregrowth Unit Trust Management Futuregrowth Unit Trust Management Jun-92 R 200
78 Riyad Equity Fund 2 (Saudi Shares) Riyad Bank Riyad Bank Nov-96 SR 10,000
Asian Equity Funds
79 Al-Ahli Asia Pacific Trading Equity Gulf Int’l Bank (UK) Ltd. National Commercial Bank (NCB) May-00 $2,000
80 Al-Mashariq Japanese Equity Julius Baer Asset Management Bank Al-Jazira Apr-00 $5,000
81 Al-Nukhba Asian Equity Nomura Investment Bank Al-Tawfeek Co. for Investment Funds Jul-98 $10,000
82 Mendaki Global Fund DBS Asset Mgmt Mendaki Holding Pte. Ltd Sep-97 S$1,000
83 Mendaki Global Fund DBS Asset Mgmt Mendaki Holding Pte. Ltd May-91 S$500
Malaysian Equity Funds
84 Abrar Investment Fund Abrar Unit Trust Managers Abrar Unit Trust Managers 1996
85 Amanah Saham Bank Islam BIMB Unit Trust Mgmt Bhd. Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd Jun-94 500 Shares
86 Amanah Saham Darul Iman PTB Amanah Saham Darul Iman PTB Amanah Saham Darul Iman Oct-94
87 Amanah Saham Wanita Hijrah Unit Trust Management Bhd Hijrah Managers Bhd May-98 RM 100
88 BBMB Dana Putra BBMB Unit Trust Management BBMB Unit Trust Management Jun-96
89 BHLB Dana Al-Ihsan BHLB Pacific Trust BHLB Pacific Trust May-98 RM 500
90 Dana Al-Aiman Mara Unit Trust Mara Unit Trust May-68 RM 100
91 Kuala Lumpur Ittikal Fund Kuala Lumpur Mutual Funds Kuala Lumpur Mutual Funds May-97 RM 1,000
92 Mayban Dana Yakin Mayban Mgt Berhad Mayban Mgt Berhad Nov RM 1,000
93 Pacific Dana Amana Pacific Mutual Fund Trust Pacific Mutual Fund Trust Apr-98 RM 1,000
94 RHB Mudarabah Fund RHB Unit Trust Management RHB Unit Trust Management May-96 500 Shares
95 Tabung Amanah Bakti Asia Unit Trust Berhad Tabung Amanah Bakti May-71 RM 500
96 Tabung Ittikal Arab-Malaysian Arab-Malaysian Unit Trusts Bhd Arab-Malaysian Unit Trusts Bhd Jan-93 500 Shares
Islamic Bonds (Sukuk) Funds
97 RHB Islamic Bond RHB Unit Trust Mgt RHB Unit Trust Mgt Jun-00 RM 1,000
98 Kuala Lumper Islamic Bond Fund Kuala Lumper Mutual Funds Kuala Lumper Mutual Funds Aug-01 RM 1,000
99 Dahlia Syariah Income Fund Mayban Life Assurance Bhd. Mayban Life Assurance Bhd. Aug-01 RM 1,000

APPENDIX-D: The Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes
Descriptive Statistics Market Capitalization Data (USD Billion) Component Weight (%)
Index Name Component Number Full Float-adjusted Mean Median Largest Smallest Largest Smallest
Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 1,422 7,603.2 6,591.6 4.6 0.8 234.2 0.0 3.55 0.00
Dow Jones Islamic Market Titans 100 Index 100 4,806.6 4,391.8 43.9 27.5 234.2 4.2 5.33 0.10
Dow Jones Islamic Market Europe Index 271 2,004.2 1,634.2 6.0 0.9 142.1 0.0 8.70 0.00
Dow Jones Islamic Market Asia/ Pacific Index 479 980.2 631.3 1.3 0.4 30.9 0.0 4.89 0.00
Dow Jones Islamic Market Technology Index 292 1,504.5 1,336.5 4.6 0.6 223.4 0.0 16.71 0.00
Dow Jones Islamic Market Canada Index 65 111.0 83.1 1.3 0.7 8.5 0.1 10.28 0.06
Dow Jones Islamic Market Japan Index 192 574.7 401.4 2.1 0.7 30.9 0.0 7.69 0.00
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.K. Index 101 723.7 710.3 7.0 0.9 142.1 0.1 20.01 0.01
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 572 4,456.5 4,209.5 7.4 1.4 234.2 0.1 5.56 0.00

Performance Price Return (%) Annualized Price Return (%)
Index Name 1-Month YTD 2002 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 0.50 -3.78 -22.59 -24.93 -23.32 -4.34
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 0.85 -4.15 -23.31 -25.18 -21.86 -4.26
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index -0.57 -8.18 -18.27 -24.44 -22.09 -6.77
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index -3.31 -6.90 -13.95 -22.90 -27.26 0.01
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index -1.71 -2.48 -39.18 -36.71 -39.45 -6.83
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index -2.11 2.49 -22.75 -17.92 -30.87 -6.92
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index -3.63 -7.61 -9.25 -19.35 -28.80 0.69
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 0.55 -7.84 -9.25 -19.35 -28.80 0.69
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 1.69 -1.47 -25.71 -25.61 -22.64 -4.01

Fundamentals P/E (including negative) P/E (excluding negative)
Index Name Trailing Projected Trailing Projected P/B Dividend Yield (%) P/ Sales P/ Cash Flow
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 18.42 16.60 19.59 16.91 3.08 1.80 1.42 11.95
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 22.24 18.36 19.40 16.91 3.04 1.98 1.75 12.34
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 15.43 14.13 16.10 14.45 2.46 2.88 1.14 9.56
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 17.29 16.66 19.76 17.18 2.11 1.88 1.24 10.28
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 22.88 19.31 22.87 19.55 3.12 0.61 1.73 14.35
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 21.79 14.32 19.14 14.32 2.06 0.66 1.52 9.07
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 32.03 18.84 24.58 18.84 1.69 0.94 1.06 10.62
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 54.03 26.97 14.96 13.77 1.49 3.09 1.08 9.32
Dow Jones Islamic Market U.S. Index 21.16 18.33 21.56 18.33 3.96 1.36 1.70 13.78

Appendix-E1: Assets, Deposits and Loans of 53 Conventional local Banks in GCC (US$ Millions)
Source: Research Unit of the Institute of Banking Studies, Kuwait
Assets Deposits Loans
Bank/ Year 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 7,241.24 6,889.63 6,280.50 5,679.71 5,426.96 4,945.30 4453.6 4703.2 4050
AlAhli Bank of Kuwait 3,859.42 3,772.11 3,818.22 3,254.46 3,163.51 3,210.13 1769.6 1625.1 1679.1
Al-Ahli Bank of Qatar 581.10 720.41 732.53 512.78 654.00 644.62 291.88 333.93 364.73
Al-Ahli United Bank 4,102.72 3,512.35 865.97 3,145.19 2,740.21 713.02 1882.7 1766.3 526.82
Al-Bank Al-Saudi Al-Fransi 10,681.64 10,146.85 8,668.23 9,101.41 8,767.28 7,438.68 4479.7 4304.2 3853.5
Arab Bank for Inv. & Foreign Trade 1,572.79 1,509.88 1,435.01 1,215.31 1,130.05 1,060.83 348.92 336.1 336.83
Arab Banking Corporation 26,586.00 26,676.00 24,358.00 21,544.00 21,758.00 20,158.00 14225 14039 12903
Arab National Bank 10,784.30 10,052.71 9,466.77 9,196.05 8,714.86 8,360.40 3948.5 3715.3 3445.9
Bahrain International Bank 887.52 1,039.53 966.81 365.95 339.63 353.76 12.36 16.85 17.56
Bahrain Middle East Bank 512.83 620.85 655.58 189.53 271.86 267.56 14.53 12.53 13.12
Bahraini Saudi Bank 595.40 529.86 424.86 482.11 424.52 327.14 329.15 323.31 266.64
Bank Al-Jazira 1,364.41 1,383.23 1,322.26 1,154.20 1,178.03 1,133.66 568.59 556.85 460.65
Bank Dhofar Al-Omani Al-Fransi 876.61 708.80 680.34 737.09 581.51 556.10 705.96 553.35 513.15
Bank Muscat 3,501.86 3,477.18 1,942.10 2,901.22 2,927.21 1,661.78 2855.9 2592.1 1514.1
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait 2,928.57 2,815.42 2,734.25 2,322.70 2,190.26 2,094.25 1278.7 1328.3 1344.8
Bank of Kuwait & Middle East 3,519.18 3,379.74 2,949.60 2,941.91 2,800.08 2,434.47 1383.7 1209.4 1095.4
Bank of Sharjah 524.82 514.15 465.52 409.31 404.25 363.43 280.43 298.04 266.81
Burgan Bank 4,839.90 3,721.98 3,777.05 3,994.08 3,141.46 3,195.10 1861.2 1644.5 1545.4
Commercial Bank International 651.76 542.28 469.55 548.74 450.96 390.47 469.47 400.4 357.94
Commercial Bank of Dubai 2,002.46 1,945.28 1,697.09 1,609.16 1,566.68 1,355.11 1237.2 1276.9 1239.7
Commercial Bank of Kuwait 5,504.05 5,056.48 4,530.84 4,278.49 3,822.62 3,646.12 2856 2377.4 1946.3
Commercial Bank of Qatar 1,430.77 1,391.51 1,274.92 1,102.22 1,064.76 1,026.26 749.87 667.37 627.37
Doha Bank 1,786.99 1,514.04 1,391.18 1,562.85 1,325.92 1,227.07 907.97 772.01 746.96
Emirates Bank International 6,405.88 5,335.05 5,605.89 4,622.91 3,671.30 4,554.79 4669.5 3062.9 4049.4
First Gulf Bank 937.99 652.11 556.94 762.82 489.69 408.61 466.91 382.45 356.51
Gulf Bank 6,114.70 5,413.48 5,840.87 5,246.43 4,626.97 5,069.92 3213.5 3067.3 2259.4
Gulf International Bank 15,232.00 15,119.50 15,679.40 10,949.70 11,414.50 11,462.40 3309.4 3923.1 4038
Industrial Bank of Kuwait 1,338.88 1,153.60 1,149.35 160.83 427.13 334.69 334.81 279.53 242.26
Investment Bank 700.28 676.03 607.64 549.59 534.58 478.41 465.6 434.71 399.66
Kuwait Real Estate Bank 2,151.98 2,117.96 1,788.29 1,403.49 1,342.08 1,092.75 1316.9 1192.9 1385.6
Mashreq Bank 6,181.22 6,014.33 5,442.62 5,113.20 5,049.63 4,524.65 2849 2941.5 3039.8
Middle East Bank 673.25 659.81 592.90 467.88 470.06 421.34 324.95 332.13 355.45
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 8,782.33 9,921.12 8,526.32 7,550.78 8,758.01 7,520.84 5538.4 5259.4 4559.7
National Bank of Bahrain 2,867.93 2,753.40 2,628.11 2,426.49 2,280.39 2,078.90 1200.3 1150.2 1068.2
National Bank of Dubai 8,893.32 7,664.57 6,784.70 7,514.11 6,329.01 5,480.48 1957.3 1902.2 1869.6
National Bank of Fujairah 717.79 752.42 667.25 554.03 594.20 522.26 412.89 436.3 386.13
National Bank of Kuwait 14,553.07 13,401.85 12,482.31 12,484.89 11,461.41 10,579.95 5089.3 4580.3 4245.7
National Bank of Oman 2,471.76 2,120.60 2,163.62 2,082.72 1,667.79 1,696.13 1871.3 1670.8 1599
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah 659.93 508.06 492.12 504.75 358.91 346.02 480.34 371.84 358.38
National Bank of Sharjah 557.38 505.20 423.17 355.05 346.67 289.76 355.44 362.01 332.03
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 466.00 461.81 478.03 327.56 328.07 346.73 315.35 317.33 329.05
Oman Arab Bank 832.49 718.40 685.22 705.77 594.36 571.16 600.01 591.42 550.62
Oman Housing Bank 429.18 429.15 444.56 16.36 23.08 80.86 412.99 421.62 435.05
Oman International Bank 1,748.80 1,921.68 2,172.34 1,295.70 1,423.04 1,656.34 1187.6 1332 1456.9
Qatar National Bank 7,795.86 6,763.51 6,141.24 6,416.61 5,444.03 4,934.41 5234.8 3744.3 3982.1
Riyad Bank 17,931.71 17,494.69 17,188.55 14,728.05 14,572.26 14,298.21 5657.3 5473.5 5165.6
Saudi American Bank 20,621.20 21,543.73 20,546.25 17,618.37 18,051.68 17,404.47 8984.2 8418 8452.9
Saudi British Bank 11,192.84 11,521.39 9,939.69 9,700.65 10,153.44 8,622.26 4277.5 4620.6 4338
Saudi Hollandi Bank 6,720.04 5,713.56 5,054.27 5,878.18 5,004.67 4,455.20 3067.3 2676.4 2454.2
Saudi Investment Bank 4,072.27 3,634.40 3,525.94 3,340.74 2,973.05 2,944.47 2009.7 2000.6 1885.8
Union National Bank 3,612.72 3,300.15 2,682.51 3,169.94 2,879.03 2,324.94 2155.7 2029.5 1788
United Arab Bank 484.50 464.59 411.46 358.74 350.17 310.47 364.86 341.22 321.91
United Gulf Bank 931.15 712.32 733.01 443.27 385.48 448.08 78.85 93.45 99.73

Appendix-E2: Assets, Deposits and Loans of 8 Islamic local Banks in GCC (All figures are in US$ Millions)
Source: Research Unit of the Institute of Banking Studies, Kuwait

Assets Deposits Loans
Bank/ Year 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. 13,815.03 12,997.68 11,448.90 10,542.35 9,785.78 8,661.74 11,275.91 10,520.67 9,243.73
Kuwait Finance House 7,733.64 6,632.26 5,817.23 5,779.20 5,065.40 4,388.63 5,875.00 4,937.21 4,092.62
Dubai Islamic Bank 4,175.44 3,205.90 2,543.70 3,573.03 2,661.05 2,077.63 3,399.98 2,595.28 2,096.63
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 1,664.61 1,188.18 725.72 1,167.26 804.43 408.24 1,460.42 1,038.86 648.05
Shamil Bank of Bahrain 1,241.90 1,316.34 1,092.05 58.19 64.73 44.3 677.92 580.08 555.91
Qatar Islamic Bank 1,212.82 1,115.02 1,094.23 1,003.48 910.66 902.34 974.20 940.30 860.66
Qatar International Islamic Bank 741.67 576.29 505.45 613.95 467.64 419.24 654.38 507.29 439.33
Bahrain Islamic Bank 508.47 516.85 414.86 401.54 408.57 366.26 406.30 417.60 354.87